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ABSTRACT

INNOVATION AND INCLUSION IN THE ARMED FORCES
Shira Eini Pindyck
Alexander Weisiger

Military organizations around the world often struggle to integrate and utilize innovative
changes in tactics and technology that would save lives and enhance military power. This
dissertation explains why the integration of innovations often encounters resistance. I argue that
resistance is most likely when innovations disrupt existing gender hierarchies. Accounting for the
relationship between gender and changes in warfare can help us understand why some
innovations are harder to integrate and why some militaries struggle more than others to integrate
them. Such changes can also influence the inclusion (or exclusion) regimes of militaries.
This dissertation builds a broad theory of military innovation and gender. It tests the
theory through a nested case comparison of the integration of two military innovations that
challenge the gender status quo by reducing exposure to risk and the need for physical strength:
(1) drones by the Israel Air Force and Artillery Corps, and (2) population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN) by the Turkish Armed Forces and Australian Defense Force. For each
case, I rely on interviews with military personnel and defense experts, as well as the analysis of
government documents, military journals, news articles, field manuals, and other primary sources.
I find that in both cases military organizations with higher degrees of inclusion (the Israel Air
Force and Australian Defense Force) more effectively integrated new innovations than military
organizations that were less inclusive. Finally, I develop and utilize an original dataset of
Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) across all NATO-member and partner countries
from 1991 to 2016 to examine whether innovation integration drives gender inclusion reform.
Given that data on gender in militaries worldwide is limited and often inconsistent, the collection
viii

of new data required a close analysis of government reports submitted to the NATO Committee
on Gender Perspectives and a range of other primary sources for each country-year. The results
show that innovative change is an important factor in understanding why and when gender policy
reforms take place. This study suggests that policymakers and scholars interested in military
innovation and its influence on the future security environment must account for the role of
gender.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
The rise of railroads and steamships in the nineteenth century made possible the rapid
movement of people, goods, and services across greater distances. For military organizations, this
meant not only that soldiers could travel to battlefields further away, but also that that medical
and logistical services could travel to support them. Railroads and steamships revolutionized the
speed, scale, and scope of military operations. As demonstrated by General Ulysses S. Grant’s
grand strategy for the Army of the Potomac in 1864 – a strategy of attack, attack, and attack –
battles now occurred only days apart. And by the end of the Civil War, wounded soldiers could
be moved by railroad to larger tent hospitals and then to by boat to hospitals in northern cities
(Bollet 2002, 5).
As militaries sought to integrate steam power into their operational planning, they found that
they faced a pressing need for military engineers and logisticians, who had to be recruited, and
then had to be promoted in rank in order to be retained. This change, however, created resentment
and dissatisfaction among traditional army and navy officers. Whereas traditional officers were
trained in combat operations, engineers and logisticians were responsible for providing services
to support such operations. In the 1850s and 1860s, Prussian traditionalists “made no effort to
hide their distain” for General Staff engineers struggling to manage an effective rail system
(Herrera 2006, 9). As I will explain in the pages to come, militaries rely on clear hierarchies that
have traditionally prioritized combat operations, physical strength, bravery, and exposure to risk.
However, the integration of railroads and steamships would place engineers and logisticians in
positions of authority, with the possibility that some of them could become high-ranking officers
without having to face the risks of combat. This development chaffed the sensibility of traditional
officers, who thought of themselves as the “real” warriors.
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In response, military organizations established clear guidelines for rank, promotion, and
prestige that clearly differentiated “line” and “engineering” officers. In particular, engineering
officers were not eligible for positions of operational command outside of their specialty. In the
Imperial German Navy, for example, engineering officers were sent to a separate school, were not
allowed to dine in the (traditional) officers’ mess, wore uniforms without the imperial crowns and
sashes sported by regular officers, and “had to endure the indignity of having their wives
addressed as ‘women,’ not ‘ladies’” (Boot 2006, 465). In other words, the emergence of railroads
and steamships created the need for personnel with a different set of skills than those of
traditional warriors. In differentiating these positions inside the military hierarchy, the technical
personnel were degraded through a process best described as feminization. Gender is often used
as a signifier of power. While masculinity is valorized, femininity is viewed as subordinate and
feminization is associated with domination and humiliation (Sjoberg 2013; Sjoberg et al 2018,
851).
Railroads and steamships are examples of innovations that profoundly affected the structure
and operation of military organizations. Such innovations offered clear advantages to militaries
interested in enhancing their relative power but also challenged internal hierarchies and thus were
difficult to integrate. Many other innovations would follow – each creating not only a significant
impact on the conduct of warfare, but also severe organizational and operational strains when
they required the elevation noncombat roles such as those of logisticians, engineers, and medical
professionals. These tensions have typically been addressed – as in the example above – by
establishing clear delineations of prestige that preserve the primacy of combat and masculine
traits such as strength and bravery (Enloe 1983, 2000, 2004). To return to the example of
steamships, it took half a century after the adoption of steam power for the U.S. Navy to merge
“line” and “engineering officers,” and the process took even longer in the more aristocratic
2

German and British navies (Boot 2006, 465). To put a finer point on it, in many military
organizations, combat support services such as logistics have historically remained one the most
undervalued areas of employment, “feminized” both because of their marginalization, and
because they were some of the first domains populated by female personnel.1
However, as innovations increase the need for combat support, and the inversion of what is
referred to as the “tooth to tail” ratio, the feminization of non-combat roles introduces a series of
challenges.2 This study addresses three central questions. First, why are some military
innovations harder than others to successfully integrate and utilize? Second, how do militaries
address the various challenges to the integration and use of innovations? Related to this, what
specific actions can militaries take to improve the chances of successful integration? And third,
do certain innovations tend to make militaries more inclusive?
The answer I provide for when and why militaries will successfully integrate innovations has
to do with organizational flexibility and inclusivity. Organizational flexibility and openness to a
different set of routines, practices, culture, personnel, and general hierarchy will make it easier to
address the challenges associated with innovative change. This flexibility is most clearly
demonstrated by organizations that invest resources in recruiting and retaining of a more
inclusive fighting force – making a military environment more institutionally hospitable to
soldiers regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.

1

Other marginalized groups have been historically “shunted to less-prestigious logistical or labor units” as
Soldiers trained to engage in combat are often referred to often as the “teeth” of the force. Soldiers whose
roles involve combat supporting and sustaining the combat troops and overall strategic effort are referred to
as the “tail.” The subsequent ratio between combat and support is often called the “tooth to tail” (Baker
2020).
22
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The integration of innovations, such as railroads and steamships, relies on logistical support
to ensure that soldiers travel to where they need to be, when they need to be there, and with the
resources they need be used. How can innovations integrated effectively if the personnel
responsible for such tasks have limited authority within a military organization? This study
argues that they cannot. Combat troops are often prioritized at the expense of increasing one’s
logistical footprint and contractors lack the security clearance to be involved in operational
planning, hampering the ability for soldiers to arrive where they need to be, when they need to be
there, and with the necessary tools to perform the task at hand.
The theory briefly outlined below, and in more detail in Chapter 2, hinges on the
understanding that any analysis of the political world is incomplete without accounting for
dimensions of both privilege and disadvantage. In particular, this study considers the dimension
of gender as critical to answering salient questions that have driven a wealth of research in
international security. While traditional theories of war and conflict take gendered assumptions
and hierarchies for granted, feminist approaches seek to bring attention to the narratives of
security that such theories ignore or even obfuscate (Wibben 2010).3 Feminist approaches use sex
and gender as lenses and analytical categories through which to examine and understand the
causes and consequences of war.4 Bridging the gap between traditional security studies and
gender analysis is an endeavor significantly aided by previous work demonstrating, for example,
how gendered narratives frame the behavior, treatment, and strategic utilization of both

3

Conventional theories of world politics have historically perpetuated assumption of universality based on
masculine characteristics and experiences, leaving little room for analyses of gender relations. Gender and
feminist thought has been largely marginalized in international relations, with feminist scholarship
diverging over whether or not to reject or build upon mainstream, positivist methodologies in service of
feminist questions (Ackerly et al. 2006, 1-4; Sjoberg 2013).
4
There has been significant criticism of quantitative research that conflates sex and gender (Sjoberg,
Kadera, and Thies 2018), making it harder to identify individuals with (and draw conclusions on) particular
sexual variables (Browne and Nash 2010), and challenging the analytical power of findings (Cohen and
Karim 2021).
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combatants (Thomas and Bond 2015) and peacekeepers (Karim and Beardsley 2013) on the basis
of their sex, as well as how combatants are socialized (Cohen 2016).
In the context of military innovation, the consequences of accounting for gender are critical
for analyses of organizational behavior and military effectiveness, as well as for the design and
evaluation of policy changes. This study makes what some readers may very well take to be a
bold claim: Militaries that invest in gender inclusion may be better equipped to not only make
salient organizational changes, but also to implement such changes on the battlefield in a manner
that enhances their relative power. In contrast to Van Creveld’s (2000) warning that gender
inclusion will be detrimental for the effectiveness of operations, Lyall (2020) demonstrates how
inequality can hamper battlefield performance. While Lyall focuses on inequalities associated
with ethnicity and race, he acknowledges that accounting for other dimensions –such as gender,
class, and ideology – may similarly strengthen our understanding of military effectiveness (2020,
419).5 Indeed, as exemplified by my analysis of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) in Chapter
4, occupational exclusions on the basis of sex can significantly limit the ability of militaries to
implement salient innovative changes. This study demonstrates that militaries that are more
gender inclusive are better able to integrate and effectively utilize the kinds of innovations that
may be necessary for military success in the 21st century.
WHAT DOES GENDER HAVE TO DO WITH MILITARY INNOVATION?
In the modern international system, the ability to generate military power and thus gain
advantages over other states is of immense interest to scholars and political actors alike.6

5

He notes, however, that given that these identities are non-ethnic, they “lack ascriptive traits” and are
thereby “harder for states to target group members” (Lyall 2020, 419, fn 39). I would contest, however,
regarding the degree to which sex and gender identity fail to constitute ascriptive traits.
6
The generation of military power is an important component of prominent theories in international
relations and security, ranging from those concerning the behavior of great powers (Mearsheimer 2001), to
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Unsurprisingly, considerable scholarship examines why, when, and where military innovations
occur, how they spread, and the forms of resistance they encounter.7 Much of this literature
focuses on the challenge of organizational change when the welfare and prestige of its personnel
and other stakeholders are threatened (Grissom 2006). However, this literature ignores what I
argue is a key and highly relevant factor – that of gender. The organizational structures, methods
of operations, and identities of military organizations are closely intertwined with a gender
regime that distinguishes between men and women, prioritizing combat, physical strength,
courage, and more generally, masculinity over feminity. The elevation of traits such as physical
strength and courage produces gender hierarchies within military organizations, associating men
and masculinity with acts of heroism in war as protectors and women and femininity with
supporting efforts and the need for protection (Elshtain 1987; Goldstein 2001). Yet, broad
changes in the conduct of warfare can disrupt or reinforce such hierarchies. In particular,
innovations that undercut the importance of physical strength and courage challenge the existing
hierarchy, and hence are likely to face opposition from those who benefit from and have
internalized the norms of that hierarchy. When culture and promotion pathways differentially
reward recruits’ willingness to fight and risk their life, innovations that minimize exposure to
danger and the importance of physical strength can be challenging to integrate effectively.
I argue that the degree to which a military organization invests in recruiting and retaining a
gender-inclusive force will influence its resilience to the integration of disruptive innovations.
Militaries that invest in institutional commitments to inclusion – for example through the

state formation (Lake and Mahony 2004), to civil conflict dynamics (Buhaug and Gates 2002) – to name a
few.
7
Posen (1984) and Rosen (1991), for example, have theorized about when militaries are likely to innovate
(albeit with some disagreement regarding what the drivers of innovation are). For a broad discussion of the
breadth and limitations of military innovation literature see Griffin 2017, Grissom 2006, and Horowitz and
Pindyck 2020.
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reduction of occupational restrictions based on sex or sexual orientation, the expansion of family
programs, and sexual assault and harassment monitoring – are more likely to have the needed
flexibility to elevate the roles that fall outside of the combat warrior framework, and will have
greater success with the integration of innovations that challenge traditional gender hierarchies.
On the other hand, military organizations with low levels of gender inclusion will find it more
difficult to integrate innovations that elevate noncombat positions. I expect to see such military
organizations reassert existing hierarchies and perform maneuvers to maintain a male definition
of combat. Such maneuvers include the organized and strategic use of gender differences,
resulting in the professionalization of gender segregation. And that segregation can in turn hinder
the successful integration of important innovations.
I also argue that innovation has a longer-term influence on gender policy reform in militaries:
gender inclusion may both affect – and be affected by – the adoption of innovations. Many
military innovations have increased the reliance on experts for the development and operation of
complex weapon systems, and these experts have becoming a growing share of combat and
service support positions in the total military labor force. This shift has also contributed to the
fragmentation of many specialties, which are often segregated on the basis of gender difference
(Carreiras 2006). Thus, I argue that military innovation is an important driver of gender inclusion
reforms. As wars are conducted at a distance and military operations become less dependent on
hand-to-hand combat, industrial nations with advanced militaries increasingly rely on
technological skills rather than physical strength or bravery in the face of personal risk. This shift
has weakened any arguments supporting the exclusion of female personnel from military work
(Kennedy-Pipe 2000).
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DEFINITIONS
Before going any further, some conceptual clarifications are in order. What exactly
constitutes a “military innovation?” And what do we mean when we talk about “gender
inclusion?”
WHAT IS A MILITARY INNOVATION?
Military innovations, at their core, are changes that offer the promise of enhancing a
military’s ability to use, or threaten to use, organized violence to achieve its objectives.
Innovations are tools and technologies, and can be used effectively or ineffectively. Thus, it is
what a military does with an innovation that matters when it comes to projecting power and
winning wars (Biddle 2004; Horowitz 2010). While there is a tendency to associate innovations
with changes in technology or hardware, such as rifles, tanks, or bombers, innovations can also
take the form of tactical and doctrinal shifts in the manner in which soldiers fight (Farrell 2010).
In order for such changes to be adopted and applied, however, they require organizational support
and processes (Horowitz 2010).
Prior theorizing about the conditions needed for militaries to innovate and for innovations to
be adopted and diffuse fails to agree upon a common theoretical understanding of what
constitutes a military innovation (Horowitz and Pindyck 2020). This confusion often arises
because of attempts to explain what are essentially different things. While some scholars consider
military innovations to be major changes that require a significant organizational restructuring
(Rosen 1988, 134; Serena 2011, 9; Farrell 2013, 6-7), others group innovations with smaller
adaptations (Adamsky and Bjerga 2012, 188; Kollars 2014). Often, scholarship is explaining
different stages of a broader innovation process – such as, for example, the invention of a new
technology or a period of bottom-up experimentation of the battlefield (Horowitz and Pindyck
2020).
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This study adopts the process-driven framework of military innovation offered by Horowitz
and Pindyck (2020). Here, military innovations are defined as “changes in the conduct of warfare
designed to increase the ability of a military community to generate power” (17). This
framework, like that of Mahnken (2011), considers a military innovation to be a process with
distinct phases (303). In this analysis I focus on the stage after a military decides to adopt an
innovation. Once a decision is taken, it is clear that a military has invested financial and
organizational resources into ensuring that the innovation can be utilized (Horowitz 2010). The
next step is to integrate the change across the organization so that it can in fact be utilized
effectively. There is a difference between handing a new weapon to a commander to use on the
battlefield and ensuring that the commander is sufficiently trained to utilize the weapon. Indeed,
the definition of military innovation used here emphasizes that innovations are designed to
increase military power, but may very well fail to do so. As other scholars have noted, the
acquisition of new military capabilities by itself does not account for the role other variables can
have on battlefield success and subsequent shifts in the balance of power (Biddle 2017; Biddle
and Long 2004; Rosen 1995; Reiter and Stam 1998; Talmadge 2015). The reshaping of the U.S.
Army for possible nuclear warfare on Eastern European (and possibly Soviet) battlefields in the
1950s, for example, did not result in an increase in military power (Bacevich 1986).
As I will explain in Chapter 2, the challenges that militaries face at the stage of integration
illustrates how existing theories of military innovation are insufficient. These challenges raise
several important questions: Why do militaries often struggle to adopt and implement innovations
in which they have invested, and that they know can provide huge benefits if they are indeed
utilized effectively? How do militaries successfully integrate across their organization disruptive
innovations they have already adopted?
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It is important to stress that this is not a study of what makes militaries more likely to
innovate. It is instead a study of what happens after innovation occurs. While other studies
examine what drives innovation or what causes innovations to diffuse, this study focuses on how
militaries go on to integrate innovations across their organizations. What militaries do with an
innovation and whether they are able to effectively utilize it is arguably of equal if not greater
importance than the decision to adopt the innovation. Indeed, the impact of a military innovation
on battlefield success or on or the international political landscape more broadly depends on the
organization and the actions it takes to effectively harness the innovation to enhance its military
power. For example, despite the German introduction of the tank in World War I, it would be the
German integration of the tank with maneuver tactics in the form of blitzkrieg that would create
the more effective implementation of the weapon.
WHAT DOES “INCLUSION” MEAN?
This study defines inclusion as the implementation of institutional policy reforms directed
towards recruiting and retaining a more gender inclusive force. When military organizations take
institutional steps towards building a “gender inclusive” force, there are a variety of ways in
which such inclusion can be interpreted.8 Some scholars, for example, define gender inclusion as
simply the integration of women as enlisted members of a military, and would argue that a higher
percentage of women implies more gender inclusion. But others consider gender inclusion to
depend on dimensions of sexual orientation and gender identity, or on a military’s awareness and
attention to broader gendered hierarchies and inequalities.9
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Karim and Hill (2018) observe a similar lack of clarity surrounding the term “gender equality” and how
its use in research has resulted in conceptual stretching and imprecise theory building.
9
For example, while Segal (1995) conceptualizes inclusion as the degree of representation of women in the
military and the nature of their participation, Carreiras (2006) and Obradovic (2014) use indexes of gender
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Women and war
Women’s labor has been a crucial yet often unrecognized and unacknowledged component of
military operations throughout history. Militaries have sought to harness such labor in ways that
would not threaten masculinized military culture – by hiring women as civilians, segregating
women into auxiliary forces, and carefully delimiting women’s roles once they were integrated
into the regular military. Female personnel were directed to jobs similar to those they might be
expected to do in the civilian workforce (such as clerical work), or tasks previously restricted to
men that were “devalued in men’s eyes” (Williams 1989, 43). In other words, military
organizations have historically recruited women to fill positions that are not high up on the
military’s professional hierarchy, ensuring that women remain unequal. Placing women in such
roles ensures that manpower needs are met, and also that gender-subordination persists (Sjoberg
2007, 84).
For example, in 1967 Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) implemented a new policy that
allowed women to serve in support positions.10 The following year, the SDF founded the
Women’s Army Corps to provide intelligence, communications, and supply capabilities. One of
the key arguments in favor of this decision was that increased investments in new technologies
would mitigate “women’s lesser physical strength through their application of attention to detail

inclusiveness, considering not only percentages of female personnel but also areas of policy realignment to
promote gender equality. Soules (2020) focuses solely on the removal of combat restrictions. Whitworth
(2004) conceptualizes inclusion across not just sex but also dimensions of race, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation: masculine ideals are fostered through a resistance to “the inclusion of the ‘other’ within their
ranks, whether that be members of ‘other’ ethnic or racial groups, gay men and lesbians, or women” (162).
10
Japanese women had previously only occupied positions of nurses, or were conscripted for war work and
fire-fighting brigades. Unlike many Western militaries, women were never trained in service or
administrative specialties to supplement or replace male soldiers (Wiegand 1982, 179). In the reconstituted,
post World War II Japanese military, women have served a symbolic role, reassuring the international
community of the protective and nonaggressive nature of the contemporary SDF. As the SDF attempted to
differentiate itself from the Imperial Army, strengthen ties with U.S. military organization, and not appear
behind European social development, women were increasingly incorporated (Sankey 2018; Sato 2012).
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and organizational skill to sophisticated machines” (Sankey 2018, 154). Given these efforts
towards integration, was Japan’s SDF an “inclusive” military? Women were actively recruited to
fill personnel needs, but the rationale for such participation was made on the basis of the
difference of personnel on the basis of their sex (Kirby and Shepherd 2016). Women were
directed towards task-oriented roles that treated them as “sophisticated machines,” rather than as
“warriors” whose strength and bravery serve as promotion pathways within military institutions.
As discussed in Chapter 2, such associations of work lacking in prestige with feminine traits (thus
making it purportedly well suited for women) are evident throughout the course of history.
In short, jobs within military organizations are often “maneuvered” to incorporate women in
a manner that maintains existing gendered hierarchies (Enloe 2000). Thus, the ability of women
to enlist and serve need not represent a substantive change in gender relations (Sasson-Levy
2011; Dharmpuri 2011). Alternatively, personnel may serve in a highly masculine, and often
sexualized organizational culture that is hostile to women and LGBTQ+ members, and conducive
to incidents of sexual harassment and assault. In other words, the mere presence of women does
not necessarily mitigate concerns about gender stereotypes and alter gender hierarchies and the
culture within security institutions. It is not necessarily the case that increasing the number of
women in an organization will make the organization more inclusive.
Identity, sexuality, and military masculinity
A military’s reliance on female labor has an important relationship with organizational
hierarchies that privilege masculine characteristics over those perceived as feminine (Enloe 1989;
Sjoberg 2013; Tickner 1999). However, the construction of such hierarchies extends beyond
distinctions on the basis of sex. Institutionalized exclusions and policies also lead to a narrow,
gendered interpretation of what a “warrior” looks like. Such constructions portray idealized,
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masculine soldiers as capable of conducting physically strenuous and challenging tasks at great
risk to their own health and safety (Goldstein 2001).
Gendered hierarchies are also evident in the decisions that military leaders make around
strategy, tactics, logistics, and the recruitment and reward of personnel, as well as in broader
discourses surrounding warfare (Enloe 1983; Peterson 2010; Sjoberg 2013; Cohn 2013). While
gender need not operate as a binary (male/female, masculine/feminine), military organizations
overwhelmingly interpret it as such (Shepherd 2008). Militaries foster desired and dichotomous
masculine ideals by disparaging differences and the exclusion of personnel within their ranks on
the basis of (but not limited to) dimensions of race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and sex
(Whitworth 2004; Herbert 1998, 79; Herzog 2019; Shafir and Peled 2002). Military personnel
who are able to claim authority within the military often do so by adopting a specific set of norms
and perspectives, preserving and perpetuating a gendered system of hegemonic masculinity
(Belkin 2012; Sjoberg 2007).
Thus, policies that address heteronormativity and other gendered issues inform a military’s
broader investment in institutional, gender-based change (Hagen 2016). Such investment includes
attention to the social structures and stereotypes pervasive in militaries, including the needs of
military families and individual soldiers seeking maternity or paternity leave, accountability
mechanisms directed towards the prevention and/or prosecution of sexual assault and harassment,
and the indiscriminate treatment of soldiers regardless of their sexual orientation and gender
identity. However, it is important to note that such policies do not by themselves alter the
pervasive and persistent power structures within military organizations. Indeed, as I argue in
Chapter 2, altering or changing gender hierarchies also requires a reevaluation of the skills and
characteristics that are rewarded and promoted within military organizations.
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Policy vs. practice
Is gender inclusion, then, the process of taking into considerations the implications of
gendered hierarchies for all military personnel, and adjusting the organization accordingly? This
question raises an important distinction between de jure institutional changes and de facto shifts
in practice. For example, a more “gender aware” organization will not necessarily result in
increased recruitment of female personnel if, for example, there are more appealing work
opportunities for women in other civilian sectors.11 As a case in point, the Netherlands and
Sweden have made substantial efforts to integrate gender perspectives in the field of operations.
Both countries’ military organizations have taken institutional steps to mainstream a gender
perspective through training as well as the establishment of specific gender-related functions,
such as gender field advisors. Here, the implications of any planned legislation, policies, and/or
programs are assessed on the basis of their implications for women and men (Kronsell 2012, 1356). However, both countries have been unable to recruit women in substantial numbers; in 2014
the Netherlands armed forces were only 9.3 percent female, and the Swedish armed forces only
7.9 percent female (NATO 2016, 10, fig. 8). In comparison, in 2014, 14.3 percent of the
Canadian and 15.2 percent of the U.S. armed forces were female (NATO 2016, 10, fig. 8).
The low recruitment of women in the Netherlands and Sweden suggests that it takes time to
alter not only the organizational culture and promotion patterns within military organizations, but
also external popular perceptions that affect recruitment. Limited representation of female
personnel, for example, may limit the possibility of substantial shifts in culture or conduct
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In the same vein, percentages tell us very little about areas of policy realignment and the presence or
absence of government policies (Carreiras 2006). A military may report higher percentages of women in
the force but also severely restrict the positions they can hold.
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(Dahlerup 2006; Kanter 1977).12 And it is not just how many women are serving that matters, but
also in what positions. A military may take steps to be aware of gender issues, but still promote
and award soldiers on their demonstration of masculine characteristics such as physical strength
and exposure to risk, while limiting the opportunities for women to actually serve in positions that
require strength or expose to risk. Women serving in positions of leadership along promotion
pathways set an important precedent for future recruits, and having women in such positions of
leadership will often require that occupational restrictions regarding combat service be lifted.
What does this tell us? Under the assumption that a military organization needs soldiers to fill
non-combat roles, an analysis of gender inclusion across military organizations requires a closer
examination of both the de jure restrictions on the basis of sex, sexual identity, and sexual
orientation, policies that demonstrate awareness of the gendered hierarchies within military
institutions, and the de facto participation of female soldiers.
This study is primarily concerned with de jure institutional changes that militaries make to
alter their gender regimes. As demonstrated by studies of other gender-based institutional reforms
– such as, for example, the enfranchisement of women – such changes are not easy for rigid,
conservative, and masculine and male-dominated organizations to make (Teele 2018). As a result,
these changes represent not only a significant shift in the allocation of salient resources, but also a
change in the institutional flexibility needed to create new career pathways and training regimens
and elevate non-combat roles. Thus, institutional commitments to gender inclusion are policy
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Some studies highlight the need for reaching a certain “critical mass” before the integration of women
will influence military organizational culture (Dahlerup 2006). Kanter (1977) puts this critical point at more
than 15-20 percent, after which women are no longer treated as tokens, i.e. as very visible representatives
of their minority who find themselves in a situation where they are left out of important communication
channels.
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reforms militaries make to assist with the recruitment and retention of a more inclusive force – on
the basis of sex, sexual-orientation, and gender identity.
This study also considers when and why militaries have high percentages of female soldiers
serving. I predict that militaries with lower levels of institutional commitment to gender inclusion
but a higher percentage of female soldiers serving are more likely to utilize women’s labor for
lower-status roles as clerks or combat support, freeing up male soldiers for more prestigious
combat roles. When it comes to the integration of military innovations, recruiting more female
soldiers but limiting the kinds of roles they can have might is at best a partial solution. By failing
to sufficiently elevate and acknowledge the primacy of noncombat skills, it will limit the
operational effectiveness of whatever innovations have been adopted.
THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To test the relationship between inclusiveness in military organizations and the integration of
military innovations, I employ a mixed-methods approach. Drawing from primary source data on
comparative inclusion regimes, I construct an original dataset of institutional commitments to
inclusion. I supplement this quantitative data with interviews with military personnel and defense
experts and careful readings of military journals to glean qualitative insights into the relationship
between gender and military innovation. The various components of this research design allow
me to compare and probe how 1) gender inclusion regimes affect the integration of disruptive
military innovations and 2) the integration of these innovations then lend to a learning process by
which militaries invest in gender policy reforms.
To test whether gender inclusion affects the integration of military innovations, I conduct a
nested case comparison of two military innovations that challenge the gender status quo by
reducing exposure to risk and/or the need for physical strength: the development and application
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of drone technology, and the use of population-based counterinsurgency. For each of these two
innovations, I compare two military organizations that sought to implement the innovation, but
had varying degrees of gender inclusion. For the example of drones, I compare the Israel Air
Force (IAF) and Artillery Corps, and for the COIN case I compare the Turkish Armed Forces
(TAF) and Australian Defense Force (ADF).
Drone operators, who are remote from violence, play critical roles while avoiding personal
risk. In what is called the “unmanning” of warfare, the adoption and use of drones requires a
reorientation in education, training, and culture, and an elevation of new positions and areas of
expertise. I leverage variation in gender inclusion across the Air Force and Artillery services in
Israel, a country that is the world’s largest exporter of drones, and uses unmanned platforms
extensively for a wide variety of purposes. Not only does the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pose a
unique opportunity for concentrated and enduring within-case variation over time, but it is also a
valuable case study in that it threatens to falsify my hypothesis (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 403405). Given the IDF’s relative success with the integration of drones, I am less likely to see
gender pose an impediment than would be the case for militaries that have struggled to implement
drones.
The integration of population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine requires cultural
sensitivity, state building, and intelligence gathering – soldiers ready “both to fight and to
build.” The use of all-female teams, like the Lioness program in Iraq and Female Engagement
Teams (FET) in Afghanistan, have been framed as essential to force protection and operational
effectiveness through enabling searches of women, gathering information and building societal
trust through engagement with the female population. Here, I consider two military organizations
that participated in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan,
and had varying levels of gender inclusion – the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and Turkish
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Armed Forces (TAF). Once again, these cases allow me to examine the adoption and integration
of COIN over time, taking advantage of within-case variation. Both the TAF and ADF were
actively involved in ISAF operations across all stages, and the ADF made significant changes to
their inclusion regime during the period of analysis. Thus, the ADF constitutes cases of both
middle and higher levels of inclusion. Finally, these two militaries differ widely in their gender
policies.
For each case, I rely on interviews with military personnel and defense experts, as well as the
analysis of government documents, military journals, news articles, field manuals, and other
primary sources. I find that in both cases military communities with higher degrees of inclusion
(the Israel Air Force and Australian Defense Force) were more effective in their integration of the
new innovations.
Next, I consider what accounts for the expansion and contraction of gender inclusion in the
armed forces across countries and over time. Numerous variables have been proposed but their
relative impacts remain unclear. So far there has been little in the way of systematic, crossnational research on factors that affect the degree and nature of gender reform. Likewise, there
has been little data collection and theorizing regarding appropriate and realistic measures of
inclusion. Drones serve as an example of a relevant innovation – operators are removed from the
battlefield, avoiding risk or the need for physical strength. We can therefore examine whether the
adoption and integration of drones encourages military organizations to invest in gender reforms.
Here, I develop and utilize an original cross-national and temporal dataset of Institutional
Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) across all NATO-member and partner countries from 1991 to
2016 to examine whether innovation integration drives gender inclusion reform. The ICI index I
developed measures the extent of institutional commitment to gender inclusion across a series of
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relevant indicators, including occupational restrictions, formal rank restrictions, percentages of
the total active force, family programs, harassment policies and monitoring procedures, and
LGBTQ+ exclusions. Given that data on gender in militaries worldwide is limited and often
inconsistent, the collection of new data required a close analysis of individual country reports,
summary reports published by the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, and a range of
other primary sources for each country-year.
The research strategy at hand is comprehensive – while my case chapters feature a close
analysis of primary sources and process tracing, my large-N chapter makes use of an original
dataset as part of a quantitative analysis. This approach allows for the measurement and testing of
aspects of my theory in a variety of ways. By selecting cases that maximize variation in the
measurement of the independent and dependent variable, and also utilizing a mixed-method
analysis of comparative gender regimes, I am able to increase the reliability of my findings
PLAN OF THE STUDY
The subsequent chapters of this study lay out the theory, research design, and findings of a
variety of empirical tests. Chapter 2 presents a theory of gender and innovation. I begin by
situating the theoretical argument in the literature. This chapter notes that the military innovation
literature as well as the literature on the gendered nature and consequences of warfare, and the
sociology of work all appear to tell related and similar stories about hierarchy, prestige, and
change – and, in the case of the innovation and gender literature, without any dialogue or
acknowledgement of one another. I then present my theory of gender and innovation, which seeks
to bridge this gap. Finally, this chapter discusses how I plan to test the theory.
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the empirical studies of the integration of drones and populationbased counterinsurgency (COIN). Each chapter begins with a discussion of why the technological
19

and/or tactical change “counts” as a military innovation. I then discuss the specific gendered
challenges such changes pose to military organizations that seek to implement them. Returning to
the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, I discuss how these challenges apply to each innovation.
Next, I turn to my selection of comparative, nested cases for each innovation: 1) the Israel Air
Force (IAF) and Artillery Corps, in the case of drones, and 2) COIN by the Turkish Armed
Forces (TAF) and Australian Defense Force (ADF). Finally, I present the findings of my in-depth
primary source research and process tracing.
Chapter 5 reverses the causal arrow and considers whether militaries that adopt low
risk/strength military innovations are more likely to subsequently invest in gender policy reforms.
This chapter considers the broad question of what drives inclusion – adding another explanation
to a literature that has produced a laundry list of potential explanatory variables. Here, I revisit the
case of drones to see if militaries that invested in the organizational integration of remote
platforms made more institutional commitments to inclusion (ICIs). I use three linear regression
models to examine the changes that occurred in the years following the organizational integration
of drones across NATO member and partner militaries across each of two sets of dependent
variables – 1) percentage of female soldiers in the total active force and 2) institutional
commitments to inclusion. I draw from an original cross-national and temporal database of ICIs
across all NATO member and partner countries, which allows me to utilize both quantitative and
qualitative cross-national and intertemporal data as evidence.
The concluding chapter discusses the implications of my findings for future research, and
then evaluates how the theory applies to a more diverse set of innovations. In that chapter I look
an additional innovation: medical-military research collaborations during the 19th and 20th
centuries. Medical military research collaborations took men and women who were not trained
“warriors” but rather nurses, medics, engineers, and scientists, and placed them in the battlefield.
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Finally, I consider the application of my theory to more recent developments in Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and the future of warfare. Will the use of algorithms to undertake many
functions associated with the armed forces remove the gender-specificity of occupations? Or will
it reinforce existing hierarchies as they are written with the male solider in mind?
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CHAPTER 2 : A THEORY OF MILITARY INNOVATION AND GENDER
Change is difficult, but often the key to improvement. Innovations exemplify this basic
truth. They have the power to reduce costs and increase benefits, enhancing the effectiveness of
operations. They can also change how certain kinds of work are done, and even perceived. In the
business world, new technologies can improve processes that are labor intensive and require low
or medium skill levels, altering the allocation of tasks, and even the structure of firms. Advanced
robotics, for example, save time, money, manufacturing space, and reduce injuries and waste,
enhancing overall efficiency.13 Such acquisitions also drastically change the number of workers
and the skills they need in automobile and other manufacturing industries. While the
manufacturing industry was once characterized by unskilled physical labor, jobs in auto and metal
fabrication now require highly specialized technical skills (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014;
Hagerty 2013). As a result, workers who had traditional “heavy lifting” jobs now need to learn a
different set of skills or change their career paths – their earlier expertise is no longer in high
demand. Thus, organizations must innovate to improve, but innovation can also threaten the
welfare and prestige of members of the organization.
When it comes to military organizations, innovative changes can have equally profound
impacts. In the modern international system, military power depends on the ability to develop and
incorporate such advances in military technology and tactics. For military organizations,
innovation can enhance effectiveness of operations as well as contribute to political bargaining
power. Nonetheless, militaries struggle to capture the benefits of new technologies and tactics.
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There is considerable evidence that industrial robots increase productivity: Graetz and Michaels (2018)
examine 17 countries from 1993 to 2007, and find that robot densification raised annual growth of GDP
and labor productivity (0.37 and 0.36 % points respectively).
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Unsurprisingly, the challenges associated with military innovation have received considerable
attention in what has grown to be a robust military innovation literature.
What are the challenges that confront the integration and use of a military innovation?
The introduction of new weapons or doctrines can risk making an existing area of expertise
irrelevant, and as a result has historically been met with resistance. Knights trained to fight with
swords were unhappy about the development and spread of firearms, just as officers trained in
cavalry charges might have been dismayed by the advent of tanks. Likewise, sailors trained in the
operation and strategic uses of battleships were unhappy about the arrival of aircraft carriers
(Boot 2006, 465). The resistance of military personnel to innovation should not surprise us.
Innovation in both the military and civilian spheres requires training of managers and workers to
transition to new operations, thus devaluing work that was formerly one’s area of expertise, and
bringing in newcomers who may be viewed as less valuable given existing social and professional
hierarchies.
Like all large organizations, militaries require clear hierarchies that encourage individuals
to behave in ways that advance the organization’s interests. While the relationship between
hierarchy, organizational identity, and prestige is the subject of existing theories of military
innovation, I argue that militaries have consistently created these hierarchies in a particular
gendered fashion. Scholarly inattention to the gendered structure of military hierarchies has
rendered us unable to explain why many military organizations struggle to integrate innovations
even when a rationalist model suggests that they should.
What is meant by “gender hierarchies” and “gendered structure?” In this study, an
occupation or activity is “gendered” when activities associated with manliness and masculinity
are given higher value, prestige, or moral worth than activities or occupations associated with
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femininity. As a simple example, military innovations that require the strength and bravery of
warriors would be regarded as gendered masculine, and seen in a positive light. Military culture
and pathways to promotion can be gendered when they reinforce and reward the willingness to
fight and risk one’s life. Yet not all tactically important military jobs require the valued military
traits of strength, courage, or toughness.
While military innovations hold immense promise for battlefield power, they require a
specific skillset in order to be implemented successfully. In particular, the gendered component of
an innovation plays an important role in determining whether the full power of the innovation is
realized. In this chapter I highlight this problem by developing a theory of military innovation and
gender. To do so I build on three literatures areas of research that usually treated as quite
separate, and rarely combined in a single analysis: (1) the literature that analyzes military
innovation; (2) the literature on the gendered nature and consequences of warfare; and (3)
research on the sociology of work. Insights from each of these strains of scholarship contribute to
a novel, systematic, and testable theory of gender disruption and military innovation.
THREE LITERATURES, SIMILAR STORIES
Scholars and practitioners who debate the challenges associated with innovative changes
within military organizations have yet to consider the role of gender. The literature on military
innovation has focused on the geostrategic environment and civil-military dynamics (see Posen
1984, for example); internal military organizational behavior and bureaucratic processes (Rosen
1991; Jensen 2016); financial resources and internal organizational capacity (Horowitz 2010);
and cultural imprints on strategic behavior (Adamsky 2010; Farrell 1996; Nagl 2005). Each of
these strains of scholarship has taught us a tremendous amount about when militaries innovate
and innovations succeed and fail, and how innovations spread. But they fail to account for
something that impacts the empirical reality of innovation in militaries – the very hierarchies
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puzzled over are highly gendered. As I show below, such hierarchies are quite similar to those
examined by the literatures on feminist approaches to International Security and the gendered
sociology of work.
Scholarship on the gendered nature and consequences of warfare examines how militarization
produces (and reproduces) a gender hierarchy as a means to enhance a society’s war-fighting
effort. This hierarchy valorizes men for their potential heroism in war as protectors and women
for their supporting efforts and need for protection (Elshtain 1987; Goldstein 2001). While a few
scholars focus on the gendered implications of specific innovations – such as nuclear weapons
and drones – there is no dialogue with scholarship on innovation.14 Some have tried to bring the
gender dimension into the sociology of technology (Wajcman 1991) and occupational segregation
more broadly (Goldin 1986; Cockburn 1983, 1985; Acker 1990), but there has been no empirical
work on how gender affects the successful integration of new innovations by the military.
Put simply, scholars of military innovation don’t talk about gender, and scholars of gendered
warfare and work don’t talk about military innovation. This gap is significant and limits scholarly
analysis and understanding of not only phenomena that have been long recognized as
undermining military preparedness but also the ability to locate those that are obscured and
unexamined. Indeed, existing scholarship on gender and international security has shed light on
many central areas of inter- and intrastate conflict, terrorism, public opinion, peacekeeping, the
diffusion of norms, and violence against civilians. Moreover, insights from the literature on
innovation with regard to dimensions of hierarchy, prestige, and culture could be of immense use
to the literature on gender, technology and organizational change.
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For example, on nuclear weapons see Cohn 1990; On the use of offensive as opposed to defensive
weaponry see Wilcox 2009; On drones see Daggett 2015; de Volo 2016; Clark 2019; Manjikian 2016; and
on the robotics more broadly see Roff 2016
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MILITARY INNOVATION MATTERS, BUT ISN’T EASY TO DO
The ability of military organizations to effectively implement novel changes in warfare can
have significant consequences. Similar to innovative technologies in the business world, military
innovations can help militaries gain a competitive advantage. Technological and/or tactical
change can affect the probability of victory in war, or even the likelihood of a war occurring,
fitting logically within broader security strategies (Posen 1984, 30; Rosen 1994, 52). Novel
changes in technology and tactics can not only increase power projection capabilities and provide
tactical and strategic advantages over adversaries, but can also shape the intensity and duration of
fighting, the tactics employed, and battlefield outcomes.15 Such changes have institutional and
strategic implications, influencing both the structure of military organizations (Adamsky 2010),
and their national security doctrines (Lieber and Press 2017; Posen 1984; Roland 1995). For
example, the integration of the “Blitzkrieg” military format, which combined tanks, motorized
infantry, and combat aircraft to achieve rapid victory in the 1930s, produced significant
battlefield results for the German army during the Second World War.16
Such change, however, is rarely easy. The innovation process extends across an
organization’s value chain, influencing outputs, processes, and services, and pulling in human and
financial resources (Lele 2019, 19). As many scholars have elaborated, the ecosystem in which
this process takes place is largely conservative, inflexible, and resistant to change (Boot 2006,
465). The development of Blitzkrieg, for example, demanded substantial changes that were “not
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For example, Biddle (2004) argues that while technological change can make military operations more
precise, such advanced weapons have a less significant effect on combat than force employment and can be
overcome by environmental factors and adversary countermeasures (62-66). Conversely, Caverly and
Sechser (2017) point out that technological advancements can shorten war duration by mitigating
information asymmetries.
16
This innovation has arguably yielded battlefield results in other contexts as well. Posen, for example,
treats Israel’s approach of combining different types of forces for high speed warfare in 1956 and 1967 as
an example of the successful application of Blitzkrieg’s operational aspects (Posen 1984, 14)
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greeted enthusiastically by professional soldiers” in the interwar German armed forces (Posen
1984, 208). Like other organizations, militaries rely heavily on internal routines to accomplish
basic tasks – also known as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or “the simplest rules of
thumb” (Posen 1984, 44; Allison 1971). Altering or combining SOPs to create new programs is
often challenging.17 Like other bureaucracies, military organizations thrive on standard, consistent
approaches to resolving problems and maintaining the status quo, prioritizing consistency and
standardization (Hill 2015, 85; Halperin 1974, 99). Given that innovative changes can disorient a
military organization, taking time and money, militaries gravitate towards that which appears to
work and is familiar (Posen 1984, 30; Farrell and Terriff 2002, 265; Horowitz 2010). As a result,
new weapons that portend major changes to organizational routines, strategies, “purposive
identity” (Rosen 1994), or “essence” (Halperin and Clapp 2007), are often met with resistance
(Evangelista 1988, 12). As a result, the failure of military organizations to change rapidly enough
is a common starting point for theories of military innovation.18
Finally, even after a military innovation is tried and tested, and substantial financial
investments and organizational resources have directed towards adoption across the organization,
militaries still face additional challenges associated with integration and use. In order to be
translatable into battlefield outcomes or coercive strategy, a change in the operational praxis of
military tactics and/or technology needs to be integrated into a broader organizational system
(Horowitz 2010). While new force deployment methods and organizational structures carry the
promise of a significant and measurable increase in military effectiveness, such promises often
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For Posen the combination of SOPs produces new programs, which together form an organizational
repertoire, or military doctrine – and, notably, is hard to do (Posen 1984, 44).
18
It is worth noting, however, there are examples of military innovations that were developed and
integrated too quickly – leading to bad results and battlefield failures: in the late 1930s, for example, the
British Army’s reliance on a tank-heavy armored division turned out to be no more effective than the
German’s combined arms Panzer Division (Biddle 2004, 206).
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fail to translate to practice (Krepinevich 1994; Horowitz 2010, 22-23). More important than any
particular novel military technology and/or tactic itself is how military forces are used (Biddle
2004). System integration, however, is a challenging task: the performance of modern combat
systems depends on supporting systems and the ability of a military organization to put tactical
doctrine into practice: planes without pilots, tanks without fuel, aircrafts without ordinance, and
soldiers without food are all useless (Horowitz 2010, 2, 22). It is no coincidence that logistics, or
the movement and supply of armies, is the biggest and most understudied aspect of military
innovation and strategy (Van Creveld 2004).
Given these challenges, theories of military innovation broadly seek to explain when, why,
and where military innovations occur, how they spread, and the forms of resistance they
encounter. If the values of “predictability, stability, and certainty” are indeed “inimical to
innovation,” when and how do militaries manage to innovate (Posen 1984, 46)? How are
innovative advances, along with changes to organizational standard operating procedures and
cultures, explained? As I explain below, much of this literature focuses on the challenge of
organizational change, while ignoring a key and highly relevant factor – that of gender.
Who innovates?
Deterministic, process-driven theories of innovation focus on the conditions under which
military organizations innovate. Such explanatory models examine when, why, and how
militaries come up with and test new ways of warfare. Grissom distills this literature into four
schools of thought – the civil-military, interservice, intraservice, and cultural models (Grissom
2006). These theories locate causal connections between a range of explanatory and intervening
variables and the likelihood that military innovation will take place. For example, proposed
variables include intervening civil servants and maverick officers motivated by realist threat
perceptions (Posen 1984; Zisk 1993), interservice competition for resources (Sapolsky 1972),
28

innovators with new ideas allied with sympathetic mid-level officers with conventional
credentials (Rosen 1994), the reshaping of strategic and organizational culture (Adamsky 2010;
Kier 1997; Farrell 1996), external shocks and the emulation of foreign militaries (Farrell and
Terriff 2002), and the likelihood that military innovation will take place.
While scholars tend to disagree about what drives innovative changes – for example, whether
it comes from within (and is top-down, or bottom-up),19 or from external forces or environments
– they all acknowledge that such changes are especially challenging when they disrupt existing
hierarchies. For example, Rosen (1994) shows that altering the system of internal development
and promotion of military personnel to empower those with expertise in new areas is critical to
military innovation, but difficult to change in hierarchical, disciplined military bureaucracies.
Here, innovations are championed with the help of senior officers who have “established
themselves by satisfying the traditional criteria for performance” (Rosen 1994, 76).20 As I will
expand upon below, such values and traits that form the basis for traditional means of reward and
promotion within military organizations are closely associated with masculinity and men. While
these scholars acknowledge the new set of actors, scientists, and specialists that military
innovations introduce into the community where military decisions are made, they fail to mention
how these new actors may challenge privileged positions of masculinity. Indeed, Rosen’s analysis
suggests that the path to innovative change requires the perpetuation of gender hierarchy: the
senior officers assisting with new patterns must be validated by conservative criteria.
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For more on the distinction between top-down vs. bottom-up military change see Grissom 2006. For the
relevance of this distinction in conceptualizing the innovation process, see Horowitz and Pindyck 2020.
20
Building on Rosen’s work, Jensen (2016b) highlights the role of senior leaders who provide the space for
military professionals to develop new ideas.
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How are innovations adopted and integrated?
Other theories focus on how, when, and why innovations are adopted and integrated across
state and nonstate actors (Goldman and Eliason 2003b; Horowitz 2010, 19; Resende-Santos
1996). Rather than focusing on the spread of innovations solely in terms of military equipment
and/or spending, Horowitz’s adoption-capacity theory brings in factors that are more difficult to
count (and thus often omitted) but equally important. Here, the capacity of states and non-state
actors to adopt a new innovation depends on their ability to make the necessary financial
investments, as well as organizational changes in terms of doctrine, recruitment, and training
(Horowitz 2010, 2-3). Purchasing the hardware necessary to adopt an innovation, such as
machinery and parts needed for maintenance, requires financial investments and not all states are
equally equipped to make such purchases.21 Military organizations must also have the capacity to
change. This includes allocating resources to experimentation, opening up bureaucratic barriers,
and altering existing definitions of “critical tasks” (Horowitz 2010, 10; Wilson 1989, 1966). In
other words, technologies and innovations have both “hardware” – i.e. the technology itself – and
“software” – the organizational or human application component (Adamsky 2010; Goldman and
Eliason 2003a, 8).
Yet what happens after adoption? Once the financial investments have been made and new
patterns of recruitment, training, and promotion created, what kinds of challenges arise? For
innovative reforms to have an impact, they must become embedded in an organization’s
practices. Rosen’s analysis indicates that the institutionalization of military change requires the
use of incentive structures to align individual and organizational goals (Rosen 1994; Hill 2015,
97). The creation of a new promotion pathways to senior ranks allows young officers learning and
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In addition to the cost of the hardware itself, potential commercial applications of the technology can
influence financial intensity: the more military-oriented, the higher the cost (Horowitz 2010, 9).
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practicing the new way of war to rise to the top: if a new skill is defined as a technical specialty,
later on down the line, “the officer with that skill will not be seen as having the broad background
that qualifies him for the rank of general or an admiral” (Rosen 1994, 20-21). Therefore, there is
an adjustment, or learning period, that follows the adoption of a given innovation. Indeed, new
systems of recruitment and training are followed by periods of trial, error, and adjustment, which
introduce their own set of challenges. However, this approach fails to account for how militaries
can manage to integrate disruptive innovations while nonetheless retaining existing hierarchies:
when a new skill or specialty is consistently devalued, it will be difficult to implement
innovations that depend on such skills.
The institutionalization of new innovations depends not only on societal, organizational, and
cultural environments, but may also lead to changes in human behavior (Goldman and Eliason
2003a, 8-9). Some scholars argue that innovation adoption is contingent upon the organizational
culture of a given military (Goldman 2006; Kier 1995, 1997; Farrell and Terriff 2002). These
cultures can vary across and within different services: For example, each branch within the US
Army has a separate entry point and culture, and officers retain relationships with their branches
through which assignments and promotions are made (Worley 2006, 72). Here, most of the
Army’s senior leaders come from the cultures of infantry and the armor, and as a result, place
these branches “in the dominant supported role and all other branches in the supporting role”
(Worley 2006, 73). This dynamic is reinforced by systems of officer development and promotion:
senior officers often achieve their positions because they served as officers in valued positions
under the existing culture and have the characteristics the organization desires in its leaders. As a
result, their careers often reflect prevailing concepts of the delegation of authority, uniformity,
and honorable war (Hill 2015, 95).
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GENDER AS A CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE OF WARFARE
Fighting a war involves challenging and often extremely painful experiences. Soldiers are
expected to fire upon enemy combatants and to suffer the fire of their enemies. While American
troops at the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775 were instructed not to “fire ‘til you see the whites of
their eyes,” such forbearance in the face of danger and chaos is far from natural (Lynn 2003, 41).
Thus, theories of warfare often begin with the simple question – how can soldiers be motivated to
put their lives on the line and to kill the enemy? While some scholarship stresses the nature of
group relations (Henderson 1985; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Stewart 1991; Stouffer et al. 1949;
Wood 2003), the proper conditioning of soldiers (Marshall 1947), an ideology or particular cause
(Lynn 1984; Posen 1993; Bartov 1989; Reiter 2007; Castillo 2014), command leadership (Reiter
and Wagstaff 2017), or material benefits and incentives (Lichbach 1998; Peterson 2002;
Weinstein 2007), Joshua Goldstein asserts that the willingness to fight (and not to flee) rests in
large part on the construction of “warrior values” (Goldstein 2001, 266). Goldstein points out
that there are several common and recurring elements in various cultures’ conceptions of such
values: warriors are expected to be physically courageous – i.e. risk death, be able to endure pain
and suffering, be strong and skillful, and be loyal to fellow soldiers and leaders (266-267).
Such constructions of heroism reflect and reinforce dominant notions of masculinity and
femininity. Jean Elshtain describes this dichotomy as between “just warriors” and “beautiful
souls” – while heroic warriors protect their families and homelands through “just” warfare,
beautiful souls are naïve, pure women relegated to home, whose need for protection motivates
men’s wars (Elshtain 1982). This dichotomy also associates peace with femininity,
characterizing men as active, rational agents and women as passive, emotional victims (Tickner,
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1999).22 War is valorized through a heroic form of masculinity, which is dependent upon “a
feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic” (Tickner 2001, 49).
These tropes are self-reinforcing: the “masculine idea of male heroes as good soldiers” serves to
reify a women’s perceived “proper position as homemakers” (Sjoberg 2013, 142). Drawing a
clear distinction between the masculine act of fighting a war fighting versus feminine nonviolent,
“normal” life assists with the suspension of social norms against killing. For example, Weber
(2002) notes that the feminine home front in World War II assisted with the projection of
American masculinity into the world, providing moral certainty to the battle (141). In other
words, by developing gender roles that equate manhood with toughness under fire, militaries are
able to overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight: Gender is a means of mobilization – a way to
“coax and trick soldiers into participating in combat” (Goldstein 2001, 331). These gendered
roles are performed within a militarized culture of hegemonic masculinity, privileging institutions
and individuals who embody masculine values (Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2000, 2004; Sjoberg 2013;
Tickner 1999).
Thus, military organizations constitute a major arena for the construction of masculine
identities (Barrett 1996; Higate 2003). As the following section explains, militaries maintain the
status of the warrior as a key symbol of masculinity – even in the face far-reaching political,
social and technological changes (Morgan 1994, 165).

22

Tickner argues that such stereotypes are not only damaging to women and their credibility as actors in
matters of national security and international politics, but “are also damaging to peace” (1999, 4). As a
result, peace is deemed a “soft” issue, unrealistic and utopian, associated with femininity and passivity. By
associating women with idealism and peace, women are disempowered, kept out of the “real world” of
international politics (Tickner 1999, 8). Notably, this culture of hegemonic masculinity is also damaging to
men (Goldstein 2001).
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Technology, science, and military masculinity
The evolution of military technology and tactics is often framed along gendered tropes
(Sjoberg 2013, 225). In order to preserve the predominance and prestige of military masculinity
and maleness, skills that are not traditionally associated with combat soldiers, such as technical
proficiency, have historically been framed as “different kinds of male activity” (Manjikian 2014,
53). Nuclear weapons, for example, produced an insulated and male-dominated community of
nuclear defense intellectuals who would populate the field of nuclear posture and deterrence
policy (Hurlbert et al 2019, 9). The science and technology of fighting wars have been associated
with masculinity – a dynamic that was evident even in the sanitized, abstract, and sexualized
language of nuclear technostrategic discourse (Cohn 1990).23 This dynamic remains prevalent
today in the field of nuclear security: despite the participation of women in leadership positions
for decades, the space remains white and male and experiences of harassment, sexism, and
gendered expectations are common (Hurlbert et al 2019).
Military technology can introduce the opportunity to destabilize existing gendered
hierarchies, and to produce something that in organizational terms is new. For Haraway (1990),
modern machinery could potentially disrupt restrictive categories of gender and sexuality,
introducing a post-human “cyborg identity” which would blur the boundary between people and
machine. Yet, while some view the creation of robotic warfighters as potentially emancipating the
military of gendered practice, others point out how such developments reassert gender labels
through the use of gendered pronouns, voices, or other traits that are easily identified as male or
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For Cohn, the abstraction (and concurrent masculinization) of the language employed by defense
professionals has served to make brutal war tactics palatable and abstract away from their victims (Sjoberg
2013, 226).
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female (Roff 2016).24 From this perspective, new technologies tend to reassert gendered tropes,
rather than destabilize and/or destroy them.
GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS AND OCCUPATIONS
While, in theory, (some) bureaucracies are based on neutral recruitment and promotion based
on merit, sociological research on gender and inequality in public and private organizations
demonstrates that bureaucratic criteria tend to favor men and men’s lives (Woodward 2012, 359).
The advantages and disadvantages, and forms of exploitation and control within organizations are
delineated in terms of masculinity and femininity, and male and female (Acker 1990, 146).25 This
dynamic is evident in military organizations, where masculine culture and gendered divisions of
labor persist regardless of women’s entry in varied positions and ranks (Sasson-Levy 2011).
“Women’s work” in the labor market has traditionally been modeled after their work at home.
Industries like clothing and food, secretarial, teaching, waitressing, and health-care positions tend
to be associated with female workers. Moreover, as workers, women tend to be perceived
differently from men (Milkman 1983, 161). From this perspective, job segregation ultimately
operates to keep women in low-paying jobs for the purpose of enforcing their continued service
as unpaid daily workers and their continued dependence on men (Milkman 1983, 161). While
“light industries” such as textiles have traditionally employed more women, the durables sector
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Heather Roff traces three avenues for the construction of gender in a humanoid robot warfighter
(“warbot”) through a close analysis of the United States Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s
(DARPA) Robotics Challenge. Roff treats the hardware, or physical constructions, the naming of the
systems and their intended roles, and the software, as evidence of a design to “not only emulate and/or coopt the biases of their creators, but…actually distill gender into hegemonic masculinities and femininities
for these machines” (Roff 2016, 2).
25
This perspective builds on Carole Pateman’s (1986) discussion of the fundamental abstraction in the
concept of liberal individualism. Pateman argues that while women now have the rights of citizens in
democratic states, the identity of the universal individual is constructed from a man and, thus, always
masculine (Pateman 1988, 223). Similarly Acker notes that the “concept of the universal worker excludes
and marginalizes women who cannot, almost by definition, achieve the qualities of a real worker because to
do so is to become like a man” (Acker 1990, 150).
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remains male-dominated (Estevez-Abe 2006). Women were assigned to tasks requiring “manual
dexterity, attention to detail, and ability to tolerate monotony” (Milkman 1983, 170). Indeed,
there is a long-standing view that jobs in manufacturing require difficult physical labor and are
only for men (Caraway 2007, 2).
Scholars have shown that the introduction of new technologies can heighten such
occupational exclusions and hierarchies, rather than resulting in a reduction of gender division of
labor. Cynthia Cockburn (1983, 1985) demonstrates how novel technologies are often delineated
as under men's control and the definition of skilled work as men’s work and unskilled work as
women’s work is maintained. Cockburn suggests that the difficulty women face when attempting
to enter technical trades has to do with the sex-stereotyped definition of technology as an activity
appropriate for men. Judy Wajcman’s ‘Social Shaping of Technology’ (SST) approach echoes
this view.26 Here, the necessary skills associated with new technologies are embedded in a culture
of masculinity: “technology is always a form of social knowledge, practices and products…the
outcomes of which depend on the distribution of power and resources between different groups in
society” (Wajcman 1991, 163). Women’s (and men’s) relationship to and experience of
technology is shaped by the gendered nature of the technology itself as a social product.
Research on the sexual division of labor examines not only types of jobs held by men and
women, but also the method of payment and supervisory and monitoring methods. Looking at
manufacturing and clerical work from 1890 to 1940, Claudia Golden offers an account of why
occupational segregation by sex prevailed in the United States (Goldin 1986). New techniques
and machinery, such as the adoption of the typewriter, resulted in the feminization of the clerical
sector (Goldin 1986, 20). Such feminization occurred not because typing was unskilled labor, but
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Grissom (2006) presents SST’s “bottom-up” approach as a fruitful avenue for future research for future
studies of military innovation (926).
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because it was cheap and easy to pay women a piece rate (Goldin 1986, 21-24).27 The presence of
more task-oriented jobs and machinery allowed for “a finer division of labor” (Goldin 1986 24).
In short, novel innovations have the potential to alter (Haraway 1990), reaffirm (Cockburn
1983, 1985; Pateman 1986; Acker 1990; Sasson-Levy 2011), or create (Goldin 1986) new
gendered hierarchies, resulting in the sex-segregation of occupations. Notably, the literature on
the sociology of work indicates that bureaucratic standard operating procedures and “critical
tasks” are highly gendered (Wilson 1989). However, there is no consensus regarding the
implication of technology for the gendered hierarchies within organizations. Some scholars assert
that technology itself is often gendered masculine (Cockburn 1983, 1985; Wajcman 1990), and
others emphasize what the technology does to reproduce or upend the gendered division of labor
(e.g. Goldin 1986 on the typewriter). While the majority of this literature finds that new
technologies often reinforce male dominance, less attention is paid to the following question:
Under what circumstances might new technologies either reinforce or undermine masculine
dominance? The theory outlined below seeks to answer to this question.
A THEORY OF GENDER AND INNOVATION
Any particular military innovation might change several factors that contribute to the
construction of “warrior values” within a military organization. Historically, military innovations
that require the strength and bravery of warriors are seen as positively associated with manliness
and masculinity. As outlined in Table 2-1, some innovations both require high levels of strength
and expose the user directly to close-contact combat, reinforcing traditional gendered
perspectives on war (Goldstein 2001, 266-267). For example, an amphibious landing of troops on
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While men were paid by time, women were paid at a “piece rate” (i.e. pieces of output produced) because
the expected duration of their employment was lower as they were expected to quit after marriage (Goldin
1986).
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a beachhead requires the coordination of airpower, naval gunfire and transport, land warfare, and
extensive logistical and tactical training. As the first attempted landing by the British at Gallipoli
demonstrates, attacking an enemy in a defended position involves a great deal of physical
strength and risk: Turkish fire turned the bay “red” (Rosen 1994, 25). Such high risk/strength
innovations reinforce traditional masculine hierarchies within military organizations. Indeed, the
island-hopping strategy that the Marine Corps war-gamed during the interwar period and
implemented with eventual success during World War II solidified rather than challenged the
“warrior” mentality of the Corps and distinguished it from the Army.28 Similarly, the French
Cuirassier’s sword, wielded by heavy cavalry who were recruited for their large, strong physique,
had a reputation for ‘eating cannonballs for breakfast,’ striking in the front line of infantry at the
Battle of Waterloo. Officers were given three horses, three girls, and three bottles of champagne,
and had three hours to ride a twenty mile course, “cover the girls,” and drink the champagne – in
whatever order they preferred (Elting 2009, 233).
Table 2-1. Classification of Military Innovations Based on Risk and Physical Strength
Soldier exposure to risk
Low
High
Physical strength
Low
Nuclear weapons
Fighter planes
requirements
Drones
Poison gas
Precision strike; C4ISR
COIN
Cyber-warfare
Suicide terrorism
High
Longbow; Crossbow
Swords
Medical (Ambulances)
Bayonets
Artillery
Amphibious landing
Note: The innovations listed provide a sample of possible cases for consideration to demonstrate the
classifications strategy of risk exposure and physical strength requirements. For the universe of military
innovations cases, see Table 2-3.
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During the interwar period, the U.S. was considering doing away with the Marine Corps and collapsing
the branch with the Army. The lessons of Gallipoli did nothing to make the case for the adoption
amphibious warfare and during World War I the role of the Marines and Army were very similar. As the
US cut back on defense spending and became more isolationist, the purpose of the Marine Corps was
questioned. The Corps needed a mission and amphibious warfare fit the bill. The re-conquest of Philippines
and subsequent findings of Plan Orange demonstrated the salience of amphibious tactics (Murray and
Millet 1996, 74-75).
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Alternatively, some innovations can devalue the importance of physical strength and bravery,
blurring existing distinctions between sex-specific roles and disrupting gender hierarchies. Thus,
gendered challenges should be particularly acute in the low-risk low-strength cell. Remote
warfare, for example, does not require large armies of combat soldiers prepared to engage in
territorial conflict, but rather operators who work from a distance and “from behind keyboards
instead of gun sights” (Schneider 2018). As I will discuss in Chapter 3, drone operators are
subsequently devalued and feminized in comparison to “real” pilots. Concerns regarding the
grooming and fitness standards of cyber warriors (and whether they will show up to work with
“blue hair” or can complete 50 push-ups, for example) highlight the challenge cyber and drone
warfare pose to militaries with a rigid culture of uniformity and masculinity (Schneider 2018). As
discussed below, militaries seeking to recruit and retain a force capable of developing algorithms
and other aspects of the technical mission at hand will encounter disruptions to the traditional
status quo.
Other innovations are more ambiguous in this regard. For example, the medieval longbow of
England was extremely difficult to use (holding back the bow for a lengthy period of time at full
draw was no easy task), but could penetrate the armored plate of a knight at a time when knights
could only be defeated in direct combat (Dockery 2006, 11). Consequently, the longbow was
viewed poorly by contemporary knights and perceived as a cowardly form of fighting. The
crossbow exacerbated these concerns, as it was simpler to master (although still requiring some
physical strength for the heavy pull prod), putting a foot soldier at an advantage to an armored
knight. In a highly stratified society like medieval Europe, a technology that could provide a lowranking conscript with the power to kill a chivalric knight, noble, or even a king was seen as an
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abomination. Thus, the weapon was viewed as “cheating,” lacking in honor, and was
subsequently banned by Pope Innocent II in 1139 (Dockery 2006, 11).29
Here, the gendered challenges to integration can be addressed in part by emphasizing the
aspect on which they conform to traditional gendered expectations – i.e. the physical strength of
soldiers or exposure to risk. In other words, these ambiguous innovations provide military
organizations with more latitude for asserting existing hierarchies – or at least emphasizing the
aspect of the innovation that conforms as a means to offset that which challenges or subverts it.
Nonetheless, innovations that fall into a low risk but high strength quadrant, or a high risk but low
strength quadrant can still disrupt the gender status quo – even if the disruption is not as acute as
those that fall in the low-risk low-strength quadrant.
NO RISK, NO REWARD
As the existing scholarship on military innovation demonstrates, the integration of novel
technologies and/or tactics requires organizational realignments and, at times, a fighting force
with a different set of skills. Military innovations can produce changes in the individual
characteristics necessary to be a warrior and/or the way warfare is organized. For example, while
direct combat has been viewed as a man’s activity, the proportion of military personnel in support
jobs, as opposed to combat, has risen over time: more personnel are needed, not to pull triggers
but rather to load trucks, pack ships, and repair equipment. Such positions, however, tend to have
lower status within the military profession,30 and the awards and honors that soldiers receive
remain predicated on their exposure to risk. The official criteria used to decide which individuals
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Notably, this coding is relative to the existing risks of fighting: a crossbow would be comparatively low
risk in the world of knights but extremely high risk in contemporary warfare.
30
The highest status members being those in combat arms specialties, followed by those in combat support
(such as military police and intelligence), then logistics and other service-support specialties, and finally
those with other kinds of professional expertise (such as doctors, lawyers, or professors), who have the
lowest status (Stanley-Mitchell 2004, 104-105).
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will be awarded medals (such as a Bronze Star or the Congressional Medal of Honor) often make
reference to individuals who risk their lives to rescue a comrade, display extreme aggressiveness
such as singlehandedly charging a target, continue to fight when injured, and display exemplary
leadership (Manjikian 2016, 108). Given that the profession’s core jurisdiction is providing
leadership for fighting wars, it is unsurprising that the work viewed as most prestigious involves
exercising judgment in the face of uncertainty.31 Thus, the centrality of war fighting has important
implications for career paths and promotion patterns.
As soldiers have been increasingly removed from the battlefield, a persistent emphasis on
arduous physical training – both in preparation for service as well as a means of group cohesion
– has remained relatively static over time and across armed forces (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978;
Barrett 1996; Dunivin 1994; Woodward and Winter 2004). Physical strength requirements justify
the sex-specific nature of certain tasks (i.e. for soldiers being men), and ensure that the military
remains masculine. Military training is challenging and requires a high degree of physical fitness,
making men out of boys and conditioning the exhibition of masculine traits such as
aggressiveness and resilience (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978; Barrett 1996; Woodward and Winter
2004). For example, the debate surrounding the perceived injustices of gender-normed physical
training (PT) standards in the U.S. military raised a variety of negative feelings about women in
the military, reinforcing dominant perceptions of gender difference (Cohn 2000, 133). PT protest
and related complaints about special treatment and standards highlight the challenge integration
poses to the ownership of men over the military. The debate surrounding the gendered nature of
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Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchel (2004) points out that this is especially true within the combat arms specialties
as an officer climbs up the hierarchy: “one of the most prized professional positions in the military
hierarchy is command, for a commander must constantly make judgments about allocating a unit’s
resources and time in the face of extreme uncertainty about the nature of the next threat. The higher the
level of command in the hierarchy, the greater the uncertainty, the wider-ranging the exercise of judgment,
and the more prestigious the position” (105).
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military tasks and the “loss of the military as a male sanctum” is applicable to attempts to
incorporate certain innovations – specifically through the loss of certain masculine roles and
ideals (Cohn 2000, 147). Thus, together, exposure to risk and physical strength requirements
provide a broader justification for privileging men and masculinity within military organizations.
This dynamic is the basis for why certain innovations are disruptive for military organizations
seeking to implement them: innovations that reduce soldiers’ exposure to risk and the need for
physical strength challenge entrenched gender hierarchies.
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN THE INTEGRATION OF INNOVATIONS
If a country is investing substantial financial and organizational resources towards integrating
novel innovations into their military, the gendered challenges outlined above become quite salient
(Horowitz 2010, 28). In other words, we want to know how militaries can integrate disruptive
innovations when the potentially transformative effects (i.e., the promise of enhanced power) is
acknowledged by the organization. Thus, the question at hand is not how important or potentially
transformative an innovation is. Rather, assuming that the innovation is important, how will a
military choose to address the challenges of integration? This study argues that gendered
hierarchies within the organization influence such choices. Entrenched systems of reward,
promotion, and decision-making power shape both the interests of actors within a military
organization, as well as their relative bargaining power.
Subgroup interests
The implementation of military innovations relies on people, organizations, and cultures –
personnel must be retrained, career incentives reengineered, and organizational cultures
threatened (Blanken, Lepore and Rodriguez 2018). The prioritization of noncombat activities
requires the creation of new career paths and promotion patterns - paths and patterns that may
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challenge the prestige of many within the organization.32 Thus, social status and individual
identity are entwined with strategic and operational understandings of “what works” in the
military (Hill 2015, 86). Subgroups within military organizations struggle to expand or maintain
their bureaucratic realms, as well as the relevance of their areas of expertise (Allison 1971; Rosen
1994). By this logic, the degree to which a subgroup benefits from the masculine hierarchy will
influence the way they prefer to address the gendered challenges of a military innovation.
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, interest groups that could benefit from disruptions to the gender
status quo are likely to promote and/or suggest similarly disruptive strategies to assist with
integration of the innovation. This dynamic is clearly demonstrated in Rachel Weber’s (1997)
analysis of how changes to military and commercial cockpit designs (built to male parameters)
were negotiated. Despite the opening of pilot roles to women, the construction of airplane
cockpits impeded their ability to take on such roles in practice. Alterations to the cockpits were
eventually made – not so that women could fly them but rather so that the U.S. could export
planes abroad to countries with smaller-statured men (Weber 1997). Thus, groups that could
benefit from the integration of a new innovation (e.g. by increasing exports abroad) are most
likely to suggest strategies that destabilize the existing masculine hierarchy. These strategies
might include, for example, the establishment of new promotion patterns that lend to the elevation
of noncombat roles and methods of operation.

32

For example, with the 1867 establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) came the
development of not only new career paths, but also a forum for collaboration between officers (Marquis
1997).
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Figure 2-1. Internal Subgroup Responses to Innovation
HIGH
INSTITUTIONAL
COMMITMENT TO
GENDER INCLUSION

LOW

BENEFIT FROM DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
• Promote/assist with integration

BENEFIT FROM MASCULINE HIERARCHY
• Assist with integration while keeping with old practices
• Oppose integration

However, subgroups that benefit from the existing masculine hierarchy may respond in one
of two ways: 1) seek to integrate the innovation in a manner that does not destabilize the existing
hierarchy from which the members benefit, or 2) resist integration entirely.
Militaries often respond to tactical or technological changes by conferring on it the same
venerated forms of masculinity as more traditional warfare.33 Thus, a military may note the value
of the innovation for broader effectiveness and attempt to implement it in a manner that maintains
a male definition of combat – such as, to return to the example of steam power from Chapter 1,
the creation of separate mess halls and promotion patterns for “line” and engineering officers.34
This approach might manifest through an emphasis on the risks soldiers face, and the lethal
aspects of their roles. Alternatively, a military may also seek to keep combat male by recruiting
female soldiers to perform crucial noncombat tasks, which are low on the professional hierarchy,
ensuring that women within the military remain unequal. By placing women in such roles,
manpower needs are not only met but “discursive structures of gender-subordination” are also
preserved (Sjoberg 2007, 84).
Others may directly oppose the integration of innovations that disrupt the masculine
hierarchy. As in other male-dominated occupations where changes to the status quo can be
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Rather than making organizational changes, militaries often tag a new technology on to an old doctrine
(Posen 1984, 55).
34
There may also be variation across this group depending on whether or not an actor sees innovation, as
opposed to cohesion and moral values, as a greater determinant of military success.
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perceived as threatening to workers who benefit from gendered hierarchies within the industry,
one would expect to see some sub-groups resist such incursions (Chira 2018). In this situation,
existing cultural assumptions in terms of honor, the delegation of authority, and the tolerance for
variation and the desired degree of uniformity, are likely to be preserved (Hill 2015, 88).
Put simply, every military (and, for that matter, non-military) organization has to make
changes. But more inclusive militaries have to make fewer changes.
Predicting innovation integration outcomes
While the implementation of military innovations affects the interests of various subunits
within a given military organization, the solution a military organization ultimately ascribes to its
gendered challenges will follow from whichever group “wins out.” Given the gendered structure
of the military system, both the interests of such groups, and their persuasive power in making
their respective cases, will likely be informed by the military’s overall degree of investment in
gender inclusion. Table 2-2 summarizes predicted subgroup bargaining outcomes depending on
the level of institutional commitment to inclusion within their military organization.
Organizations that have demonstrated institutional awareness of gendered concerns, such as
sexual assault and harassment and family leave programs, promotion patterns, and the lifting of
occupational restrictions, will be more open to solutions that destabilize masculine hierarchies –
such as retraining personnel, reengineering incentives, and altering organizational cultures.
Changes to a gender inclusion regime require a certain degree of organizational flexibility – the
same quality that is required for the disruption of existing hierarchies in other non-military
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organizations.35 Moreover, a military that has already invested in some of the changes required to
successfully integrate a disruptive innovation will face a different (and most likely, smaller) set of
gendered challenges. In other words, more inclusive military organizations will be better able to
implement disruptive innovations precisely because they have already made gender policy
reforms. Here, one would expect to see subgroups that might benefit from the implementation of
a disruptive innovation hold more sway or influence over the solutions offered by the broader
military organization. On the other hand, in military organizations with lower levels of gender
inclusion, one might instead expect subgroups that benefit from the masculine hierarchy to have
more of an influence. After all, inducing an unwilling organization to change is difficult (Biddle
1998, 67).
Thus, subgroups seeking to maintain the gender status quo will likely have greater persuasive
power in military organizations that fail to invest institutional resources into maintaining an
inclusive force. Careerists on a structural ladder “man” the military service, and promotion to
higher positions is “dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished devotion to a service’s
mission” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 168). As a result, military leadership is often unlikely to
integrate innovations that are inconsistent with such roles and missions. In effect, senior leaders
who have been recognized, promoted and socialized within a military would be unlikely to
advocate change that undermines the ethos of the system in which they prospered.
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Notably, there are a range of other factors might also affect the outcome of this debate as well as the
organizational flexibility or a given organization. Nonetheless, I expect an organizationally flexible military
community that has not adopted gender inclusive policies and practices to struggle to integrate innovations
that disrupt traditional “warrior” values.
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Table 2-2. Predicting Innovation Integration Outcomes
Approach to innovation integration

Predicted outcomes

• Establish new promotion patterns
• Elevate noncombat operations
• Redefinition of combat

Long-term solution to
gendered challenges and
hence effective
integration.

Medium

• Maintain existing promotion patterns
• Recruit women for lower status roles

Short-term solutions, not
all challenges addressed.
Less effective integration

Low

• Maintain existing promotion patterns
• Reject integration of innovation

High
Level of
institutional
commitment
to inclusion

No change and poor
integration.

Thus, the level of institutional commitment to inclusion within a military organization will
influence which subgroup “wins out,” which will, in turn, determine the solution the organization
will subsequently apply to the gendered challenges of military innovations that reduce exposure
to risk and/or the need for physical strength. These solutions have varying implications for the
effectiveness of a military innovation. As summarized in Table 2-2, three pathways arise: First,
militaries with higher levels of gender inclusion will opt for more disruptive solutions, elevating
noncombat and “softer” aspects of a military innovation, and even, in some cases, reexamining
existing definitions of combat. This approach is likely to be the most effective at addressing the
gendered challenges of innovation.
Second, militaries with middle levels of gender inclusion will seek to integrate a military
innovation while keeping the character of combat masculine, and relegating women and
feminized tasks to less prestigious roles. While this approach may serve short-term needs, without
new means of promotion, career advancement, official recognition of roles performed, and
organization-wide incorporation of such roles into doctrine and training, these gains will be
partial at best. For example, the use of planes in combat was initially considered un-chivalrous
and feminine in their asymmetry, resulting in the limited use of planes in World War I: “Even
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though combat planes were at the forefront of early nineteenth-century technological
advancement” they were often flown in manner that sought to reassert their masculinity (Wilcox
2009, 223). While the British and French model of single combat was seen as more masculine as
it best approximated one-on-one combat, the German method of flying in squadrons was more
effective in battle but viewed as cowardly due to the reduced risk to pilots (Wilcox 2009, 223224). From this perspective, Britain and France poorly implemented combat aircrafts due to
deeply rooted perceptions of manliness and masculinity within their organizations.
And third, militaries with very low levels of gender inclusion will place little value on
operations that challenge a masculine, kinetic understanding of fighting. Such organizations will
resist the integration of low risk and/or low strength innovations, reinforcing existing gendered
hierarchies. These militaries will presumably still want to integrate the innovation but will be
unwilling to take the steps necessary to do so effectively.
Despite these varying responses, they are nonetheless both conditioned upon higher levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion. These points are the basis of my first Inclusion
Hypothesis, H1:
Inclusion Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more institutional commitment to gender inclusion a military
organization makes, the more effectively it will respond to the gendered challenges of a military
innovation that challenges established gender hierarchies and hence the more likely the
organization will be to successfully integrate the innovation.
There are varying ways in which the level of inclusion will make integration of
innovations more or less successful. In particular, I predict that militaries with low, middle, and
high levels of inclusion will adopt different approaches to the integration of new innovations, and
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may experience different difficulties. These differences are outlined in the following subhypotheses H1a-c:
H1a: Rejection: Military organizations with low levels of institutional commitment to
gender inclusion will exhibit greater resistance to the integration of a military innovation
that challenges established gender hierarchies into their operations.
H1b: Feminization: Military organizations with middle levels of inclusion will utilize
gender difference to assist with the integration of a military innovation into their
operations, resulting in the professionalization (or further institutionalization of gender
segregated roles) of gender segregation.
H1c: Full Integration: Military organizations with high levels of gender inclusion will
be more likely to elevate noncombat roles, establish new promotion patterns, and/or
consider redefinitions of combat itself.
The predicted professionalization of gender segregation in military organizations with
middle levels of inclusion carries additional implications for the creation of a complementary
innovation – the strategic application of gender difference. The weaponization of femininity in
warfare is nothing new. Women have served as spies and support personnel on the basis of their
gender and tailored feminine “contributions” to the war effort.36 In other words, women are often
recruited to perform tasks that arguably they are uniquely suited for on the basis of their sex.

36

Notably, such “supporting” roles include that of morale-boosting wife, mother, and “camp follower” – a
term has often been used synonymously with prostitute. For example, many women from poor families in
Korea’s countryside “supported” the American male soldiers stationed in their country during the Korean
War by doing laundry, cooking, and tending to the soldiers’ sexual demands (Moon 1997, 3). This
characterization of “support” has served to justify acts of rape (such as that of a nineteen-year-old Beijing
National University student, Shen Chung, by two American soldiers in 1946), as well as permit the cheap
provision of critical services to military organizations throughout history by ensuring their ideological
separation from combat (Enloe 2000, 40).
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For example, during World War II, when technology was offering new ways to encipher
and conceal communications, the United States Navy staffed a cryptanalysis division with a
group of female undergraduate recruits (Mundy 2017, 20). Following the bombing of Pearl
Harbor and America’s entry into the war, the Navy began to expand its targeted recruitment of
women, as did the Army, for its own rival code-breaking unit.37 Here, women were considered
well suited for careful repetitive work, freeing men to take over what were considered more
advanced, challenging, and interesting tasks. Most importantly, while increasingly important to
military operations, cryptanalysis was not a job that career military men wanted: “Officers
understood that it was better for their careers to spend a war in the theater, being shot at and
commanding men, rather than sitting safely behind a desk” (Mundy 2017, 57). In its formative
stages, cryptanalysis was an occupation without fame or prestige in the United States, having “yet
to be established as a man’s field, or even a field” (Mundy 2017, 57). Thus, cryptanalysis became
an area where women were actively recruited.
Here, the recruitment and incorporation of women did not occur as a step towards
equality or a dismantling of gendered hierarchies within military organizations, but rather because
women were framed as adept to fill lower-status roles in a time of need. The framing surrounding
the strategic necessity of female labor has persisted over time and has rested largely on the
preservation of a sense of military maleness (Enloe 1983; 2000). Such framing has been
increasingly institutionalized into military doctrine, as the case of population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN) in Chapter 4 demonstrates. As a result, the strategic application of
gender difference bears increasing resemblance to a military innovation that has been incubated
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For more on the several thousand American women who broke codes in the messages sent by Japanese
and German militaries and diplomatic corps, see Mundy 2017. I would like to thank Brigadier General
William J. Bowers for this recommendation.
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and experimented with, formally implemented, and diffused across the organization. As a stark
example, in the context of nonstate actors and the application of suicide bombings by terrorist
organizations, the use of female suicide bombers has become more widespread (Stone and Pattillo
2011; O’Rourke 2009).
One might argue that the professionalization of gender segregation will produce the best
results overall from the perspective of a military, insofar as it allows for the implementation of an
innovation without forcing a significant cultural shift. While this argument does not seem
inconsistent with my theory, it suggests that the link between the implementation of the
innovation and overall military capability/effectiveness may not be entirely straightforward.
Nonetheless, as illustrated in Table 2-2, as such strategic applications become increasingly salient
to organizations, such labor will need to be rewarded and promoted within organizations in a
manner that may increasingly destabilize the primacy and prioritization of combat. The
occupational segregation of noncombat roles is therefore the basis of the following hypothesis:
Inclusion Hypothesis 2 (H2): Military organizations that have lower levels of institutional
commitment to inclusion will seek to integrate a military innovation while maintaining the
existing masculine hierarchy. They will devote resources towards the development of a
complementary innovation – the professionalization of gender segregation.
For militaries with mid-to-high levels of institutional commitment to inclusion, I also
expect to see the development of technological and tactical adjustments designed to enable a
military to recruit from as inclusive a pool of talent as possible, and/or address the gendered
challenges associated with a military innovation. Military organizations that seek to become more
inclusive will often have to update and/or alter their hardware so soldiers of all heights, weights,
and sexes can utilize them effectively. Take, for example, the US Air Force’s removal of a
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restriction prohibiting pilots of the F-35A fighter jet from weighing less than 136 pounds. This
restriction – originally put in place after testing demonstrated that lightweight pilots could be
seriously injured or killed while ejecting from the aircraft – precluded many women (and lighterweight men) from piloting the plane (Browne 2017).38 However, thanks to modifications to the
pilot’s helmet and the aircrafts’ ejection seat, lightweight pilots can now fly these planes. Here,
technological changes, such as making the helmet lighter, delaying the opening speed of the
parachute, and adding a head support panel to prevent the pilot’s head from moving backward
during the ejection, have assisted with gender inclusion. Not only do these changes allow more
soldiers to fly F-35As, but also they make the F-35 ejection system safer for all pilots (Browne
2017).39 The decision to build future submarines “with the height, reach and strength of women in
mind” (as currently indicated) would also serve as a relevant example (McDermott 2018).
Broadly speaking, the invention, adoption, and implementation of innovations are more
likely to arise in diverse organizations (Wilson 1966).40 Indeed, recent scholarship indicates that
companies with more women can be more innovative (Ann Hewlett, Marshall, and Sherbin 2013)
Thus, smaller-scale technological changes to assist with the integration of drones can
serve as a consequence of mid to high levels of gender inclusion. For example, one might expect
that militaries seeking to recruit women into roles that are difficult to fill, or that allow male
soldiers to ascend to more prestigious positions, will also invest in technological changes that
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A Pentagon testing office report raised concerns about the risk of neck injuries during ejections, finding
that lightweight pilots had a 23% chance of being killed and 100% chance of being injured by the ejection
process. Following this report, the weight restriction was imposed in 2015 (Browne 2017).
39
Notably, the US Navy and Marine Corp operate their own versions of the jet but have not yet announced
plans to modify the seats, retaining weight restrictions, suggesting that gender inclusion might be a lower
priority for these services (Browne 2017).
40
Wilson treats diversity as a function of the complexity of the task structure and of the incentive system:
in diverse organizations individuals are more likely to seek to define tasks for themselves to enhance their
bargaining power and are therefore more likely to innovate.
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might assist with gender inclusion. Such smaller-scale changes might, for example, include the
development and use of lightweight composite materials (or, more broadly,
technologies/materials associated with the weight a soldier carries).41 These arguments can be
summarized by the following hypothesis:
Inclusion Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Military organizations with more institutional commitments to
gender inclusion will invest in technological changes that can make such inclusion successful.
REVERSING THE CAUSAL ARROWS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF INNOVATION FOR
INCLUSION
While these hypotheses address when innovation will be integrated into military practice, one
potential longer-term knock-on effect of innovation adoption is that that integration may also
serve as a determinant of gender inclusion. This leads me to a second question for analysis: does
the integration of military innovations that minimize exposure to danger and the importance of
physical strength encourage military organizations to make gender reforms?
Institutional efforts towards the recruitment and retention of a more inclusive force have
historically gone hand in hand with the adoption of innovations that require the expansion of
(lower-status) support or other non-combat professional positions. Military innovations have
increasingly relied on experts for the development and operation of complex weapon systems
(Janowitz 1960), which has amplified the share of combat and service support positions (Binkin
1986). This change has contributed to the fragmentation of many specialties (Huntington 1957;
Rosen 1991), which are often segregated on the basis of gender difference (Carreiras 2006;
Mundy 2017). Gender mainstreaming efforts across militaries following the passing of UN
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Applicable future developments include modifications to Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) in
ballistic vests and exoskeletons, for example.
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Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security suggest an inherent
link between capacity building and research cooperation in advanced technologies with “human
and social aspects of security,” including counter-terrorism and civil-military relations (NATO
2017, 70). Thus, military innovation may be an important variable when considering what
accounts for changes in the extent of gender inclusion in the armed forces over time, and
differences across countries.
Indeed, other studies have targeted military technology as a potential factor driving inclusion,
but usually in the context of the rise of professionalization and the need for soldiers to fill the
ranks of more sophisticated and technologically advanced services (Kennedy-Pipe 2000;
Obradovic 2014).42 From this perspective, the shift from hand-to-hand combat to technical roles
in modern military operations will also produce a willingness to incorporate female personnel
(Van Creveld 2000). Thus, with the targeted recruitment of women to fill noncombat or
“feminine” roles on the basis of gender difference, we might also expect to see militaries that
have adopted an innovation to take steps to increase their institutional commitment to inclusion.
It is also possible that military organizations will learn from the effectiveness (or
ineffectiveness) of their chosen solution to the gendered challenges of integrating a given
innovation. In other words, a military may learn, through trial and error or observation of other
organizations, that making institutional investments in gender inclusion will enhance their ability
to successfully integrate an innovation, and then take further steps to make the organization more
inclusive. This dynamic is evident in the case of population-based counterinsurgency (COIN)
examined in Chapter 4. Here, the discourse surrounding military engagement in reconstruction
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Lana Obradovic (2014) reports technological advancements that no longer require most soldiers to be
physically present on the battlefield as a primary cause of gender reform (76). However, there is no explicit
measure of such advancement in her cross-national quantitative analysis.
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efforts has emphasized the significance of women and femininity for the forces (Kronsell and
Svedberg 2011). As a result, successful implementation of COIN was premised on the targeted
recruitment of women to fill noncombat or “feminine” roles on the basis of gender difference – as
demonstrated in the proliferation of Female Engagement Teams (FETs). Thus, we might also
expect to see militaries that have invested financial and organization resources towards the
adoption of COIN to take steps to increase their institutional commitment to inclusion.
In other words, inclusion may both affect – and be affected by – the integration of an
innovation in a military organization. When the adoption of a salient military innovation requires
the expansion of support or other non-combat professional positions, I expect to see military
organizations take institutional steps towards gender inclusion. This is the basis of the following
hypothesis:
Inclusion Hypothesis 3 (H3): Successful integration of an innovation that challenges established
gender hierarchies by a military organization will encourage future institutional commitments to
gender inclusion
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR INNOVATION INTEGRATION
Gender, of course, is not the only factor that can affect the integration of innovations. There
are several other variables that, independent of institutional commitment to inclusion, may
influence the ease with which a military organization can integrate a military innovation.
Hierarchy
Militaries are large and diverse organizations that have both hierarchy and varying
degrees of decentralization (Sapolsky, Friedman, and Green 2009, 7). The degree of hierarchy
within the military organization and the society in which it is embedded may also influence the
ease with which innovations that pose gendered challenges can be successfully integrated. The
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culture of disciplined obedience within military organizations emphasizes order, hierarchy, and
division of function, assigning less value to new ideas, concepts and innovations (Huntington
1957; Murray 1996, 301). A less centralized hierarchy, for example, might make a military both
more likely to take steps to become more inclusive and to accept innovations. Here, military
organizations might be more likely to privilege openness to new ideas and/or merit, leading not
just to the integration of gender-disruptive innovations, but the integration of any innovation.
Moreover, operating units may have more latitude to execute disruptive innovations without the
need for organizational changes: U.S. submarine warfare in the Pacific in World War II, for
example, required unrestricted warfare of a kind that was forbidden at the time but nonetheless
performed by the U.S. navy (Rosen 1994).
However, the opposite argument applies here as well – in less hierarchical organizations,
elites may experience more pushback when they try to implement innovations that pose gendered
challenges. Both centralized and decentralized commands have struggled to implement
innovations. Large military organizations are centrally directed and, as a result, the adoption and
integration of military innovations proceeds from the top down – even when operational control is
decentralized (Rosen 1994). It is thus not clear ex ante whether increased hierarchy should be
associated with more or less success in integrating innovations. An argument grounded in
hierarchy would not, however, predict differences in the successful integration of a military
innovation depending on whether the innovation challenged the traditional gender hierarchy. Nor
would it predict that differences in gender inclusivity would affect the success of integrating
innovations that challenge gender hierarchies.
Bureaucratic incentives
Subgroups within a military organization may also resist the integration of a military innovation
due to pure self-interest, as opposed to what they may see as “best” for their organization and
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military effectiveness more broadly. Their position as it may relate to autonomy, protection of
positions of power, and the marshaling of material resources, extends to other hierarchies aside
from gender (Rosen 1994, 18). In other words, there may be other relevant bureaucratic obstacles
blocking implementation: a military service might benefit from the gendered structure that an
innovation reinforces, but still be inclined to reject it on the basis that it could reallocate
important resources to another service. Similarly, there may be a bureaucratic structure in place
that leads to environment predisposed towards the adoptions of innovations (as demonstrated by
the U.S. Navy’s adoption of carrier warfare; Horowitz 2010, 73). Such institutional characteristics
may influence the flexibility and responsiveness of different organizations, even in the absence of
external threats or executive intervention (Avant 1994). However, while military bureaucracies
may have preferences for particular types of conflict, the role of bureaucratic resistance may also
serve as a mediating or constraining variable, rather than an imperative that drives policy
(Saunders 2011).
Force structure
The movement to all-volunteer forces, shrinking youth cohorts, and economic opportunities
in the private sector may also influence military recruitment and retention of personnel to perform
lower-status tasks. From this perspective, volunteer-based armed services compete for the best
candidates in a shared labor market for the best candidates (Moskos 2000; Moskos and Wood
1988). Here, the basic contract of the soldier within professional militaries is a liberal contract,
which shapes “expectations toward social mobility through acquiring education or a profession in
return for their service” (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2017, 140). In a system of mandatory
conscription, there may be more of an expectation that soldiers simply do what they are told,
whereas a volunteer system (especially one in which soldiers intend to make a career of service)
will face greater challenges with soldiers who are unwilling to undertake lower-status roles. In
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other words, because soldiers in volunteer armies choose to serve, they are not simply “more
highly motivated” as Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam (2011) argue, but rather more motivated in a
specific direction, namely to ascend the professional hierarchy (932). Laborsaving innovations
that reduce exposure to risk may be especially appealing to volunteer militaries that are more
sensitive to potential casualties (Vasquez 2005). However, unless the roles such innovations
introduce are ascribed a higher status within the military organization, they are unlikely to appeal
to personnel seeking career advancement.
Alternatively, conscripted personnel may be serving against their will and with soldiers with
whom they have little in common. Thus, it may be more challenging for such conscription
militaries to achieve discipline and unit cohesion, with important implications for the
effectiveness of military operations (Cohen 2013; Shils and Janowitz 1948). Moreover,
conscription might undermine the development of skills required to integrate a given innovation –
regardless of how disruptive it is to the status quo. Biddle, for example, questions whether
conscript militaries can effectively master the “modern system” of force employment because
they return to civilian life before mastering “the necessary tasks” (2004, 49).43
Threat Perception
Large-scale geopolitical threats can also influence the manner in which a military
organization will respond to the challenges associated with a given innovation (Posen 1984). The
Realist approach stresses the predominance of security competition in the international system
and its role in driving state interests. Here, the threat to national security is a causal mechanism,
connecting the security environment to policy decisions regarding innovation integration (Weiss

43

Grauer and Horowitz, however, find no significant relationship between the adoption of the modern
system and conscription (2012, 10).
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2018).44 In other words, a high level of perceived threat may tend to drive militaries to make the
necessary organizational changes required to integrate a disruptive innovation. While in
peacetime senior officers are “systematically promoted from below,” in accordance with existing
hierarchies, the integration of innovations can require the creation of new promotion pathways
that open up more opportunities for personnel with varying areas of expertise (Rosen 1994, 20).
However, this line of reasoning ignores the existence of gendered obstacles to integrating
innovations.
Other scholars have noted that external threats may heighten manpower shortage concerns,
influencing a military’s decision to recruit and retain an increasingly inclusive force (Carreiras
2006; Obradovic 2014; Segal 1995). Here, threat serves as a potential driver of inclusion, rather
than how military organizations may choose to address gendered challenges of integration.
Indeed, after women are mobilized in times of war, they are often then demobilized and once
again restricted in the types of services they can perform. And for male personnel, filling roles
formally occupied by women during wartime can be perceived as emasculating. Thus, I include
and test the importance of this explanatory variable in my large-N analysis of the drivers of
inclusion in Chapter 5.
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For example, in the Cuban missile crisis, national leaders modified organizational routines when
necessary – as demonstrated by the creation and operation of the ExComm (Welch 1992, 124).
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SUMMARIZING INNOVATION-INCLUSION THEORY
Table 2-3. Summary of Hypotheses

H1

The more institutional commitment to gender inclusion a military organization makes, the
more effectively it will respond to the gendered challenges of a military innovation that
challenges established gender hierarchies and hence the more likely the organization will be
to successfully integrate the innovation.

H1a

Rejection: Military organizations with low levels of institutional commitment to gender
inclusion will resist the integration of a military innovation that challenges established gender
hierarchies into their operations.

H1b

Feminization: Military organizations with middle levels of inclusion will utilize gender
difference to assist with the integration of a military innovation into their operations, resulting
in the professionalization (or further institutionalization of gender segregated roles) of gender
segregation.

H1c

Full Integration: Military organizations with high levels of gender inclusion will be more
likely to elevate noncombat roles, establish new promotion patterns, and/or consider
redefinitions of combat itself

H2

Military organizations that have lower levels of institutional commitment to inclusion will
seek to integrate a military innovation while maintaining the existing masculine hierarchy.
They will devote resources towards the development of a complementary innovation – the
professionalization of gender segregation.

H2a

Military organizations with more institutional commitments to gender inclusion will invest in
technological changes that can make such inclusion successful.

H3

Successful integration of an innovation that challenges established gendered hierarchies by
a military organization will encourage future institutional commitments to gender inclusion

These hypotheses imply the relationship illustrated in Figure 2-2 below. If a military
organization adopts an innovation that challenges dimensions of risk and/or physical strength, I
expect the level of institutional commitment to gender inclusion to drive their approach to
integration. This approach is, of course, also influenced by other factors that influence innovation
integration, regardless of whether an innovation poses gendered challenges.
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Figure 2-2. Relationships Among the Hypotheses
H1

YES

DOES INNOVATION
REDUCE RISK EXPOSURE
AND/OR NEED FOR
PHYSICAL STRENGTH?

LEVEL OF
INSTITUTIONAL
COMMITMENT TO
GENDER
INCLUSION

SUB GROUP
RESPONSE
H2
INNOVATION

LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESSFUL
INTEGRATION

ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS
BUREACRATIC
INCENTIVES
HIERARCHY

H3

THREAT
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESSFUL
INTEGRATION (ABSENT
GENDERED CHALLENGES)

NO

FORCE
STRUCTURE

TESTING THE THEORY
I test these hypotheses using a mixed-methods approach that leverages paired case
comparisons, process-tracing, and large-N quantitative analysis of cross-national and temporal
data collection. The components of this research design allow me to examine and compare not
only how military organizations approach the gendered challenges of innovation integration, but
also how such integration affects broad changes across military inclusion regimes. Case studies
allow for a detailed analysis of drone integration – how the level of gender inclusion within a
military organization shapes a military’s approach to innovation integration, the challenges that
arose, and the ways those challenges were addressed (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004). I
examine two instances in which military innovations challenge the gender status quo by reducing
exposure to risk and/or the need for physical strength: the integration and use of drones and
population-based counterinsurgency (COIN). In order to test the effect of innovation adoption on
gender inclusion, I then utilize a large-N approach, drawing from an original dataset of
Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) across all NATO member and partner countries.
This approach allows me to not only shed light on the variation in inclusion across military
organizations, but also not locate broad trends in the factors that lend to (or detract from) a
military’s decision to invest in recruiting and retaining of a more inclusive force.
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INNOVATION CASE SELECTION AND PROCESS TRACING METHODS
Military innovations are important but difficult to pin down empirically, given
substantial variation across innovations. Thus, my universe of cases includes what are generally
accepted as innovative changes in the conduct of warfare across the military innovation
literature.45 Table 2-4 below presents a range of historical military innovations. This table
includes not just innovations that introduce reduced physical strength requirements and/or a lower
degree of risk, but also those that require soldiers to be physically strong and increase their
exposure to risk. The latter are innovations that reinforce, rather than destabilize traditional
gendered hierarchies, and thus do not pose gendered challenges within the scope of my theory.
Table 2-4. The Universe of Military Innovation Cases: 20th to 21st Centuries
Military Innovation

Century

Armored Warfare

Risk

Strength

th

High

High

th

High

High

th

20 Century

Battlefleet Warfare

20 Century

Tactical Fires

20 Century

High

High

Fortifications (Trenches)

20th Century

High

High

th

Low

High

th

High

Low

th

High

High

th

Medical

20 Century

Chemical Weapons

20 Century

Close Air Support

20 Century

Radar, Signals Intelligence

20 Century

Low

Low

Motorization, Blitzkrieg

20th Century

High

High

th

High

High

th

High

High

th

High

High

th

Amphibious Warfare

20 Century

Carrier Warfare

20 Century

Submarine Warfare

20 Century

Air Defense

20 Century

High

Low

Strategic Bombing

20th Century

High

Low

th

High

Low

th

High

High

Helicopter Air mobility

20 Century

Total War

20 Century

45

This list draws from a more extensive set of innovation cases compiled in Horowitz and Pindyck’s
(2020) analysis of the existing definitions of military innovation. This list represents only a limited sample
of innovation cases and there is significant variation across the literature regarding which cases “count” as
true innovations. While there are certainly many additional relevant cases for analysis, this dissertation
represents an initial step towards testing the broader theory.
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20th – 21st Centuries

Nuclear Revolution
Air-land Battle, Follow-on-Forces Attack

Low

Low

th

st

High

High

th

st

High

High

th

st

20 – 21 Centuries

Unconventional Warfare

20 – 21 Centuries

Counterterrorism

20 – 21 Centuries

High

Low

Population-based Counterinsurgency (COIN)

20th – 21st Centuries

High

Low

st

High

High

st

Low

Low

st

Low

Low

st

Transformation, Effects-Based Operations

21 Century

Guided Missiles

21 Century

Information / Electronics Warfare

21 Century

Network-Centric Warfare

21 Century

Low

Low

Computers46

21st Century

Low

Low

st

Low

Low

st

Low

Low

Remotely Piloted Vehicles (Drones)

21 Century

th

4 Generation Warfare

21 Century

Note: This list draws from Horowitz and Pindyck’s (2020) survey of existing definitions of military innovation
and cases considered in the literature.

I select two innovations for analysis that provide relevant variation on the independent
variable, allow me to control for key alternative explanators for which data can be obtained, and
are intrinsically significant and relevant to contemporary operations. The first innovation is
Remotely Piloted Vehicles, commonly referred to as drones, and the second is population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN).
For each of these two innovations, I compare how military organizations with varying levels
of institutional commitment to gender inclusion responded to the gendered challenges associated
with the innovation. Thus, my research design conceptualizes each innovation as a set of nested
cases and focuses on how different military organizations, with varying degrees of institutional
commitment to inclusion, respond to its gendered challenges differently. As Table 2-5 below
shows, innovations are also selected on the basis of opportunity for paired comparisons that vary
on my independent variable during clearly noted moments in time. This allows for a close

46

As integrated circuits became smaller and more powerful in the late 1970s and early 1980s, computing
capabilities rapidly developed. These changes would later usher in significant advances in cyber
capabilities as well as the integration of such capabilities into conventional war fighting arsenals (Schneider
2017, 82-83).
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analysis of key periods of change in innovation integration across military communities with
varying degrees of gender inclusion.47
Drones are a clear case of an innovation that my theory predicts would generate gendered
challenges. The reason is simple: pilots are remote from violence, avoiding personal risk. Tapping
on a keyboard does not readily overlap with valued military traits of strength, courage, or
toughness. While drone technology is rapidly proliferating and has a range of potential
applications (Byman 2013; Davis et al 2014; Horowitz et al 2016), countries that invest heavily in
remote platforms have struggled to keep up with the growing number of pilots needed to operate
them (Kreps 2016). Moreover, given that drone operations are conducted from a distance instead
of in a battle space with the enemy, operators are recruited and trained differently (Ehrhard 2010).
As I will explain further in Chapter 3, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) provides a useful case
to test my theory for several reasons. First, the IDF has invested substantial resources into the
integration of drones since early initiatives during the 1970s, allowing for concentrated and
enduring within-case variation over time. Second, the IDF’s relative success in the
implementation of drones to enhance their security interests means that the organization serves as
an influential case (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 403-405). Such success indicates that I would be
less likely to observe gendered challenges to the integration of drones. Within the IDF, I leverage
inter-service variation in gender inclusion across the Israel Air Force (IAF) and Artillery Corps to
test my theory through a nested case analysis.48 While the IAF was the first service in the IDF to
open up combat roles to women, the Artillery Corps took longer to remove occupational and rank
restrictions on the basis of sex. These cases represent different values of the independent variable

47

Such timing and sequencing of events is critical to making inferences about causal relationships (Beach
and Pedersen 2013, 2-5; Bennett and Checkel 2015, 6).
48
For other examples of nested case analyses see Carson 2018 and Lin-Greenberg 2019. On the use of
“subcases” within a single case, see Gerring 2004, 342; Hall 2003, 395.
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– the level of institutional commitment to gender inclusion. They also allow me to control for
alternative explanations of threat and force structure.
Table 2-5. Innovation Case Selection
Lower Inclusion Case

Higher Inclusion Case

Period of Change

Population-Based
Counterinsurgency

Turkish Armed Forces

Australian Defense
Force

2001 – 2016

Drones

Israel Artillery Corps

Israel Air Force

1995 – 2017

In my other case, my theory’s predictions are more nuanced. Population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations involve considerable risk but also the expansion of
noncombat roles requiring lower levels of physical strength. Unlike traditional combat operations
that primarily rely on masculine warriors, counterinsurgency requires cultural sensitivity, state
building, and intelligence gathering – soldiers must be ready “both to fight and to build” (FM324, 1-105). The elevation of noncombat roles, cultural awareness, and the strategic use of gender
difference amongst soldiers have proven challenging for military organizations seeking to
implement COIN.
Given that the use of COIN is largely characteristic of the Western counterinsurgency
community, I compare two NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in
Afghanistan with varying levels of institutional commitment to gender inclusion – the Turkish
Armed Forces (TAF) and Australian Defense Force (ADF). Here, the U.S. approach to
counterinsurgency and publication of the U.S. Field Manual 3-24 in 2006 initiated a wave of
doctrinal innovation across the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan. By focusing on this population and
moment in time, I am able to examine a specific, contained instance in which a range of militaries
with varying levels of gender inclusion (or exclusion) regimes had to decide how best to
incorporate COIN doctrine. The TAF and ADF in particular were actively involved in ISAF
operations across all stages. Moreover, in contrast to the TAF, which had the lowest level of
65

gender inclusion across all ISAF participating militaries, the ADF made substantial investments
in gender policy reforms during the 21st century, providing variation in the independent variable
(shifting from middle to high levels of inclusion) over time.
For both sets of nested cases, qualitative analysis and a comparative case study method allow
me to analyze innovations adopted by military organizations with varying gender regimes. Here,
the absence of large numbers of like cases, and the linked nature of processes of innovation
development and diffusion, covariance methods are impractical and ill suited (Herrera 2006, 5).
Process tracing allows me to make causal claims by establishing temporal succession and
contiguity between chains of events and looking for observable evidence of causal mechanisms
(Bennett and Checkel 2015, 4). Such controlled comparisons help me identify the causal
importance of institutional commitment to inclusion and the theory’s subgroup mechanisms. I use
process tracing in each case to establish (a) whether the innovation posed gendered challenges;
(b) the organization’s response to these challenges; and (c) the extent to which this response
helped or hindered the successful integration of the innovation (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 4). I
utilize key moments of change to investigate variation in both the approaches to and experiences
with innovation integration, and consider the normative and international context surrounding
such processes (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 120-43; Bennett and Checkel 2015, 23). As evidence,
I rely primarily on primary sources – including official documents, news articles, and semistructured interviews.
Measuring success
There are a variety of ways to measure the relative success, or effectiveness, of innovation
integration. There is a tendency amongst scholars of military effectiveness to define effectiveness
in terms military victories and battlefield outcomes (Horowitz 2010, 5; Millett and Murray 2010,
2). However, effectiveness may not always result in military victories given the possibility of
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unequal circumstances and a range of other potential intervening variables (Brooks 2003, 154;
Grauer 2016). And while militaries are always trying to project power and deter their enemies,
they are not always fighting wars. Others define effectiveness more broadly as combat or fighting
power (Grauer and Quackenbush 2021, 2; Van Creveld 1982). Such approaches tend to think of
effectiveness as derived from a combination of “men and material” – specifically, the extraction
of combat power from a (male and masculine) fighting force (Grauer and Quackenbush 2021, 2).
In addition to battlefield victories, effectiveness is also measured in terms of the ability to reduce
casualties (or inflict casualties on your enemy, depending on your perspective). For example,
Biddle and Long (2004), Beckley (2010), and Lyall (2020) measure effectiveness using a “loss
exchange ratio,” or attacker casualties divided by defender casualties.49
In contrast to the outcome-driven literature, this study takes an alternative approach to
measuring relative success. Rather than examining war outcomes, it examines the changes a
military must make in order to implement a given military innovation, all else equal. This
understanding of effective innovation integration draws from scholarship on military
effectiveness that focuses on the ability of militaries to perform a specific set of missions and
functions (Biddle 2004; Pollack 2002; Talmadge 2015). Put another way, military innovation
requires a military force with the skillset required to effectively utilize the innovation (Biddle
2004; Talmadge 2015). Here, success is measured by how well a military organization performs a
set of tasks that are associated with a specific set of skills required to implement a given
innovation.

49

Casualties and other data on outcomes in battles are also used in studies that seek to examine learning
processes during wars. See, for example, Weisiger 2016.
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Notably, a failure to perform such tasks may naturally influence outcomes on the battlefield –
which is why scholars who define effectiveness along these lines nonetheless examine such
outcomes (Biddle 2007). Indeed, in the analyses that follow I explain how many of my interview
subjects noted that a failure to perform the necessary tasks required to fly a drone, for example,
resulted in problems on the battlefield. This has important implications for military power. The
performance of a specific set of tasks and demonstration of the necessary skillset to do so may
influence battlefield outcomes, and also the translation of resources into asserting dominance and
will on the international stage. However, the measurement approach at hand does not focus on
outcomes. This study defines effectiveness in a manner that focuses on the tasks required to
integrate and implement a given innovation, with broader implications for combat and military
power.
This measurement strategy considers gendered aspects of operational effectiveness that are
largely omitted from the existing literature. It focuses on the degree to which soldiers are
sufficiently trained and prepared for the tasks at hand. If such soldiers are devalued and
disparaged, for example, training and preparation are unlikely to be successful. Here, gendered
hierarchies serve to demonstrate to personnel that their presence is unwanted, that they don’t
belong, and/or that they are perceived as lesser contributors to national defense. Such forms of
gender-based discrimination do not lend to an environment in which male and female soldiers can
thrive, and holds back men and women from performing to the best of their abilities (Egnell and
Alam 2019, 259). Thus, the specific gendered challenges associated with task performance are of
significant importance when considering whether or not soldiers have the necessary skillset to
implement a given innovation.
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Next, I examine whether the integration of low risk/strength innovations drives gender
inclusion reform. Unlike the previous analyses, this chapter takes a quantitative, macro-historical
approach and tests if military innovation results in higher levels of institutional commitment to
inclusion, treating gender inclusion as the dependent variable. Given the complex and varied
nature of “inclusion” in the armed forces, I build on the existing scholarship discussed in Chapter
6 to compile an index score that will allow for the application of a quantitative approach. While
my relevant universe of cases includes all modern state militaries from 1991 to the present, this
initial analysis focuses solely on NATO member and partner countries.50 Carreiras (2006) points
out the convergence effects of a NATO country analysis: global pressures to achieve gender
equality in society at large, professionalization of the military, and common membership in the
Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) constitute a common denominator that
produces “comparable effects in terms of cognitive models, policy orientation, and formalization
of behaviors” (97). Moreover, this confluence of factors arguably biases against my argument,
strengthening the validity of my findings. The statistical analysis is built from an original dataset
that measures Institutional Commitment to Inclusion (ICI), as well as historical accounts of all
military innovations examined in the literature cross-nationally and over time.
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The end of the Cold War introduced an opportunity for militaries, especially those in the Global North, to
restructure their forces for the 21st century. Throughout the 1990s, militaries around the world reduced
personnel, cut defense budgets, closed military bases, and formed new volunteer-based forces (Obradovic
2014, 39). Without massive land wars to fight, or a tax-paying and voting population interested in paying
for conscription of a large standing army, most states shifted their emphasis from large, conventional
warfare forces, to light, high-quality and high-tech forces, moving from “a heavy to a light force model”
(Obradovic 2014; Sankey 2018, xi).
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The ICI index measures the extent of institutional commitment to gender inclusion across a
series of possible indicators.51 Such indicators include occupational restrictions, formal rank
restrictions, family programs, harassment policies and monitoring procedures, and LGBTQ+
exclusions. In order to evaluate differences in de facto and de jure change, I also examine
percentages of the total active force. This approach also allows me to examine differences across
the dimensions of inclusion. In most cases, data had to be extrapolated from individual country
reports and summary reports published by the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives from
2008 to 2016, as well as an organizational survey conducted in all NATO nations in the year
2000. For earlier dates, a range of individual primary country sources, as well as secondary
sources were consulted.
In order to determine what drives inclusion reform, the statistical analysis draws on other
explanatory factors that lead to higher levels of inclusion – such as domestic empowerment, force
structure, and threat perception.
My empirical findings regarding how inclusion affects innovation integration can be found in
Chapters 3 and 4, and those regarding how low risk/strength innovation integration affects
inclusion are in Chapter 5.
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These indicators a largely drawn from previous quantitative cross-national analyses of the participation
of women in NATO forces conducted by Obradovic (2014) and Carreiras (2006) – who are building from
Segal’s (1995) model of inclusion in the armed forces.
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CHAPTER 3 : THE CHAIR FORCE
In February 2013, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta unveiled the Distinguished Warfare
Medal (DWM) to honor pilots and other troops far removed from the theatre of war, whose
actions have an “extraordinary” impact on combat operations. Having “seen first-hand how
modern tools like remotely piloted platforms and cyber systems changed the way wars are
fought,” Panetta intended to introduce the Distinguished Warfare Medal to reflect “the reality of
the kind of technological warfare that we are engaged in in the 21st century” (Panetta 2013). The
medal, referred to by some derisively as “the Nintendo Medal,” was immediately met with strong
opposition – criticized both for cheapening battle sacrifices of “actual” war heroes engaged in
kinetic battles, and for normalizing the desensitized killing of people far away (Economist
2014b). Indeed, when the idea of awarding such medals to drone pilots was aired, a retired Green
Beret exclaimed “I suppose now they will award Purple Hearts for carpal tunnel syndrome”
(Economist 2014a). One USAF veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan likened operating a drone to
“being a pilot for nerds,” pointing out that “I don’t think they’re going to make movies about
guys who fly Predators” (Enemark 2013, 88).52 For many, the actions taken by “armchair
warriors” who commute home to their families in suburban Nevada each night seem simply
irreconcilable with traditional conceptions of heroic acts of valor. Given the intense criticism
from the media, elected officials, veterans’ groups, and coalitions seeking to limit the use of
autonomous weapons, incoming Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel scrapped the medal less than
a month after Panetta announced it (de Volo 2016, 60).
Unmanned, or remotely piloted aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones, have become
ubiquitous forms of military hardware, and have been widely used in warfare. Large fractions of
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Several films have been made about drone pilots. Including, for example, Good Kill in which a USAF
pilot struggles with the ethics of drone strikes.
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military budgets have been spent on the development, production and purchase of remotely
piloted airframes, ranging from the size of commercial aircraft to the size of large insects.53
Indeed, drones offer an array of operational applications that are appealing to many military
organizations. However, while a growing number of militaries invest heavily in the purchase and
adoption of remote platforms, they often fail to pay sufficient attention to the means by which
these systems are controlled (Conwell et al 2016, 15). Despite what the title “unmanned aerial
vehicles” implies, humans are very much in control, or “in the loop.”54 Remote operations depend
heavily on extensive systems of human support.
In this chapter, I argue that in order to understand why militaries struggle with the human
component of drone integration, one must account for the role of gender in the military arena.
Why is gender an issue here? As Panetta’s failed Distinguished Warfare Medal illustrates, the
actions taken by drone operators do not align with a military culture and organizational hierarchy
that rewards and promotes soldiers on the basis of characteristics such as heroism, exposure to
risk, and the demonstration of personal strength. Such privileged characteristics have historically
been associated with manliness and masculinities (Tickner 1999; Goldstein 2001; Sjoberg 2013).
Drone operators, however, engage in the battlefield from a distance, with little or no risk to their
own lives. Unlike soldiers with boots on the ground, operators engage in warfare from trailers,
often on bases near their families and loved ones. There is no need for operators to be physically
strong to conduct their operations. Rather, operators require a different set of skills, such as
mental acuity, attention to detail, and patience with lengthy and repetitive tasks. These are skills
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The Black Hornet Nano, for example, is a handheld, 2.8-pound, micro drone equipped with cameras
(Sanborn 2015).
54
A separate, but important question for future research is how the replacement of remotely piloted drones
with autonomous systems without an operator in the loop will disrupt and/or reassert existing gendered
hierarchies within military organizations. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the gendered implications of
Artificial Intelligence (AI).

72

that have traditionally been associated with femininity and the gender segregation of labor in
military organizations, but also in other sectors of the economy. Derisive references to “cubicle
warriors” highlight a discomfort with drone warfare’s disorientation of the gendered,
heteronormative structures that organize traditional narratives of warfare (Clark 2019, 3; Dagget
2015).
Even with a technology as versatile and potentially path-breaking as drones, their integration
and use may be a struggle because of the challenge they pose to traditional military norms and
hierarchies. I argue that the degree to which a military organization invests in recruiting and
retaining a gender inclusive force will influence its ability to surmount the challenges of drones.
Military communities that invest in institutional commitments to inclusion – for example by
reducing occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, expanding family programs, and sexual
assault and harassment monitoring – are more likely to have the needed flexibility when it comes
to the elevation of roles that fall outside of the combat warrior framework, and thus greater
success with the integration of drones.
To illustrate this theory, I leverage inter-service variation in gender inclusion within a
military organization that has been relatively successful with the development and
implementation of remote platforms and thus serves as an informative case – the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF). In particular, I examine how the Israel Air Force (IAF) and Artillery Corps dealt
with the gendered challenges of drone integration in different ways. While the Air Force was the
first service in the IDF to open up combat roles to women, the Artillery Corps took longer to
remove occupational and rank restrictions on the basis of sex. Not only have the policies towards
and culture of inclusion varied across these two services over time, but so has the physicality, or
proximity to “the fight” associated with roles in each service. While both services emphasize the
degree to which their soldiers risk their lives, Artillery Corps positions are more concerned with
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on-the-ground operations, and therefore emphasize physicality, strength, and the sex-specific
nature of the tasks at hand. I draw on several qualitative sources, including interviews with retired
and reservist Israel Defense Force (IDF) drone operators and jet pilots, and Israeli defense
industry experts, in addition to Israeli news articles, and other primary sources, to identify factors
that affect the success of drone integration
I find that while the Air Force showed less resistance to the integration of drones and the
delineation of roles as “combat support,” this was not true for the Artillery drone operators, who
resolutely considered themselves to be unrecognized and underappreciated “warriors.” These
findings suggest that the ways in which the gendered challenges of drones are addressed has
important implications for military effectiveness and the gendered division of labor in the
military.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF DRONES
The term “drone” encompasses a range of combat and surveillance systems that are operated
remotely.55 The concept behind such systems is nothing new. Uninhabited aircrafts have been
part of military aviation since the early years of flight.56 In 1917, the British remotely guided an
aircraft by radio, and soon after the U.S. Army Air Corps developed the Kettering Bug to crash
into targets much like a flying torpedo. By the 1930s, the US Army and Navy were using pilotless
aircrafts for anti-aircraft gun target practice, and the first mass-produced target aircraft, the RP-4,
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I use the terms drone, uninhabited (or unmanned) aircraft, and remotely piloted aircraft interchangeably.
Notably, these terms do not describe autonomous systems that are able to make decisions on the use of
force without a human operator in the loop.
56
Unmanned balloons, for example, were used in the 1849 Italian War and the American Civil War
(Horowitz et al 2016, 10).
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was developed in 1935.57 When an American pilot was shot down over the Soviet Union in the
1960 U-2 incident, an increased interest in the reduction of risk to pilots spurred further work on
uninhabited flight, and the U.S. employed surveillance drones during the Vietnam War (Erhard
2010).
A notable shift in the development of drones occurred in 1973, when Soviet-built Arab
defenses challenged Israel’s air supremacy, and the IDF began to reevaluate their military
hardware and invest in the development of indigenous drones as a potential response (Weiss
2018, 198-199). This shift would depend largely on the technical progress of the IDF, fueled by
politically induced technology transfers from the United States. As technologies advanced and
improved, pilotless aircrafts were transformed into reconnaissance platforms, and were used
during the Cold War and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. By the 1980s, drones could provide
real-time intelligence gathering and electronic jamming, and could be armed with precision
munitions. The moderately capable drones employed in Israel’s operations in 1982 would mark
an early demonstration and moment of trial and error, followed by the U.S. deployment of the
unarmed Predator in the 1990s Balkans war, and the so-called drone revolution following 9/11
(Weiss 2018, 187-188; Ehrhard 2010).
In the years since, drones have played an increasing role in how military forces fight, with
immense promise for achieving battlefield outcomes. Drone technology has grown dramatically
and military organizations operate a range of remotely piloted systems.58 While unarmed drones
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Variants of the aircraft (also referred to as the US Army OQ-2A) were operated from the outset of World
War II until 1960 (Conwell et al 2016, 17).
58
While outside of the scope of this analysis, it is worth noting that remote operations also occur on the
ground and at sea. For example, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) can be used for demolition and
demining operations, to carry weapons, heavy equipment, and wounded soldiers, and to provide
surveillance. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) can target ships and submarines, and conduct mine-
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can be used solely for surveillance and reconnaissance, armed systems can also carry out lethal
missions. The more advanced the drone, the greater the range of over the horizon operational and
loitering capabilities.59 Notably, these platforms also vary across their required systems of human
support and the proximity of operators to the battlefield, with implications for both the degree of
risk posed to operators, as well as the psychological implications of both targeted strike and
surveillance-based operations.
The usual components of a remotely piloted system include the aircraft itself, a
communication system, a ground control station (GCS), and, if necessary, equipment to launch
and recover the aircraft. While small drones, like the Raven, may be controlled with a hand-held
controller, a laptop, and backpack antenna, larger drones such as Predator and Global Hawk have
ground stations the size of truck trailers. The more sophisticated the done, the greater the human
support required to operate, maintain, and support the remote system. While one person may be
able to build, operate, and maintain a more basic drone, this is not the case in more complex
systems. For example, around 168 people are needed to keep a Predator in the air for 24 hours,
and 300 people are required for the larger Global Hawk (Cloud 2011). Moreover, as complexity
increases, so does the need for personnel training.60
While historical accounts of drone development emphasize the employment of remote
aircrafts and advances in hardware capabilities, far less attention has been paid to the human
aspects of controlling the vehicle or mission planning (Conwell et al 2016, 17). These human

hunting and sweeping operations. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) can recover items from the sea
floor and provide intelligence (Roblin 2019).
59
For example, the U.S. Predator and Reaper combine data processing and logistical capacity, allowing the
U.S. to conduct strikes around the world. However, many drones lack these capabilities: the armed Chinese
CH-3 can reportedly fly at a much shorter range than the U.S. Reaper, and can remain in the air for less
than half as long, carrying half the payload (Horowitz et al 2016, 12).
60
In advanced systems, the GCS is configured to perform mission planning, fly the aircraft, launch and
recover the system, control payloads, and provide situational awareness (Conwell et al 2016, 17).
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aspects are not only highly gendered, but they have also proven to be especially disruptive to the
set of traditions and values that define military organizations – which is consistent with my
theoretical expectations.
DRONES AS A MILITARY INNOVATION
While some scholars have described the “unmanning” of warfare as a revolutionary change in
weapons development, others contest just how significant the development of drones is for the
way militaries fight.61 Despite this disagreement, scholars generally agree that drones are
nonetheless “an important innovation” (Freedman 2016, 153). Regardless of how transformative
remotely piloted systems are, they represent a change in the conduct of warfare designed to
increase military power (Horowitz et al 2016; Horowitz and Pindyck 2020).62 The potential
benefits of armed and unarmed remote vehicles holds immense promise for military
organizations.
Given that drones do not have a pilot on board, they significantly reduce potential human
costs to using military force. In addition to removing the risk that pilots will be killed, drones also
remove the need for search-and-rescue packages that accompany strike aircrafts in case a pilot is
downed, requiring fewer assets to carry out a given mission. As a result, drones provide strategic
utility in especially high-risk, contested environments (Conwell et al 2016, 17). Moreover, in
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For example, Singer refers to drones as “the most important weapons development since the atomic
bomb” and Saur and Schörnig call them the “silver bullet of democratic warfare” (Singer 2010, 10; Saur
and Schörnig 2012, 363). Freedman, on the other hand, is skeptical of just how “revolutionary” drones are
(Freedman 2016, 153).
62
As I discuss in Chapter 1, It is important to note that there is a difference between what a military
innovation is designed to do, and its battlefield outcomes: while military innovations, by definition,
promise to enhance military power, they are not always successful in doing so (Horowitz and Pindyck
2020). Indeed, the military effectiveness of drones is a subject of debate: David Kilcullen, for example,
argues that drone strikes result in the loss of local support and mobilize people to join insurgent groups
(Freedman 2016).
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comparison to pilots, drone operators require limited training. While piloting an F-22 takes years
of training, Reapers and Predators are relatively easy to learn to fly (Davis et al 2014, 11).
Drones also increase the possibility of greater centralized control over the use of force.
Uninhabited vehicles can remain aloft over potential targets for far longer than piloted aircraft,
offering advantages in terms of identifying and engaging targets, and bolstering surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities: continued, real-time surveillance can enhance a military’s ability to
identify targets and minimize collateral damage (Horowitz et al 2016, 21; Davis et al 2014, 11).63
As a result, many modern systems can carry out multiple phases of military operations. Drones
make it possible for an operator to identify, monitor, and strike targets miles away, bringing
together transformative technologies such as advanced sensors, instantaneous communications,
efficient engines, global positioning systems, and, in the case of the larger platforms, missiles
(Freedman 2016, 153-154).
Finally, the technology underlying drones has become commercially available, and there are
many willing exporters (Byman 2013; Davis et al 2014, 11; Horowitz et al 2016, 9). Compared to
inhabited aircraft, drones are relatively cheap and their costs are falling (Gilli and Gilli 2016). As
a result, drones are an extremely attractive military innovation for a variety of actors. A
significant number of countries have been engaged in the development and construction of
drones, and some of them, such as the U.S., Israel, and China, are active exporters. In short, the
appeal of drones is further demonstrated by their proliferation around the world.
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Nonetheless, scholars have noted that the reported civilian casualties, or “collateral damage” from drone
strikes are unreliable, locating discrepancies between official figures and those reported by independent
organizations (Plaw, Fricker, and Colon 2015).
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THE GENDERED DIMENSIONS OF DRONE WARFARE
The adoption of drones requires not just the acquisition of the aircrafts themselves and the
construction of physical infrastructure (e.g. runways, hangars, training grounds, and bases), but
also the creation of new personnel positions and dedicated units. Both the formation of units
dedicated solely to the operation of drones, and the reconstitution of existing units to operate
drones alongside an existing set of tasks (such as piloting inhabited aircrafts, or conducting
ground combat operations), requires the recruitment, training, and retraining of soldiers to
perform new tasks that require a different set of skills than traditional combat soldiers. Such roles
are less prestigious, and challenge commonly held, gendered constructions of militarization and
warfare (Manjikian 2013, 50).
To understand the problem, remember that militaries are predominantly masculine
institutions, prioritizing combat and a dichotomous, essentialist perception of gender. In military
organizations, traits such as physical strength and courage are rewarded and promoted, producing
gender hierarchies. Such hierarchies define what is masculine or feminine, and what attributes are
viewed as inherent in men and women. Remote warfare, however, fails to align with the
traditional understanding of combatant and war hero, thus making it difficult to distinguish which
tasks are worthy of honor, value, and respect within military organizations (de Volo 2016, 58;
Clark 2019).
Table 3-1. Classification of Drones Based on Risk and Physical Strength

Physical strength
requirements

Low

High

Soldier exposure to risk
Low
Nuclear weapons
Drones
Precision strike; C4ISR
Cyber-warfare
Longbow; Crossbow
Medical (Ambulances)
Artillery
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High
Fighter planes
Poison gas
COIN
Suicide terrorism
Swords
Bayonets
Amphibious landing

As shown in Table 3-1, drones remove the need for both physical strength and exposure to
risk, and thus reside in the low-low cell where the gendered challenges of integration are expected
to be the most acute. While drones fly in war zones, human pilots and sensor operators can be
thousands of miles away, conducting operations a safe distance from the battlefield.64 Given that
operating a drone does not require the physical toughness associated with combatants, the
unmanning of warfare opens roles for those who have been traditionally disqualified from
military service on the basis of sex, disability, and/or injury (deVolo 2016, 58; Dagget 2015,
362). Drone operators require a different set of skills than the masculine warrior. Finally, because
remote operations involve no risk of life, it is difficult for drone operators to exhibit courage and
be rewarded accordingly within the military organization.
Blurring the boundary between protecting and protected
The replacement of manned aircrafts with unmanned aerial vehicles complicates the
boundary between masculine and heroic actions performed on the battlefield, and the feminized
realm of domesticity and peace. The narrative surrounding the world of war and that of civilian
society, or home life, reflects accepted discourses about gender-appropriate behavior (Elshtain
1987). This separation is a foundational aspect of military strategy. For example, Sun Tzu refers
to fighting that occurs across such blurred boundaries as “dispersive ground” where soldiers are
near their homes and “long to return” (1971, XI-2, 130). From this perspective, soldiers need to
physically and psychologically separate themselves from the feminine sphere of families, homes,
and social networks in order to fight effectively.

64

In the United States, for example, drone pilots conduct operations from trailers located at the Nellis and
Creech Air Force bases in Nevada (Singer 2009, 34).
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These distinctions, however, are less clear for many drone operators who are often still
dealing with the pressures of home life while experiencing the psychological disconnect of being
at war (Sjoberg 2013, 206). They must transition from the sphere of “battle” back to that of their
home each day. As one operator pointed out, “you see Americans killed in front of your eyes and
then have to go to a PTA meeting” (Singer 2009, 34). Here, the site where protecting occurs is
not separated from the sites to be protected: combat occurs near the home, grocery store, and
soccer field (Daggett 2015, 368). Unlike manned aircraft pilots who leave the scene of a strike as
soon as possible, drone operators are often tasked with continued observation over the area,
watching the effects of their actions in detail (Dao 2013). Without the risk to self, operators
struggle to balance or reconcile their kills (Phelps 2021).
A different set of skills and challenges
Concerns regarding the presumed physical capabilities of soldiers become less salient in
“riskless” warfare. Drone operators require a different set of skills, which, for some, represent a
broader trend of feminization.65 Operators must be both technically proficient and emotionally
ready. Technical skills and adaptability are frequently demonstrated through performance-based
assessments, evaluations, training classes, and mission requirements. While technical readiness is
relatively well defined for the field of remote operations, the emotional readiness of drone
operators receives far less attention (Cooke et al 2016, 177). Emotional readiness refers to an
operator’s control over emotional states of anxiety, depression, and anger, as well as their level
of self-consciousness, and impulsivity (Cooke et al 2016, 178). While in some cases drone
operations are stressful, at other times they are quite monotonous, extending for hours on end. As
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Martin Van Creveld (2000, 2013) draws a connection between changes in warfare and the feminization
of Western militaries. Van Creveld argues that this rise in femininity degrades military organization, and
that masculine military spaces must be maintained.
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a result, drone operators note a high rate of fatigue, exhaustion, and burnout due to operational
tempo and shift work (Hardison et al 2017).
These kinds of monotonous tasks have historically been associated with femininity and as
a result, often slotted as lower status work fit for female soldiers. For example, in 1968 Japan’s
Self-Defense Force (SDF) founded the Women’s Army Corps to provide intelligence,
communications, and supply capabilities. One of the key arguments in favor of this decision was
that women’s lesser physical strength would be mitigated through the application of their inherent
attention to detail and organizational skills to sophisticated machines (Sankey 2018, 154). A
similar argument has been used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to justify the recruitment of
female personnel to mixed-gender battalions in the Defense Border Array: “Female operators suit
this kind of role…with its need for long concentration spans and multi-tasking” (Lappin 2018).
As discussed in Chapter 2, such associations of certain skills with women and femininity his been
evident in the sexual division of labor across economic sectors throughout history (Goldin 1986).
Despite the gendered nature of detail-oriented and often monotonous remote work,
operators are often expected to conduct their operations with the precision of any soldier – with
immense value placed on the suppression of emotions such as fear and empathy (de Volo 2016,
57). Given that the nature of drone operations is often one of secrecy, operators have been
reported to cope through self-medication rather than seeking out a health care provider (Cooke et
al 2016, 179). Providers are rarely familiar with the work environment of drone operators, let
alone have the security clearance to know what takes place. As a result, drone operators often
attempt to hide the signs of stress associated with their role (Cooke et al 2015, 179).
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Purple hearts for carpal tunnel syndrome
Drones also offer fewer opportunities to demonstrate valor on the battlefield.
Traditionally, it is soldiers who have had close personal contact with the enemy and been
intimately involved with killing who are labeled as heroes through medals and military honors
(Manjikian 2016, 107). As a result, formal recognition for conducting a surveillance or strike
operation while physically outside of the combat zone is often inadequate for recognition and
promotion (Hoagland 2013).
As demonstrated by the controversy surrounding Panetta’s Distinguished Warfare Medal
(in large part because of its elevated status over other combat medals that require soldiers to risk
their lives, such as the Purple Heart or Bronze Star), there is resistance to ascribing drone pilots
with the true warrior status reserved for those with boots on the ground. Rather drone pilots are
equated with office workers, rather than war heroes (de Volo 2016, 58). Medals function not only
as “gendered status markers,” identifying heroes as individuals who have performed acts of valor,
but also as a form of incentive and reward for doing the challenging and dangerous of work
required of a combatant (de Volo 2016, 60-61; Goldstein 2001). In other words, militaries
maintain a clear hierarchy regarding the role of risk in ascension and reward within their
organizations: like a soldier on the ground or pilot flying in the area of operations, drone
operators can save lives. However, because the enemy is not directly firing at operators and they
are not in any immediate physical danger, such actions are rarely seen as comparable (Cooke et al
2014, 184). This has important implications for the recruitment and retention of operators ‘who
fear, as did an early crew member of the USS Monitor, that “there isn’t enough danger to give us
glory”’ (Fitzsimonds and Mahnken 2007, 100).
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DRONE INTEGRATION PREDICTIONS
As explained above, there are a variety of ways that military culture and promotion pathways
might make the procurement, training, and retention of drone operators more difficult.
Transitioning to different technologies or operational concepts can significantly impact the
individuals within a military community, affecting hierarchical relationships, the authority of
command, and institutional control over resources and people (Fitzsimonds and Mahnken 2007,
96). Nonetheless, militaries usually find ways to solve problems that arise. This section uses the
theory of innovation integration and inclusion outlined in Chapter 2 to predict how militaries will
address the gendered challenges of drones and the implications of such solutions for 1) military
effectiveness, 2) strategic gender segregation, and 3) technological change.
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS TO INCLUSION
According to my theory, military organizations with higher levels of gender inclusion are
more likely to opt for solutions to the gendered challenges of drones that disrupt the existing
status quo, better defining career paths and training for drone operators and elevating the status of
drone operators within the organization. This approach is likely to be the most effective at
addressing the gendered challenges of drones. Military organizations with middle levels of gender
inclusion will seek to integrate drones while keeping the character of combat masculine. This
might include reifying tropes of heroism and risk to include drone pilots within the “warrior
ethos,” or emphasizing technical proficiency as a male activity and expanding out towards the
civilian sphere where those with such skills are empowered over those without (Manjikian 2014,
53; Masters 2005). Alternatively, a military might treat drone operations as a feminine, lowerstatus form of combat support. Here, militaries may actively recruit female soldiers as operators,
while keeping such roles low on the professional hierarchy. Finally, I expect militaries with very
low levels of gender inclusion to resist devoting resources towards the integration of drones. The
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shift from manned to unmanned aircrafts carries with it a salient loss – evident not only in the
reduction of manned units, but also the reassignment of former pilots to a devalued operator
position.
These arguments are formalized in the hypotheses listed below.
Drone Integration Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more institutional commitments to gender inclusion a
military organization makes, the more effectively it will respond to the gendered challenges of
drones.
Drone Integration Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Military organizations with low levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion will resist the integration of drones
Drone Integration Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Military organizations with middle levels of
inclusion will utilize gender difference to assist with the integration of drones, resulting
in the professionalization of gender segregation.
Drone Integration Hypothesis 1c (H1c): Military organizations with high levels of
gender inclusion will be more likely to elevate noncombat roles, establish new promotion
patterns, and/or consider redefinitions of combat itself
For militaries that invest resources towards the integration of drones but seek to do so
while maintaining existing gendered hierarchies, I expect to see the segregation of drone
operations on the basis of sex. Here, the active the recruitment and incorporation of women into
drone operations may occur not as a step towards equality or a dismantling of gendered
hierarchies within military organizations, but rather because women are framed as adept to fill
such lower-status roles. The occupational segregation of noncombat roles is therefore the basis of
the following hypothesis:
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Drone Integration Hypothesis 2 (H2): Military organizations that seek to integrate drones while
maintaining the existing masculine hierarchy will devote resources towards the development of a
complementary innovation - the professionalization of gender segregation
Integration attempts that are paired with the recruitment and retainment of a more
inclusive force may also include smaller technological changes that allow for drones to be
operated by a wider range of personnel. Such changes might reduce the weight of the drone
hardware itself, develop specialized vehicles for drone transport, and/or retrofit the bases drone
squadrons operate from.
Drone Integration Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Military organizations with more institutional
commitments to gender inclusion will invest in technological changes that can make such
inclusion successful.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to examine the effect of the level of gender inclusion on the integration drones, I
employ a comparative case study method. The universe of potential cases for this study includes
military communities that have invested heavily in the adoption and integration of drones.
However, such communities vary substantially across both their degree of gender inclusion, as
well as their relative success with the implementation of remote operations. My theory predicts
that drone adopters are likely to similarly invest in solutions to the gendered challenges of
integration. However, the solutions ascribed will vary depending on their gender inclusion regime
(my independent variable). Such solutions will, in turn, influence a military organization’s
relative success at implementing drones (my dependent variable).
Within this population, I select the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Few states develop, export,
and utilize drones to the degree and in the same manner as Israel. Research, development, and
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production of drone technology play a significant role in Israel’s military planning – both for
export purposes and domestic use – and as a result, the country’s drone fleet is nearly entirely
indigenously manufactured. Israeli initiatives in the mid-1970s were crucial to the development
of the contemporary drone revolution, and future advancements in drone programs around the
world would be largely derived from the Israeli model (Weiss 2018).66 Unsurprisingly, Israel has
historically been and continues to be the world’s largest producer of drones and uses both armed
and advanced unarmed drones as key military assets.67 Put simply, the IDF is a clear case of
military organizations that has invested substantial financial and organizational resources into the
integration of uninhabited platforms (Kreps 2016, 5). Moreover, the organization poses a unique
opportunity for concentrated and enduring within-case variation over time.68
Finally, when compared to other militaries, the IDF has been relatively successful in
implementing drones as a means of enhancing their security. Their ability to monitor potential
threats within and outside of Israeli territories, and also strike targets quickly and accurately, has
arguably been enhanced by the development and integration of remote operations. As a result, the
IDF serves as an influential case (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 403-405). According to my theory,
I would be less likely to see gendered challenges in countries that are relatively successful at the
integration of drones. In other words, the extent to which gender inclusion poses a barrier for
Israel should be smaller than in countries that struggle to implement drones.
In order to test the above hypotheses, I locate variation in the gender inclusion regimes within
the IDF. I select two services with designated drone squadrons for comparison: the Air Force and
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For example, Abraham Karem, an Israeli aeronautical engineer who had been working on uninhabited
technologies in Israel during the 1970s, played an important role in the development of the U.S. Predator.
67
Israel was responsible for 41 percent of all drones exported between 2001 and 2011, and as of February
2010, Israeli drone export sales included more than 42 countries (Bergen et al 2020; Davis et al 2014, 10).
68
For example, the IDF’s 200th Squadron, known as the First UAV Squadron, has been in operation since
1971 and is the oldest continually serving drone unit in the world (Gettinger 2019, x).
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Artillery Corps. These cases represent different values of the independent variable – the level of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion. Thus, despite the IDF’s overall success with the
implementation of drones, I expect to locate relative differences across the two services. The
section below provides a brief background of the IDF’s gender regime, and how institutional
commitments to inclusion varied across the two services overtime.
INCLUSION IN THE IDF
The IDF was established in 1948 on the ethos of a “people’s army” in service of the
modern nation state, based on a system of mandatory conscription of both men and women.
Women had taken part in fighting organizations that preceded the establishment of the State of
Israel, joining Jewish and British units during the Second World War in field positions and as
combatants (Sasson-Levy 2011; Herzog 2019, 155). In pre-state Palestine, kibbutz women bore
arms and performed guard duty during the Arab revolts of 1930s, laying the groundwork for
female participation in pre-state Jewish militias such as the Haganah and Palmach and in the 1948
war (Kaplan Sommer 2018). However, while both men and women had the “right to contribute”
to the new Jewish collective in Israel and to become soldiers, such contributions were largely
structured around an essentialist perception of gender (Berkovitch 1997, 608).69 Mandatory
conscription served as the basis of Israel’s ethno-national collective, defining citizenship on the
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Even on kibbutzim, where there was no gender pay gap, women were kept out of managerial or
agricultural positions that generated the collective’s income, and relegated to cooking, laundry, and
childcare roles (Kaplan Sommer 2018). Early images of women in pre-state militias highlighted their
sexualized, gendered statuses: in 1948, the magazine Bamahane printed a photo of Palmach member Ziva
Arbel drinking from a pitcher with the caption of “who is jealous of the pitcher?” Soon after, a popular
singer released a recording of “I Wish I Was a Pitcher” (Sankey 2018, 140-141).
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basis of gender, class, and race in not only the military but also society more broadly (Herzog
2019, 155; Berkovitch 1997; Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2017, 14-15).70
The military serves the State of Israel as both a citizenship-conferring institution in which
men and women serve, as well as a male-dominated, masculine territory with a rigid gendered
division of labor. Women serve for fewer years than men and are easily exempted from service
on the grounds of pregnancy, marriage, or religious belief.71 A women’s civil contribution to the
collective is primarily through motherhood, which is thus the main raison for releasing women
from army service (Herzog 2019, 158; Berkovitch 1997). It was during the early years of
statehood that the IDF first institutionalized gendered frameworks and roles, creating two
separate tracks from women and men in the military and Israeli society more broadly. Those who
did serve would face structural and institutionalized differences on the basis of gender, as well as
a male chauvinist culture (Sasson-Levy and Amram Katz 2007, 110).72 Soldiers were primarily
assigned to gender-determined military occupations, and faced barriers to advancement in the
military on the basis of sex and sexual orientation (Cohen 1997).73
In the years that followed, such restrictions continued to dictate the roles men and women
were able to occupy in the IDF. Women served in the Women’s Corps (Chen), primarily in
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For example, compulsory military service is a powerful mechanism for delineating between Jewish and
Palestinian citizens of Israel – only the Jewish population is conscripted. With the exception of Druze
(included in the law) and Bedouins (who are entitled to volunteer), Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel are
exempt from military service (Herzog 2019, 169; Shafir and Peled 2002).
71
Under the 1949 “Defense Service Law” all citizens or permanent residents of Israel were deemed eligible
for compulsory military service. Women serve for fewer months (24 as opposed to the 32 served by men)
and are called upon for reserve service for fewer years. Married women are exempt from compulsory
service, and pregnant women are exempt from both military and reserve service (Lomsky-Feder and
Sasson-Levy 2017, 16).
72
For example, in her analysis of the Israeli military, Orna Sasson-Levy finds that “the language used by
soldiers, the pinup pictures in military offices…the songs soldiers sing during marches” and even the Tshirts that soldiers design to represent their units “frequently convey chauvinistic content that denigrates
women or portrays them as sexual objects” (Sasson-Levy 2011, 394).
73
Even women who had fought in pre-state militias were transferred to roles such as nursing, teaching, or
social work (Sasson-Levy 2010, 175-176).
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secretarial or administrative positions (Sasson-Levy 2003; Izraeli 1997). Roles as infantry and
tank instructors, drivers, aircraft mechanics, and basic-training commanders were opened to
women after the 1973 war, yet this shift was premised on the understanding that drafting women
would free up more male soldiers for combat. While additional restrictions on the basis of sex
were lifting in the early 1980s,74 those based on sexual orientation were tightening. A 1983
regulation placed official restrictions on the assignment of homosexual soldiers, stating that
sexual orientation could prove to be a security hazard. As a result, homosexual soldiers were
restricted from serving in in intelligence positions requiring a top security clearance (US GAO
1993, 40-41).75 However, subsequent domestic changes would undercut such exclusions,76 and
on May 18, 1993, all restrictions on the recruitment, assignment, or promotion of soldiers and
civilians on the basis of sexuality were lifted (US GAO 1993, 41).
A turning point in the Israel Air Force
In 1994 Alice Miller, an immigrant from South Africa, applied for IDF flight training and
was rejected because she was a woman. The justification for that rejection was that women
generally served in the military for fewer years, and therefore even if she succeeded in becoming
a pilot, it would not be worth the considerable investment needed to train her. Miller appealed the
decision and the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the Israel Air Force (IAF) pilot training course
be opened to women (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2017, 16; Sankey 2018, 140). And as a
result, the Air Force was the first military service to open combat roles to women. In subsequent
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For example, restrictions on women’s presence in certain combat areas were lifted in 1982 (Gittleman
2020).
75
Conscripts who were identified as homosexual were required to undergo additional psychological testing
to determine whether 1) their sexual orientation could serve as a security hazard, and 2) they “had the
mental fortitude and maturity to withstand the pressure of serving in the defense forces” (US GAO 1993,
41).
76
In 1988 sodomy was decriminalized, and in 1992 the labor law was amended to prohibit hiring and
workplace discrimination on the basis of “sexual inclination” (US GAO 1993, 40).
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years, more female personnel entered the pilot training pipeline. The first female combat
navigator graduated in 1998 and the first female combat pilot in 2001 (Sankey 2018, 140; SassonLevy 2005, 266).77
On January 1 2000, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, approved an equality amendment to
the Defense Service law allowing women to serve in any role in the IDF on equal basis with men,
depending on military needs and the inherent nature of the position (Sasson-Levy 2005, 265).78
Air force piloting positions were subsequently opened to women, gradually followed by fourteen
other roles (Gittleman 2020). The Women’s Corps was subsequently disbanded and, for the first
time, the IDF began to monitor sexual harassment (Sasson-Levy and Amram Katz 2007). In May
2003, staff officer training courses were integrated and, for the first time, organized by
prospective work environment and designated role rather than gender.79 The following year, the
first mixed-gender semi-infantry battalion, Karakal, was established (Gittleman 2020).80
During this time, the IDF also began to emphasize the ability of women to contribute “in the
areas of technology and scientifically-based responsibilities” (The State of Israel 2004, 6). In their
response to the United Nations’ Division for the Advancement for Women questionnaire to
governments, Israel emphasized both the importance of both gender-difference and the
integration of women into technological roles. In other words, the Israeli approach to inclusion
emphasized the unique skills of women, as women, in serving in the range of new roles

77

Media coverage at the time portrayed these women as “unique species” rather than signifying a general
phenomenon. These changes also drew increasing criticism from rabbis claiming that religious male
soldiers serving alongside women would be prevented from observing modesty laws (Sasson-Levy 2005,
266).
78
The amendment in Section 16(a) of the Defense Service Law directs the IDF to open all its positions to
women, unless there is a special aspect of the job that is deemed unsuitable for women.
79
This is carried out only for a secondary course that has limited opportunities for ascension in the military
(Sasson-Levy and Amram Katz 2007, 107).
80
The Karakal battalion is responsible for securing the border with Egypt. More than half the battalion is
female, and all members of the battalion must volunteer to serve for three years (Sankey 2018, 140-141).
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associated with the country’s growing technological capabilities. In the subsequent years, the IDF
would encourage female conscripts to enlist in technical and technological professions, offering
designated training on the basis of sex for roles as flight supervisors, simulator and heavy
machinery operators, tank operation instructors, and logistics, electronics, and aircraft
maintenance workers (The State of Israel 2014, 44).
Gradual change in the Artillery Corps
In 2014, the Artillery Corps opened its elite units to female soldiers for the first time. Women
were required to commit to three years to military service like their male comrades (as opposed to
the two-year term required of female conscripts) and physical standards and military regulations
were adjusted to enable their entry (Shoval 2014). Nonetheless, the roles women were permitted
take on often remained restricted on the basis of the strength required as well as exposure to risk.
Women were not deployed across the border, and were precluded from roles that required them to
carry heavy weights. As a result, the majority of female soldiers in the Artillery Corps served as
simulator trainers, other forms of combat support, or as clerks. As I will discuss in my analysis
below, many of the Artillery Corps’ proposed inclusion efforts were framed around the drone
operator squadrons.
Table 3-2. Gender Inclusion Timelines of the Israeli Air Force and Artillery Corps
Air Force

Artillery Corps

Combat support roles open
e.g. instrument fitter; radar operator

1973

1973

Combat roles open
e.g. pilot; weapons operator

1995

2000; 2014 (Partial)

Rank restrictions removed

2000

2014 (Partial)

The variance in inclusion between Israel’s Air Force and Artillery Corps allows me to
analyze how different military communities responsible for the integration of drones within the
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IDF responded to the gendered challenges of drones. Given that drones were consolidated across
these services in 2001, and the planning and development for this shift took place during the
previous six years, there is significant variation in inclusion across and within the IAF and
Artillery Corps from the late 1990s to 2000s. In other words, when the IDF was 1) making
decisions about how best to reframe their drone integration strategy, and 2) implementing this
strategy across the IAF and Artillery Corps with varying degrees of success, both services
underwent significant changes to their gender inclusion regimes. I predict that in the IAF, the
approach to drone integration would be increasingly disruptive to existing hierarchies as gender
inclusion increased (H1; H1c). In the Artillery Corps, where there was far less inclusion, I expect
to see gender segregation, or the integration of women into lower status drone squadrons (H1c;
H2a), and/or the more limited use of drones (H1a).
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: HIERARCHY AND BUREACRACY
Given that these services are housed under the same military organization, there is no interservice variation in terms of my explanatory variables of force structure (conscription), and
perceived threat (high).81 However, the two services do vary across hierarchy and attention to
bureaucratic concerns. When compared to aerial operations, ground maneuvers require more time
and it is not always clear how long they will take. Indeed, field operations are characterized by
immanent friction, with an emphasis placed on fire and the quantity of soldiers and weaponry
(Ben-Shalom and Tsur 2017, 86). For the Israeli Ground Forces (IGF), the quality of actions is a
sign of willingness to overlook bureaucracy and take risks for the sake of comradeship and, as a
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One might argue, however, that there is a difference in the force structure between the two services
because IAF operators serve for more years than those in the Artillery Corps. Thus, the IAF is more of a
“professional” force. One might also point to changes in the degree of threat given the IDFs engagement in
a range of military operations and conflicts during the period examined. However, these variations in
conflict level are not between the services and thus do not represent a potential alternative explanatory
variable.

93

result, soldiers often alter daily routine considerations (Ben-Shalom and Tsur 2017, 94). Given
the chaotic, unplanned, and uncertain nature of ground combat, the doctrine of the IGF is that of a
decentralized command and control allocation. In the IAF, on the other hand, movement is often
characterized as quick, adaptable, and flexible, with a strong need for centralized control. Given
that landing times are determined by the amount of fuel, the time schedule of aerial operations is
precise and missions require accurate planning, strict performance, and communication with
central command and control (Ben-Shalom and Tsur 2017, 87).
Table 3-3. The Air Force and Artillery Corps: Alternative Explanatory Variables
Air Force

Artillery Corps

Bureaucracy

Routines strictly followed

Routines often overlooked

Hierarchy

Centralized

Decentralized

Threat Perception

High

High

Force Structure

Conscript

Conscript

However, these differences do not have clear causal implications – the variation in
bureaucratic structures and degree of hierarchy between the two services could both help and
hinder the integration of drones. While the Air Force’s more centralized hierarchy may make it
easier to implement top-down changes to entrenched career pathways, training, and incentive
structures, the decentralized Artillery Corps may experience more openness and flexibility when
it comes to implementing disruptive innovations. Moreover, the novelty of the drone program
implies that IDF leadership will have no experience operating drones and thus reflect the
traditional gendered hierarchies. Rather, these inter-service differences may very well prove to be
mediating or constraining variables that change and/or develop over my time period of analysis.
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PROCESS-TRACING AND INTERVIEW METHODS
To conduct this analysis, I use process tracing to compare how the Israeli Air Force and
Artillery Corps responded to the gendered challenges associated with the integration of drones.
Here, I examine a chronological series of events – the consolidation of the IDF drone fleet under
the Air Force (with the exception of an Artillery squadron) from 1995 to 2000 and subsequent
years of operation from 2001 to 2017 – for observable evidence of causal mechanisms. For each
service, I locate gendered challenges, the responses to these challenges and the extent to which
these responses helped or hindered the successful integration of drones (Bennett and Checkel
2015, 4). Note that success is not measured by war outcomes, but rather by the recruitment and
retention of operators with the necessary skillset to perform both basic and complex tasks. This
analysis treats the human component of drone operations as a universal baseline that military
communities must meet in order to utilize the full fighting power of drones, all else equal.82
Figure 3-1. Air Force and Artillery Corps Drone Integration Timeline: Sequencing of Events

Early 1990s, realize can utilize
drones for targeted strikes

1995

Operators face challenges

2007

2001

Program to consolidate drones under IAF
(with exception of Artillery Corps)

2017

Address challenges in varying ways
as inclusion regimes change

As evidence, I rely on semi-structured interviews with retired and reservist IDF drone
operators, jet pilots, and industry experts, as well as articles in the Israeli news and the IDF
military journal, Bamahane. Interview subjects were identified through a “snowball sample” and
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As discussed in Chapter 2, this understanding of success draws from a task-oriented measure of military
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recruited based on their knowledge of and experience with military operations involving drones.
Initial nodes in the sample were identified through contacts with individuals who have directly
engaged with the integration of drones and/or were able to connect me with prospective
interviewees through their networks. Ultimately, I was able to secure interviews with thirteen of
the fifty-four individuals I contacted. These took place in Israel between February 23 and March
5, 2020 in a variety of locations across the country, and virtually from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
between October 26 and December 12, 2020. In total, I conducted nine in-person and four virtual
interviews – twelve of which were male and one was female.83 Subject ages ranged from the 20s
to 70s, providing a wide timeframe for analysis: their experiences with the IDF’s integration of
drones extended from the years preceding the implementation of a new drone program under the
IAF in the 1990s, to the early years of the new operator program, to the evolution of what the
drone program is today.
This approach introduces several potential sources of bias. First, interviewees may have been
incentivized to take credit for and write themselves into the historical narrative of drone
integration. Or, they may simply struggle to correctly remember events that occurred some time
ago. Whenever possible, respondents were asked for specific dates so I could verify the timelines
discussed below. In addition, the interviewer’s gender may have affected interviewee responses
and incentives for participation: interviewees may have overemphasized their attention to and
awareness to gender inclusion.84 Finally, the low response rate introduces the possibility of
selection bias across respondents. Such rates are not surprising given that drone operators, like
aircraft pilots and other personnel within the IDF, are not allowed to reveal their military
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A sample of the interview questions is included in the Appendix
For more on the role of gender in the interview process, see Carreiras and Alexandre 2013; Huddy et al
1997.
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occupations to the public due to security concerns. As a result, the interviewer primarily
contacted subjects through their social networks and at times spoke with potential interviewees on
the phone and through text before the interview to answer questions and assure that their
anonymity would be protected. All names are omitted from the subsequent analysis as well as
from all recordings, transcripts, and interview notes.85 The interviewees agreed upon their cited
titles. With the exception of the biases posed by the gender of the interviewee, the concerns raised
above do not lead to more or less agreement with my hypotheses. These concerns may reduce the
statistical significance of my findings but for the most part should not bias them.
While some interview subjects drew from their experiences serving in the Air Force, Artillery
Corps, and certain elite ground combat battalions whose operations were informed by drone
surveillance, others drew from elite experience in the defense industry and/or as leaders of private
companies in the process of selling their solutions to some of the challenges of drone integration
to the IDF. As a result, the following analysis examines a range of experiences with the IDF’s
integration of drones, as well as the procurement and development of remote aircraft technology,
the recruitment of drone operators, and/or the standardization of training surrounding the use of
drones in military operations. These interviews provide information on historical, social, and
bureaucratic processes that have shaped the use or perception of drones and the soldiers who
operate them.
ANALYSIS: UNMANNING THE IDF
In the early 1990s the IDF was transitioning to what then Chief of Staff Ehud Barak referred
to as a “small, smart army,” which would increasingly rely on and prioritize the development of
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The fear is that these individuals will become targets if their roles are revealed. Interviewees that have
retired and no longer serve in reserves also preferred to remain anonymous due to the classified nature of
their operations.
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more precise targeting systems (Bergman 2019, 385). A meeting between Arieh Weisbrot, the
commander of the first IAF drone unit, Squadron 200, and the heads of the IAF operations
department resulted in the idea to combine all the recent technological advances in intelligence
and operations into a single process that would create a new method of targeted killing (Bergman
2019, 385).86 By late 1991, the Apache pilots of Squadron 113 began training with Squadron 200,
and in 1992 Israeli drones were used to target Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi
(Dobbing and Cole 2014, 10-11; Bergman 2019, 386).
These developments ushered in an increasing realization amongst Ministry of Defense
(MOD) and IAF leadership that that the IDF had the technology and capability to utilize drones in
different ways.87 From this perspective, the IDF needed to both consolidate and expand the
development and implementation of drones, requiring the creation of a special program that
would place unmanned aircrafts under the purview of the IAF. The idea at hand was a
controversial one: drones would not only serve a major role in IDF operations, but also eventually
replace the majority of manned missions.88 In 1993 the legal framework for a classified program
that would completely restructure the IDF’s integration of drones was initiated. The program
would cost billions of shekels and would be one of the biggest of the MOD at the time.89
It is from this point forward that my analysis begins. In the years that followed, the IDF’s
existing drone program would be consolidated under the IAF and Artillery Corps – two services

86

Drones would track targets, transmit an image of the target to operational command, and designate the
target with a laser beam that could be picked up by an Apache helicopter’s laser detector (know as “passing
the baton”). Then, the Apache would mark the target with its own laser, which would be locked on to by a
Hellfire missile and fired (Bergman 2019, 386).
87
Retired IAF Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4
88
Rather than treating drones as a mission-specific innovation, the new approach would treat remote
aircrafts as a fleet that would be continuously upgraded and adapted for a range of roles: “The idea is that
we would have fighters, helicopters, transporters, and UAVs… The way the Chief of the Air Force and the
IDF was looking at the [UAV] fleet was the same as the way they were looking at fighters.” Ibid.
89
Ibid. As of mid-2020, 1 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) was worth about 0.30 U.S. dollars.
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with significant differences, changing over time, in terms of gender inclusion. How did those
differences influence the relative success of each branch in their ability to integrate drones?
In what follows, I chart the integration of drones across three periods of change: 1) 19952001, 2) 2001-2007, and 3) 2008-2017. The first period includes the development of a novel
drone program under the IAF, when the service was just beginning to alter their gender inclusion
regime and open the pilot academy to women. The second period includes the effects of these
early decisions on the integration of drones. While drones had previously been spread out across
the services, all drone career pathways were now consolidated under the IAF – with the notable
exception of one service, the Artillery Corps, which would receive their own training and
oversight. By the early 2000s, de jure inclusion efforts were continuing to expand in the IDF and
the first generation of female pilots and operators were making their way through the flight
academy and beginning their military service. At the same time, most roles within the Artillery
Corps remained closed to women. During this period the operators within both services were
beginning to encounter a series of gendered challenges, which became especially pronounced by
the mid to late 2000s. In the final period of analysis, the disparity in the inclusion policies of the
two services was further exacerbated, shaping the solutions each service applied to the challenges
they encountered, as well as the results of said solutions. These phases of change and varying
inclusion regimes are summarized in Table 3-4 below.
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Table 3-4. The Integration of Drones: Key Periods of Change

Level of
inclusion

1995-2001

2001-2007

2008-2017

Development of new approach,
almost all drones under IAF

First generation of operators,
gendered challenges arise

Different solutions to
challenges, varying results

IAF: Low/Medium. Alice
Miller case, IAF removes
occupational restrictions on
basis of sex. Male-dominated
with prioritization of piloting

IAF: Medium. Occupational
restrictions removed, more
women enter flight academy,
move down pipeline

IAF: Medium/High. More
female personnel, older male
jet pilots more open to shift
from piloting to operating

Artillery: Low. Extremely
male-dominated and
masculine

Artillery: Low/Medium.
Lower-status roles open to
women

In what follows, I examine the integration efforts, gendered challenges and their solutions,
and responses. I will begin with the development of the new drone program (which focused
primarily on the IAF), and then examine the second two periods for each service in turn.
A NEW APPROACH TO DRONES
Let’s begin with the first period of change, 1995 to 2001. In 1995, at the same time Alice
Miller was making her case against the IAF to the Knesset, the MOD tasked an IAF Colonel in
uniform with developing, integrating, and ultimately delivering an operational unmanned system
that “must kill” to the air force.90 This would require the delivery of not just the drones
themselves but also a complicated network of human and technological support.91 As a result,
decisions ranging from the reallocation and retraining of individuals who had been serving in
other roles, to the flag or symbol associated with the new bases would need to be clarified. These
decisions would address gendered challenges to the human integration of drones – specifically,
how to reconcile concerns regarding the prestige and perception of operators with traditional
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Unlike other countries, in Israel an officer can retain their position while serving in the MOD.
At the time, 10,000 people were involved in developing the system – many of which were working in the
defense industry. Retired IAF Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4.
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military culture and hierarchies. It took the Colonel, who will be referred to as Colonel X, four
and a half years to complete the task at hand – from August 1996 to February 2000.92
New career pathways, same hierarchy
The integration of drones requires the development and definition of new job descriptions,
career paths, and training procedures.93 This includes distinctions between operator roles: while
external operators would be responsible for take-off and landing, internal operators would carry
out and complete the mission at hand.94 Under the new system, the entry point for drone
operations was the same as that of any other aircraft. Young recruits seeking to pilot an aircraft or
helicopter, or operate a drone would all begin at the air force academy. These were all soldiers
that in their final year of high school had been deemed healthy enough to be tested for the pilot
program and passed.95 After one year at the academy, recruits would receive two years of
additional training: the first was more advanced studies at the academy, and the second was
becoming a pilot. Soldiers that failed flight training were slotted for non-piloting paths in the air
force and allowed to choose between a few options – one of which was drone operations. Those
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Because of the classified nature of this program, Colonel X’s name is omitted from this analysis. Despite
receiving the highest award in Israel for contribution to the safety of the country (Pas Bitchon Yisrael) for
his work on the program, the name and role of the Colonel remain hidden from public records.
93
Many of these decisions were made with the assistance of the IAF training department. Retired IAF
Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4.
94
Missions began with an external officer who would hand off the drone to an internal operator once it was
in the air.
95
While women were permitted to go through the flight academy at this point, the young Israelis who
received notices that they were of the appropriate fitness for the pilot training were entirely male. Young
women interested in serving were required to submit a letter outlining their interest in service. Former IAF
Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5; Former
Fighter Pilot, Tel Aviv, Israel, March 2, 2020, Interview #7.
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who chose to become operators would then enter a specific drone training school.96 As a result, a
clear hierarchy between pilots and the remainder of the air force was retained.
While future operators would consist of flight academy dropouts, the first drone squadrons
were comprised entirely of former pilots who had been recruited by Colonel X at the start of the
program as part of an operational training team.97 In the years that followed, the practice of
drawing squadron leadership from former pilots would persist. As a result, the IAF would rely
entirely on experienced pilots to command UAV squadrons.98 Unsurprisingly, such pilots were
uniformly male personnel that had risen to prominence in an IDF that had placed a great deal of
emphasis on the heroism and masculinity of pilots. Given that women only began to enter the
flight at academy in 1997, there were no experienced female pilots to draw from. However, even
as more women began to enter the pilot pipeline, the practice of selecting experienced male pilots
for command of the drone squadrons would continue. In short, the approach to drone integration
in these early years was to create clear career pathways and training protocols for operators while
preserving the existing hierarchy.
A “first class” squadron in flight suits
In order to ensure that the program would be viewed as successful and the roles within it
prestigious and desirable, a great deal of time and energy was spent on the “feel” of the bases, the
instillation of a combat culture, and the salaries of drone operators and technicians. Even the
color of the walls and the chairs in the base were seriously considered in the planning: in response
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5
97
This team included one Lt. Colonel and three Majors. The Lt. Colonel had a long family history in the
IAF: his father was once chief of the air force, and he himself was an AF-16 fighter pilot. Retired IAF
Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4
98
Each squadron has a unit commander, a deputy, a squadron commander, a samat aleph (another deputy),
and a series of majors. Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
February 29, 2020, Interview #5
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to one oversight reviewer who noted that three to four times as much money had been spent on
furniture than was originally planned, Colonel X replied that it needed to be “first class.”99
Moreover, the decision was made that when operators were on base they would wear flight suits
like the regular pilots, communicating their importance and equal role within the IAF as well as
instilling a combat mindset across operator squadrons.100
Given that the drone career progression would be relatively unknown to prospective
personnel, Colonel X sought to ensure that the respective salaries would further elevate the status
of remote operations. However, defining drone operator and technician salaries would prove
challenging due to substantial pay grade differences between fighters, co-fighters, and technicians
in the IAF.101 In order to renegotiate salaries, Colonel X created a crisis, insisting that the existing
pay grade classifications were preventing the procurement of experienced drivers for the trucks
that had been modified for remote system, which would halt progress on the program.102 The
subsequent renegotiation over the salary of truck drivers opened the door for Colonel X to
renegotiate the salaries of other roles as well – including operators and technicians. Notably,
operators would still earn substantially less than IAF pilots because they experienced no personal
risk of life.
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Retired IAF Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4
Ibid. Notably, this program is so classified, that operators would later develop their own rationale for
why they wore the same suits as pilots: ‘the reason unmanned operators put the same uniforms because in
the beginning they took pilots to that squadron and they came with the uniform…with the flying suits…I
think nobody planned it…after two years people qualified as operators didn’t want to be not like the pilot
so commander said “ok go take a green suit” and the rest is history.’ Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel
(location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5
101
For example, the development team initially employed former drone technicians to work with them,
who were working on an aircraft technician’s salary. However, unmanned aircrafts were of an even lower
pay grade, making it difficult to recruit technicians for the new system. Retired IAF Colonel, Tel Aviv,
Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4.
102
Given the lower pay grade of drivers, skilled drivers were difficult to procure: drivers were usually
young and the older, more experienced drivers were rare. As a result, the logistics department was reluctant
to part with them. Ibid.
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During this period of change, Colonel X sought to make drone operations fit comfortably
within the climate, culture, and hierarchy of the IAF. While efforts were taken to make drone
operators prestigious and masculine, their relative status compared to manned pilots was
nonetheless clearly defined. This approach aligns with my first hypothesis (H1): In a military
community with low to medium gender inclusion at the time, drones were integrated in a manner
that would retain dominant masculine hierarchies. These early decisions made by Colonel X and
his team would have important implications in the years to come.
THE AIR FORCE
Once the new drone program was deemed operational, it was handed over to the IAF in
2001.103 In the years that followed, the first generation of drone operators would encounter a
series of challenges –in terms of the career paths available to them, their interactions with pilots
on shared bases, as well as their preparedness for an increasing shift from intelligence and
reconnaissance to targeted strikes. The following sections track the initial challenges to
integration that arose from 2001 to 2007, and how these were addressed in the period from 2008
to 2017 as the IAF became increasingly inclusive.
2001-2007: “A squadron of failures”
While most drone operators hailed from a pool of air force academy dropouts, there was
initially another point of entry for a small number of operators – those responsible for external
operations such as takeoff and landing. In the early 2000s the drones in operation were radiocontrolled (RC) models – the same kind that civilian hobbyists would purchase. As a result, IAF
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From now on, any other service in the IDF that required the use of drones would need to contact the
IAF. Drones had been previously scattered across the services. Now operators were either moved to IAF
squadrons or, if they were nearing the end of their service, transferred to the defense industry. Drone
Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), March 5,
2020. Interview #10.
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personnel would watch young men around the ages of 16 and 17 flying RC models, and recruit
them directly as operators.104 Despite the fact that external operators were considered of a lower
status than the internal operators responsible for the mission at hand, this form of recruitment
produced contradictory understandings of prestige and importance between operators.105 While
external pilots were initially scouted for their skills and brought directly to drone operations,
internal operators reached their position by failing pilot training:
We started as maybe thirty civilians. Five joined the military. Three finished the [external operator]
course…so for me [completing the training] was a big wow. I finished something very hard. But for
[the internal operators], they were failures…all of the units of UAVs are full of failures. Ninety
percent of them didn’t succeed the pilot academy and that is the reason they are operators.106

As drone technology advanced, this method of external operator recruitment eventually
halted – the caliber of the aircrafts being flown was far more advanced than the recreational RC
models hobbyists were playing with.107 As a result, the primary means of progression for a
civilian to become an internal drone operator would be by failing the pilot academy, or
transitioning from a fighter or helicopter squadron after an injury or the closure of a manned
squadron. Notably, operators from the latter pathway were perceived as “the best men” in drone
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After a one-year course, the recruits would sign on for another two years (in addition to the three years
of required service). Approximately six to seven external operators were recruited this way each year.
Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview
#5
105
One operator described this hierarchy as “internal operators are actually doing the mission, which is why
we are here. External is doing a service to the internal…external piloting is boring. You are standing
outside and responsible for takeoff and landing.” Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
“Today in Israel you cannot stay in the military if you are just an external [operator], you must also
trained as an internal [operator].” Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve
anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5.
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squadrons, preserving the existing hierarchy within the IAF with riskier, piloted operations at the
top.108
Sharing a base
In many cases, both UAV and piloted squadrons were housed under the same base. At first,
when the UAV operators arrived with their flight suits, many of the pilots on base were confused
and, in certain instances, annoyed.109 For some pilots, the decision to give operators the outfits of
pilots but clearly an attempt to superficially upgrade the prestige of those who hadn’t even made
it through the flight academy: ‘They [the operators] felt good but the helicopter squadron on the
base said, “what is going on?” They didn’t like it.’110 While many of the jet pilots interviewed
noted that while the work done by drone operators was important, it was not comparable with that
of manned piloting. Many felt that the bases for operators and pilots should be separate. Notably,
those who made the case for shared bases were former pilots who became operator squadron
commanders and felt that not only was the dialogue between pilots and operators important for
effectively completing the missions at hand, but also an important aspect of the forthcoming
transition from primarily manned to unmanned flight.111
No degrees for UAVs
In the early 2000s, the IAF began to award soldiers a B.A. degree after two years at the flight
academy, a degree that normally requires three years of study in Israeli universities.112 As a result,
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Drone Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
March 5, 2020. Interview #10.
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Former Fighter Pilot, Tel Aviv, Israel, March 2, 2020, Interview #7.
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Former Fighter Pilot and IAF Drone Squadron Commander, Kfar Saba, Israel, March 30, 2020,
Interview #8.
111
Ibid; Interview 1; Former Fighter Pilot, Tel Aviv, Israel, March 2, 2020, Interview #7.
112
The first diplomas were awarded in 2005. Former Fighter Pilot and IAF Drone Squadron Commander,
Kfar Saba, Israel, March 30, 2020, Interview #8.

106

the pay grade of pilots increased commensurately, posing a substantial financial burden on the
IAF.113 Notably, this change would also be reflected in the salaries of drone operators who
dropped out of pilot training after two years, creating an imbalance across operator pay grades
that had nothing to do with rank and expertise: “if you became a failure later you make more
money but you don’t have higher positions as operators.”114 This disparity would affect the
relative career opportunities of operators after they completed their military service. Most
operators choose not to pursue military careers as opportunities for ascension within the IAF are
primarily reserved for manned pilots.115 Thus, operator careerists are rare, and most do not remain
in the military. Moreover, given that operators, like pilots, sign on for additional years of service,
those that dropped out of the pilot training after one year were put at a significant disadvantage.
Most Israelis travel for a few years after finishing the military at age 21, and then begin their
studies. As a result, operators are often behind the normal academic and career progression when
they leave the military.
Today if you are an operator, you are released around 26 or 27 and usually you don’t have a
university degree…when I graduated, all my friends were done traveling around South America and
beginning their studies…everyone else is released when they are 21…so it’s a big thing to give
up…[especially without any] tools when you are released. [Drone operators have] no degree and just
know how to fly a UAV… if you are going to the big companies – Elbit, Aeronautics etc – you can do
something, but if you don’t want to do this anymore you just lost four years of your life and that is
it…[your 20s] is a critical time… only ten percent [of operators] stay in the military career…I have no
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This change would also strengthen the perspective amongst IDF leadership that drone operators need not
be former pilots: “it costs more to take someone who has finished the academy to fly a UAV…the US uses
pilots because most of the American UAVs fly with a stick and throttle, but in Israel they fly with a
keyboard and mouse so the whole concept is different.” Ibid.
114
Regardless of whether or not they received a degree, drone operators make a lower salary than pilots
because they do not risk their lives: “pilots get extra money for risking their life and for getting a degree.”
Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview
#5.
115
Drone Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
March 5, 2020. Interview #10.
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regret because I chose to [work in the industry] for ten years, made a lot of money and could buy a
house. But if I wanted to be a lawyer or a doctor, I would say to myself what did I do?116

One clear career path available for former operators is to work in the defense industry,
training operators in foreign armies. For many, this is initially an appealing route. Drone
operators have the appropriate skills, are competitively compensated, and travel places (with a
foreign passport) they would otherwise never go to.117 However, the rate of attrition of operators
in the industry is high: at Flightline, the client training program run by Aeronautics, the average
retention of operators is two years. Increasingly, operators utilize the training they receive in the
industry, and leave to study engineering and pursue alternate careers.118 One UAV operator who
was employed at Aeronautics for seven years, first as an operator and eventually in a series of
management positions, left because was no longer interested in participating “in other people’s
wars…I am doing reserves here and this is enough.”119
From “collectors to hunters”
While drones had previously been used for intelligence and reconnaissance missions, by the
mid-2000s they were increasingly utilized for the task given to Colonel X six years earlier – “a
system that must kill.” Israeli drones were used to gather intelligence during the Al Aqsa Intifada,
conduct air strikes in Gaza in 2004, assist in ‘Operation Summer Rains’ following the capture of
Corporal Gilad Shalit in 2006, and to conduct strikes in the Second Lebanon War (Dobbing and
Cole 2014, 10-11). As targeted strikes were increasingly employed, drone squadrons struggled to
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5
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“A very cool job for a twenty-something year old.” Ibid.
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Drone Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
March 5, 2020. Interview #10.
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5
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adapt. Operators “went from collectors to hunters,” where “collecting” refers to intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance and “hunting” means killing.120
While some operators were unperturbed by (and in some cases, welcomed) this switch, for
others it was a difficult transition.121 One operator who was recruited in the first year of the new
program noted how operations during the mid-2000s became “more and more complicated, as the
things that you are required to do as a human being…not as an operator are different.”122 Many
operators were simply resolute that the new approach wasn’t for them. In one UAV squadron,
approximately eighty percent of the operators stated that they “couldn’t do it.”123 Here, the
commander recalls “going down the list [of operators] every few months to see who could be a
killer.”124 Notably, these challenges did not alter the operational environment in the squadrons,
which had, since the early 2000s, emphasized emotionless professionalism. As one former
operator put it, “feelings were not allowed in the room.”125 By the early to mid-2000s, the drone
squadrons were still markedly male-dominated, and with a strong masculine culture. Without the
traditional means of reconciling one’s kills within the military sphere – for example, through
battlefield exposure and risk-taking – operators struggled to make the shift from “collecting” to
“hunting.”
This shift would require a change in “the DNA of the unit” as well as the psychology of
operations. Here, squadron commanders adopted a new approach to operator training, one that
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Former Fighter Pilot and IAF Drone Squadron Commander, Kfar Saba, Israel, March 30, 2020,
Interview #8.
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Ibid.
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
123
Ibid.
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These decisions weren’t taken lightly: “if someone was going to be a killer they needed to be good
because the cost of a mistake is much higher.” Ibid.
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
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focused primarily on training new operator recruits to be accustomed to conducting targeted
strikes.126 Unlike the older, more experienced operators who were accustomed to surveillance and
reconnaissance operations, it was easier for the younger operators to make the shift to targeted
strikes. Indeed, many of the more experienced operators were reservists who were coming in once
a week and, as a result, took more time to adapt.
Thus, in the early years of the new program many of the gendered challenges of drone
operations persisted (H1). Despite the actions taken by Colonel X to establish clear career
pathways as well as a degree of prestige for operators, these actions also solidified the lower
status of operators in relation to pilots. As a result, such pathways provided limited professional
opportunities both within and outside of the military, and the prestige of operators was always in
question. Operators were aware of their relative status when compared to flight academy
graduates, and many pilots were annoyed to share their bases with the operators donning the same
flight suits as them. Moreover, as drone operations increasingly involved targeted strikes,
operators struggled to transition to their new roles in a climate that emphasized a “combat
mindset.” While the approach of integrating drones in a manner that maintained the existing
masculine hierarchy (H1b) did successfully establish a clear organizational framework for the
human aspect of drone operations, this framework largely failed to address many of the gendered
challenges of drones.
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This new approach drew from lessons learned by the commanders from their experience with inhabited
aircrafts: “When the IAF acquired the capability to aim through a fighter pilot’s helmet, they was
conservative and though it was too dangerous for young, inexperienced, pilots to train with. So they
decided to start by training more experienced pilots to use the new helmets. This was hard for the senior
pilots because they were used to the old system of targeting. It took ten years before the IAF realized the
importance of starting young with important new capabilities, and started to train the people who were in
the academy to fly with the helmet from day one.” Ibid.
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2008-2017: an increasingly open IAF
One operator noted that it took twenty years, since his entry into the force in 2001, for the
environment in drone squadrons to change and for the psychological implications of their
missions to be openly discussed on base: “as a young man nobody was talking about their
feelings…now if something happens you talk about how you feel about it in the debrief…now it
is ok to talk to [the psychologist on base].”127 Changing “the DNA” of the operator squadrons
would take nearly a generation, but it happened. By the time the first class of drone operations
who were trained in strike operations were serving in reserves, a significant psychological shift
had occurred across squadrons.128
This shift was also accompanied with a greater degree of institutional commitment to
inclusion within the IAF. By the late 2000s, women were increasingly serving in the IAF as
pilots, operators, and technicians, and the environment in squadrons was more open to a range of
sexual orientations and identities.129 In 2016, the IAF appointed its first female drone squadron
commander, Captain Bar - one out of thirty drone operators in regular service and reserves
(Avraham 2016, 17). However, it is important to note that the greater participation of women is
not synonymous with a change in the IAF’s gender regime. Indeed, several operators noted the
“professionalism” of the female pilots and operators they served with – that they performed their
missions to the same degree of skill and accuracy as their male counterparts, “if not better.”130
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
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Former Fighter Pilot and IAF Drone Squadron Commander, Kfar Saba, Israel, March 30, 2020,
Interview #8.
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“Twenty years ago, an operator wouldn’t say if they were gay, but now you can be an openly gay
operator…when I came to my squadron in 2002, there were no woman at all…and after three or four years
women went to the flight academy, stopped participating and started coming the UAV units.” Former IAF
Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5.
130
Former Fighter Pilot (Major), Tel Aviv, Israel, February 25, 2020, Interview #1; Former IAF Drone
Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5.
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For Captain Bar, ‘the aviation and uninhabited world is a manly world. I can’t say there’s a fiftyfifty divide between women and men…I interview [female] recruits that aspire to come to our
squadron for different jobs, and I still hear stigmas about “fitting" jobs for men and women.’131
Thus, while the de jure organizational changes of the 1990s and early 2000s had resulted in
higher percentages of female personnel, elements of combat culture and ego in the operational
environment remained.
For example, entry to the IAF remained competitive and overwhelming male: one defense
industry executive notes that in five years of overseeing operators, over one hundred in total, he
only had two female operators and two female technicians with IAF experience.132 And while
more women were serving as pilots and operators than before as occupational restrictions eased,
both manned and unmanned units remained predominately masculine and male. For many
operators, their uniforms – specifically, their flight suits and badges – continued to play an
important role in instilling a sense of importance across squadrons.133 This feeling of importance
and prestige was also bolstered by the shared sentiment that their missions played a significant
role in the security of the state.134
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Captain Bar also noted that while she is “happy to see more girls getting into roles in the aviation world
like navigators, pilots, operators and various commanding roles…. not because it matters if a man or a
female are operating in those jobs, but because there's a shift in people's perception, a progress in the
society” (Avraham 2016).
132
Drone Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
March 5, 2020. Interview #10; It is worth noting that the IAF roles extend beyond aircrafts, pilots and the
technicians around them. Such positions include AA (Anti Aircraft), radar operators, intelligence analysts
and many others.
133
“I go to reserves with [many] symbols on me…my name…the symbol of my unit…the symbol of my
base…the Israeli flag…air force pilots have the same thing…same suit…there are a lot of soldiers in the
base and only a few people with these uniforms, so you feel like you did something to get this
uniform…you feel good working with the symbols and flags.” Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location
omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020, Interview #5.
134
“Four or five months ago there was a big issue in Gaza. It was five o’clock in the morning, they
called…it was after the Americans killed the Iranian… the phone rings and they ask if can come. I say
when? They say now. I ask what happened and they say they can’t tell me. I open ynet and see the news
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During this time, IAF leadership increasingly emphasized the “human factor” of drone
operations, and the similarities between operators and manned pilots. In 2016, the IAF made a
request to refer to drones as “remotely piloted aerial vehicles,” rather than “unmanned,” to stress
the human involvement in making and carrying out decisions: one officer told the newspaper
Haaretz, “It was important to us, both for the motivation and the responsibility, to make it clear
that it’s no different from someone sitting in a cockpit. The question is who decides what to do”
(Cohen 2016a). From this perspective, drones, like any other weapon, require capable soldiers to
operate them. One senior officer at the Palmahim air force base cited the human factor as “100%”
critical to operation: “Forget about the movies. This is not a kid’s model aircraft, it is an
operational tool, and it is no different than any other tool” (Yaron 2016).
Despite such attempts to emphasize the human factor of drone operations by comparing
operators to aircraft pilots, operators note that their role in the military hierarchy is still not
clearly defined. While there was a general agreement amongst interviewees that drone operators
are not “warriors,” whether they are “the people that support the warriors” or the “people that sit
in the office” was disputed. Some operators were not sure themselves:
We are not warriors because we are not risking our lives…we are not supporting the warriors because
we are not fixing the tank…and we are not sitting in the office…I think that until now we are something
strange…there is no specific declaration about our status within the military more largely…where do
we fit?135

As the IAF became increasingly inclusive, the combat culture within drone squadrons would
slowly change, as would the strategies for emotionally readying operators – whether through open

and say ok I will come…I tell [my wife] I am going and no kindergarten today because missiles will fly in
a few hours. On the one hand this is a frustrating situation to live with here, but on the other hand, there is
something I can give…this is something I could say is rewarding...in Israel you feel very bad if there is a
situation and you sit at home and do nothing.” Ibid.
135
Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
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dialogue during debriefs or through increased access to base psychologists. This was not
necessarily due to the entry of more female soldiers, but rather a significant organizational change
that gave greater attention to a wide range of skills and training protocols. Manned pilots were
also becoming increasingly flexible when it came to transitioning to drone operations: many of
the former jet pilots I interviewed expressed an openness to becoming a full-time operator and an
awareness that their previous roles were becoming increasingly irrelevant to military
operations.136 In short, as the IAF invested more in institutional commitments to inclusion, the
approach to drone integration became increasingly open and flexible.
THE ARTILLERY CORPS
In the early 2000s the majority of employed by the IDF were advanced, high-level platforms,
with a few smaller, tactical drones employed in the field.137 These tactical drones were loweraltitude and intended for use by the “green army,” or ground forces. Unlike the “blue” platforms
operated by the IAF, these “green” UAVs provided field commanders with video footage of what
was happening over the hill, on the roofs of houses, or around the corner. Here, small teams of
operators would walk with the combat soldiers, take the drones out of bags that they carried on
their backs, and launch them from the field. Such small operator units were housed under the
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Former Fighter Pilot (Major), Tel Aviv, Israel, February 25, 2020, Interview #1; Former Fighter Pilot,
Tel Aviv, Israel, March 2, 2020, Interview #7; Former Fighter Pilot and IAF Drone Squadron Commander,
Kfar Saba, Israel, March 30, 2020, Interview #8.
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As a result, there was less of an emphasis on supplying close ground force support, and more so on
special operations and intelligence gathering. The majority of missions were “pre-missions” focused on
getting the necessary intelligence to conduct an operation rather than during an operation. Drone Company
Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), March 5, 2020.
Interview #10.
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Artillery Corps, arguably to assist with the precise calibration of firepower, as well as to make the
battalion more attractive for young conscripts.138
In the early years of the new program the Artillery Corps drone units were of a lower priority
to the IDF and, as a result, platforms were updated less frequently and prone to malfunctions.
Moreover, the training and integration of operators within the broader ground forces as well as
the career pathways available to them lacked the same degree of forethought and planning evident
in the IAF.139 Artillery operators were treated like any other soldier in the service with one
important omission that would severely undercut their status within a highly male-dominated and
masculine climate – that of combat training.
By the late 2000s, the technology was changing and the IAF began investing more in lighter,
tactical drones that could be carried on soldiers’ backs in the field. Around this time, the Artillery
Corps was also facing increased pressure to demonstrate that they were following the new IDF
gender inclusion public diplomacy initiatives to recruit women for lower status positions in
combat battalions so as to free up male soldiers for more advanced training. As a result, the
Artillery Corps embarked on their own public diplomacy campaign, highlighting the “cutting
edge” nature of the drone squadrons – both for their innovative technology, as well as their
inclusive climate. The Artillery Corps drone squadrons were strongly framed as the frontier of
female inclusion in a historically male-dominated service. In reality, however, few women could
serve in such units and the culture remained markedly combat-oriented and masculine.
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When compared to other ground force battalions, such as paratrooper or infantry brigades, the Artillery
Corps is less attractive to young Israeli beginning military service: “Artillery doesn’t have a good name that
people want.” Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls,
October 26, 2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12; Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom
Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
139
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9.
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2001-2007: operators as “regular artillery soldiers”
The Artillery Corps drone squadrons were comprised of young conscripts who completed a
eight month operator-training course following the regular boot camp at the beginning of their
service.140 The operator-training course emphasized navigation, orienteering, maneuvering an
urban environment, walking with heavily weight loads, and the technical skills required to
operate drones.141 Notably, this training course is much shorter than that of IAF operators and, as
a result, the operators who rely entirely on this training (as opposed to those who came from the
IAF) were considered of a lower caliber within the UAV community.142 The training regimen of
Artillery operators focused primarily on walking with a heavy weight load and building and
maintaining technical skills, rather than skills needed for ground combat. Such technical skills
were especially important in the early years of the drone program when the IDF was directing the
majority of their investments in remote systems towards the drones operated by the IAF. As a
result, the technology for the smaller, tactical drones was often faulty and ridden with bugs,
requiring frequent upgrades and the lower quality imagining required a careful and patient eye for
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Other soldiers entered the Artillery drone squadrons upon termination/participation in the IAF pilot
course. While most drone operators who have progressed through the IAF pipeline (i.e. failed the flight
academy, and completed their operator training), are directed to serve in an air force drone squadron, a
small number are directed to an Artillery drone squadron that operates larger drones on an IAF base. Drone
Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), March 5,
2020, Interview #10.
141
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26,
2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12.
142
The tactical platforms were intended to be very simple to operate and the training course for the smallest
systems is only five days. As a result, the first three to four training units were often under-utilized and
unprepared: “no one knew what the unit was about…even the unit could do its job correctly.” Former
Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26, 2020 and
November 2, 2020, Interview #12; “they need to teach you how to launch it, how to land it, how to use the
camera…but it is a very short course…something like a month and the internal pilot course in the air force
is six months.” Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29,
2020, Interview #5.
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analysis.143 Operators were required carry the drones on their back – a total weight load of up to
fifty percent of their body weight. Then, after walking for long distances, operators would quickly
assemble, operate, and disassemble their platform. This physical effort was not only highly
challenging, but also served to reinforce their masculine status, as well as further justify the
existing exclusive gender regime. 144 Thus, despite their lack of combat training, some operators
considered themselves to be “regular artillery soldiers.”145 Others, however, noted that they only
“felt like a regular combat unit” during the initial boot camp training of their first year:
Instead of being the best at shooting with gun, we were the best at operating but [during the first year
we also] knew how to do what [infantry units like the] Golani do…the feeling decreased when we were
in the field…we practiced less in carrying weights and combat training [and lost] the feeling we
had…we were stuck in the middle. Not an IAF operator and not…[the kind of] combat [soldier] that
we used to be.146

Thus, the status of artillery operators – both in comparison to IAF operators and to other
Artillery Corps soldiers – was “somewhere in the middle”: neither as skilled as IAF operators, nor
as masculine as regular infantry soldiers. As one former operator put it, “IAF operators have a
better service. I wear a regular uniform and they wear a flight suit. They sit in a big room with
AC and coffee and I sit in a field in the mud.”147 Thus, while IAF operators were admittedly
considered more professional, their lack of on the ground experience and exposure to the
battlefield also denied them a degree of the masculine status awarded to ground forces.
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“Before the pictures got better, drone operations required a lot more thinking than combat. Originally,
the desire to keep things on the field simple and straightforward meant the technology was limited, and we
were not well prepared…we needed to read the situation…see intelligence from above and connect the
dots.” Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9
144
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9; Drone Company
Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), March 5, 2020,
Interview #10; Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls,
October 26, 2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12, Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom
Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
145
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9.
146
Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
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Ibid.
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We are not as professional as [IAF operators] but they sit in air conditioning…I wake up in a sleeping
bag brush my teeth from a bottle and then fly a UAV…we are somewhere in the middle – not a combat
148
soldier with a cool weapon but also not wearing a flight suit.

Career pathways
While there are no formal limits on the advancement of drone operators serving in the
Artillery Corps, most choose to leave at the end of their service. While technically possible, rising
to the top of the hierarchy within the Artillery Corps is not easy for operators: “you are not really
artillery if you are flying drones and not shooting cannons.”149 Artillery operators, like those from
the IAF, encounter similar opportunities to join the defense industry. However, because they
operated smaller, tactical drones, for only three years (as opposed to IAF operators who leave the
military with eight years of training and experience) opportunities for advancement are more
limited: “we don’t even call them operators…when you go to Aeronautics and you are an
operator from a small tactical UAV unit as opposed to the air force, you are not the same.”150
These operators are primarily responsible for training foreign militaries in the operation of
smaller drones once they enter the defense industry.151 Here, the size of the platform an operator
is responsible for training a client with, is reflected in their relative salaries. As a result, operators
hailing from the IAF tend to make more money than those from Artillery, and progress to
management positions with greater ease. On former Artillery operator who currently works in the
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26,
2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12.
149
Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13. Operators
can go on to be squadron leaders, platoon leaders, COs, unit commanders, and even division commanders.
However, an operator has yet to command an entire division. Some attribute this to the fact that the unit is
still relatively young and no one has progressed far enough. Drone Company Executive (Former Combat
Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), March 5, 2020. Interview #10.
150
Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
151
Drone Company Executive (Former Combat Officer), Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity),
March 5, 2020. Interview #10.
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industry noted that of “all the people in reserves...people who finished a little before and two
years after me [in 2016], maybe two or three are working in the industry…[most] want to travel
and study computer science and engineering.”152 Moreover, defense industry opportunities differ
across artillery operators and drone unit officers: “only officers can work in the
company…operators can be technicians and then [move up] if good.”153
Notably, the Artillery Corps never appeared to contest their lower professional status when
compared to IAF operators.154 Rather, the route taken by the Artillery Corps during the early
2000s was to devote as little energy and attention to integrating drones as possible. Drones were
treated as just another weapon, not a career pathway deserving of prestige (H1a).
2008-2017: an expanding arsenal
By the late 2000s, the value of the remote platforms for “over the hill” operations was
increasingly recognized across the ground forces. In 2010, the IDF made a large purchase of
Skylark drones from Elbit Systems, significantly expanding remote operations within the
Artillery Corps. These drones would, like the previous systems, be utilized for various operational
and tactical intelligence purposes for ground force units by a separate Artillery squadron. As a
result, the Rochev Shamayim, or “Sky Rider” drone unit was established as an independent
squadron of the “David’s Sling” Brigade in 2011.155 Entry to the squadron was initially
competitive: one former operator recalls how out of the 400 recruits in the fall of 2011, only
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
Ibid.
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26,
2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12; Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call,
November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
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The other two units of the brigade, the Meitar and Moran units, fire guided surface-to-surface missiles.
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26, 2020
and November 2, 2020, Interview #12. See also Lapin 2016a.
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eighty gained entry to the brigade and fifteen to the Sky Rider unit. However most of these
recruits sought entry to the Brigade with the hope of being placed in the other units – such as
Moran or Meitar – which were responsible for firing guided surface-to-surface missiles: “I wasn’t
so excited about the Sky Rider unit…I didn’t have a say about going to drones…I wanted the
Moran unit…at the beginning not many people knew about the unit…people asked, what? What
do drones have to do with artillery?”156
The Sky Rider unit would move from branch to branch, assisting IDF ground forces in
infantry, engineering, armor, and artillery in combat when needed. Operators would provide
tactical support on a battalion level and provide intelligence directly to the battalion commanders
of those units in the field. One former artillery operator referred to this dynamic of shifting from
unit to unit as a form of “speed dating” where you “get used to being an outsider.”157 Especially
during the early years of the unit, operators found that the infantry units they were assigned to
assist often didn’t know what to do with them: “some respected us as equals even though we
didn’t fight, and others wouldn’t let us through the door…[I] had to deal with the issue of not
being taken seriously…[and was] treated as if they don’t need me.”158 As a result, operators often
felt that they struggled to be a cohesive part of the squadron they were accompanying with for a
given mission – which was exacerbated by the feeling that “we lacked the infantry ability to
handle a gun.”159
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9. Another operator
echoed this view: “we are like the unit that operates the canines – each operator and his dog are
lonely…one night they go to raid a house and on night go to a special activity somewhere else…we do the
same…moving from one unit to another.” Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company
Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26, 2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12.
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
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As the Skylark technology continued to advance, there was greater demand for Skyrider units
and they were increasingly employed in the field – including, for example, Operation Pillar of
Defense in Gaza in 2012 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (Cohen 2016b). However,
during both operations, operators cited their lack of combat training as a major concern: “one of
the main things we talked about in the unit after [Operation Protective Edge] was that the teams
do not feel at all safe if needed to enter Gaza…do not feel like we have the tools to do what needs
to be done…operate and work in enemy territory, as opposed to as a sitting duck.”160
In the years that followed, the Artillery Corps operator training would receive increased
attention – with an emphasis not towards addressing the concerns raised in 2014, but rather
towards expanded recruitment as well as more tailored training where the majority of flights
would be conducted in simulators on base in air conditioned rooms. While this shift would
arguably produce better operators, they would also be “a little more soft,” equally untrained for
combat, and less prestigious within the ground forces.161
Strategic gender segregation?
In the late 2000s the IDF was placing an increased emphasis on the integration of female
soldiers across services and roles: by 2016, over half of the battalions guarding the perimeters
with Egypt and Jordan were mixed-gender (such as, for example, the Bardelas Battalian along the
border with Jordan). These deployments were intended to balance the growing need to guard
borders while allowing “prime combat forces” to train “for greater challenges” (Harel 2017).
Thus, rather than assigning what are considered key (male) forces to tasks such as policing the
West Bank, the army expanded the number of female combat troops who could appropriate these
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
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positions, freeing up other divisions for more extensive training and “hotter” deployments.162
During this time, the IDF was also amping up its media and Spokesperson’s Unit coverage of
female combat soldiers – which, along with Operation Protective Edge in Gaza during the
summer of 2014, the IDF ascribed to a growing number of female soldiers who expressed interest
in serving in combat units.163
The Artillery Corps mirrored this approach, placing female soldiers along the border to free
up male soldiers for more rigorous and tailored training exercises. In 2014, Rochev Shamayim
opened to female personnel, as long as they committed to three years of military service (Cohen
2016b). That year, six female soldiers passed the physical aptitude tests required join the Moran,
Meitar, and Sky Rider units of the David’s Sling Formation (Poch 2014). However, the
operations conducted by female soldiers were limited due to the weight of the drones themselves
(carried on soldiers’ backs), as well as restrictions on female service in positions over the
border.164 Thus, while male soldiers in artillery drone units would take part in missions requiring
Skylarks to be carried in the field with accompanying gear on their back, female soldiers were
only permitted to “carry out missions where the equipment can be transported on vehicles” (Gross
2018). For the operators within the squadrons themselves, the few female artillery operators
taking the drones by vehicle were considered as serving in support roles: “they don’t need to be
fighting soldiers.”165
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Deployments at borders that have been agreed upon through peace agreements are less active, ”hot,” or
hostile than that those at the border with Lebanon or Gaza, for example. There is a lower chance of capture
and other high-risk scenarios.
163
For example, 41 percent of women drafted in November 2014 expressed an interest in serving before
their induction (a 13 percent rise in the willingness of pre-induction women to serve in combat units
compared to 2013 (Cohen, August 3, 2015).
164
War would likely involve a massive ground maneuver which means they will need to walk with the
system (the UAV and launching system) on their backs for long distances.
165
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9.
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In 2016, the supposed expansions of inclusion efforts in drone squadrons as framed as
occurring synergistically with technological advancement: female operators were described as
“the newest generation to defend Israel from the air against a myriad of threats” (Lapin 2016b).
Such characterizations were often paired with arguments surrounding the “technological gains” of
gender integration. News articles attributed the Skylark drone unit’s use of smaller, lighter-weight
launchers to efforts to increase gender inclusion across units.166 Such improved launching systems
would allow women to more easily participate in current operations in Gaza and the West Bank.
One Ynet article, noted how male soldiers have now “gained” from gender integration because an
“easier, simpler, and lighter launching platform for the UAV was developed for the female
soldiers.”167
Smoke and mirrors
However, with the exception of one operator who noted that a female soldier could operate
truck-loaded drones in the Artillery Corps, all interviewees resolutely stated that they had never
encountered a female Artillery operator and struggled to reconcile the integration of female
soldiers. Given that the majority of the interviewees currently serve in weekly reserves, they are
aware of how the landscape of operators has changed, as well as who the current active-duty
operators are in a given year. Interviewees questioned the ability of female personnel to
physically carry and launch the drones, as well as where they would sleep on the field.168 Some
noted that the adjustments made to allow the entry of female operators with special launchers in
2016 were “the right thing to do…because the people wanted it,” but lamented the operational
implications: “if you can only have twelve teams and two of them are female then you don’t have
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These launchers utilize a catapult with a rope that stretches from the launching pad, sending the drone
into the air without the need to manually pull a cable (Zitun 2016).
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Ibid.
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
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twelve teams that can do everything.”169 Moreover, one interviewee claimed that the
technological changes cited as lightening the load and thus easing the integration of women to
drone units were actually intended to reduce the personnel assigned to these units (keeping them
male), rather than adding more female soldiers. As one former operator put it, “the technology
has changed but the guys are the same.”170
I never met a female Skylark operator and based on my knowledge of how they [Skylark units] operate,
I don’t think there will be one. Skylark personnel are known for carrying a lot of weight on their
back…in the army it is a percentage of your body weight…so if you bring a smaller female into the
unit she can’t carry as much so everyone carries more…I don’t see how this happen…they have female
simulator trainers but no operators…the point of making the drones lighter is for fewer personnel
171
rather than including more women.

Arguably, such attempts to frame drone positions that male soldiers find unsavory as elite and
“cutting edge” to female soldiers largely reflect a (failed) attempt at organized gender
segregation. Here, rather than promoting women to actual elite positions in the military that may
lead to greater job opportunities upon completing service, the pairing of drone integration with
gender integration seems to serve little more than a marketing device, reifying existing gendered
discrepancies. Yet this strategy seemed to be entirely all talk. Despite the widely publicized
appointment of Lt. Col. Reut Rettig-Weiss as commander of the Rochev Shamayim battalion in
2018, making her the second woman to lead a combat unit in the IDF, the actual percentage of
female operators remains extremely low (Cohen 2016b; Gross 2018).
Moreover, the culture both within squadrons, as well as the message communicated by
squadron leadership would present operators as traditional combat soldiers, highlighting their
heroism and exposure to risk. In an interview with Calcalist, one IDF Major in charge of a Sky
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Rider unit explained how commanders no longer sit “in the center of the country” but rather
“venture inside, into the battlefield, along with the battalion commander,” stressing the lack of
separation between operators and the battlefield (Eilam 2014). Here, the collaboration of artillery
operators with the various IDF combat forces they assist is emphasized, rather than their technical
skills: one Skylark vice commander explained that “our men are neither engineers not
geeks…they are people who…live and breathe the battlefield” (Eilam 2014).172 Moreover,
regardless of the realities of their career pathways outlined above, drone operators were
increasingly portrayed as elite “fighters” that have been “carefully selected from among the most
prestigious training courses in the IDF” (Eilam 2014). By likening artillery operators to combat
soldiers, their masculine status was emphasized.
However, as discussed above, Artillery operators receive very limited combat training –
something that the Artillery operators I interviewed were unhappy about and cited as an important
operational challenge: “In 10 years [if we will have a conflict] up north, everyone would cross the
border [and utilize combat skills]…we are unprepared for a situation like that.”173 In addition to
noting the risks they face on the battlefield when operating in proximity to fighting ground forces,
Artillery operators also emphasize their strength and status within the broader military hierarchy.
Indeed, when asked if they consider themselves to be clerks, combat support, or warriors, they
resolutely self-identified as warriors, while every other interviewee equated drone operators with
clerks, support, or “something undefined.”174 As one former Artillery operator put it:
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The technical skills of artillery operators are frequently undermined in interviews with the press: a
Skylark major asserted that drone pilots are “not necessarily engineers or mathematical-minded people”
and that “any 12-year-old child can learn in but a few hours how to operate the Sky Rider” (Eilam 2014).
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We were warriors…we should have been better trained for combat…fighting is manly. Women have no
place in this space because it is more difficult for them to be aggressive and violent…there is
something in the environment between only men…the aggression that makes the military and my work
very manly. Women are better suited for support roles and intelligence…this was known [in my unit]175

As a result, Artillery Corps operators function in an uncharted territory full of gendered
contradictions. Their squadrons are composed of self-declared warriors who are neither trained
nor considered as such by the rest of the operators or the larger IDF community (at least within
my pool of interview subjects). They are presented as prestigious, but sufficiently low-status to be
populated by women so as to free up male soldiers for “real” combat. Indeed, one artillery
operator noted how the shift to more tailored, professional training utilizing simulators as well as
the opening of units to female soldiers resulted in a significant loss of prestige: “when they started
putting girls in the unit they made it really less prestigious.”176 Moreover, both within the IDF
operator community as well as the defense industry, they are viewed as having lower status than
IAF operators. Finally, while artillery drone squadrons claim to be cutting edge in their inclusive
policies, which are supported by advancements in hardware, in reality men and masculine culture
dominate the squadrons. The masculinity of such squadrons, however, remain diminished in
comparison to the rest of the ground forces: “eighteen year olds who want combat still want the
combat of a gun.”177
Thus, the Artillery Corps approach to the integration of drones failed to successfully address
the human component of operations. The lack of attention to drone operations and investment in
operator training during the early 2000s went hand in hand with their more limited use, and was
consistent with my expectations for a military community will low levels of gender inclusion. As
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator, Phone Call, March 3, 2020. Interview #9.
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator (Now Drone Company Executive), Zoom Calls, October 26,
2020 and November 2, 2020, Interview #12.
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Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit Officer, Zoom Call, November 5, 2020, Interview #13.
176

126

tactical drone operations expanded in use and demand, and occupational barriers on the basis of
sex began to decline, Artillery Corps leadership attempted to frame drone operations as women’s
work (H2). However, given restrictions on female service near combat zone across the border as
well as limitations on the weight female soldiers are permitted to carry, this approach was
unsuccessful. As a result, male Artillery soldiers continued to serve in lower-status operator roles
with fewer opportunities for advancement, recognition, and sufficient training – much to their
dissatisfaction and concern.
These findings, summarized in Table 3-5, are broadly supportive of my hypotheses. The IAF
responded to the gendered challenges of drones more effectively than the Artillery Corps (H1).
Moreover, the Artillery Corps’ failed attempt at gender segregation (H2) also presented
technological changes to the platforms (i.e. making them lighter) as directed towards greater
inclusion (H2a).
Table 3-5. Summary of findings
IAF

Artillery Corps

Higher inclusion. Better at integrating drones.
Face gendered challenges and overcome them
(H1)

Lower inclusion, Struggle to integrate
drones. Gendered challenges persist.
Operators in demand but low status (H1)

• New career pathways, “first class” bases,
flight suits
• “Squadron of failures,” tensions with pilots
on base
• Transition from “collecting” to “hunting”
challenging for operators as “feelings not
allowed in the room”
• Late-2000s: emphasis on emotional
readiness, “human factor” of operations

• Resist integration, operators seen as
“regular Artillery soldiers” without
combat training
• Late-2000s: arsenal expands and in 2014
drone squadrons open to women
• Attempted strategic gender segregation
and supposed inclusion-driven
technological change (H2; H2a)
• In reality, no female operators, tech
changes to reduce personnel
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Despite the variation across the bureaucratic structures and degree of hierarchy within the
IAF and Artillery Corps, many of the concerns expressed in interviews relating to these two
explanatory variables were markedly quite similar. In both cases, the novelty of drones required
a certain degree of “buy in” from leadership. Moreover, interviewees noted that there was a
general lack of understanding by leaders who had little to no previous experience with drones
(certainly not flying them) and as a result struggled to grasp the full range of their capabilities as
well as the best practices of remote warfare.
Indeed, the small community of Ministry of Defense leadership that was kept abreast of
developments in the early drone program carried a range of competing interests and points of
view. The Chief of Staff, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and twenty-five generals from each of the
services had a seat at the table – many of whom did not entirely believe in the new program or
want things to change. While the impetus for the new program was premised on a broad
understanding that eventually the IAF would not need so many pilots and that missions would be
transformed, convincing leadership of that vision would prove challenging in practice –
especially given that all of the high ranking officers were pilots at the time.178 Moreover, given
the intangible nature of the developments ahead in remote systems, many of the ideas proposed
were “considered the stuff of science fiction” and not taken entirely seriously by MOD
leadership.179 For example, in one meeting a brigadier general exclaimed that the program was
“selling toys instead of munitions,” comparing drones with “what my son plays with on
Saturday.”180 As a result, Colonel X sought to normalize remote operations as just another tool in
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Retired IAF Colonel, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 27, 2020, Interview #4
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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the IAF arsenal. Leadership was invited to the field to see the flight tests and any progress that
had been made.181 Rather than a destabilizing force or waste of valuable resources, drones were
presented as a new fleet that would fit comfortably within the existing IAF hierarchy.
In the years that followed, IAF drone squadron commanders noted how, despite the general
understanding that drones were the future of the air force, leadership still lacked the experience
and expertise to understand the concrete needs when it came to ability of operators to complete
the mission at hand. Put simply, the leadership consistently remained comprised of former jet
pilots, not drone operators. To some extent, this changed over time. While drone squadron
commanders were initially all former pilots, over time more operators became commanders.
However, these commanders were an exception to the rule, and the lack of career ascension of
operators further demonstrates the primacy of pilots and manned flight within the IAF’s gendered
hierarchy.
Artillery Corps leadership, on the other hand, largely viewed drones as just another tool for
conducting operations: “as a combat soldier you can get a dog, a big rifle, or a UAV.”182 Thus, it
was up to the newly formed drone squadrons and combat units they would accompany to learn
how to use them effectively. While the training regimen of operators would receive more
attention from leadership by the late-2000s, interviewees noted that this regimen often neglected
the realities of their operations – specifically concerning their exposure to risk and lack of combat
training. As with the IAF, operators remained absent from Artillery Corps leadership. Thus, I find
that leadership was a constraining factor in both cases.
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This approach was not always successful: one particularly skeptical general was eventually convinced to
travel from his office to the test site where he was shown a short movie, and given engines, wings, and
other hardware to hold. At the end of the visit, however, he remained dubious, insisting at the following
meeting, “I was there and it will not work.” Ibid.
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Former IAF Drone Operator, Israel (location omitted to preserve anonymity), February 29, 2020,
Interview #5.
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EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF FINDINGS
While Israel has played a leading role in the development and use of unmanned systems,
there are other countries in the Middle East that have adopted and integrated remote platforms
into their arsenals. In addition to investing heavily in drones, many of these countries also have
comparatively lower levels of institutional commitment to inclusion. As a result, according to my
theory, I would expect to see these militaries struggle with integration of drones. In what follows,
I briefly apply my theory to two additional military organizations with the means and incentives
to integrate drones but have lower levels of gender inclusion – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have low levels of gender inclusion and have
invested significant financial and organizational resources towards to the adoption of drones. In
the sections that follow I briefly consider how my theory applies to these two cases.
While Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF) has historically directed substantial resources
towards the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), they have increasingly invested in the procurement,
maintenance, and development of remote platforms. In 2014 Saudi Arabia purchased CH-4 and
Wing Loong armed drones from China, and by 2017 the military began investing in indigenous
drone production: the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology reportedly partnered with
the China Aero-space Science and Technology Corporation to manufacture Chinese CH-4 drones
(Gettinger 2019, 199; Frew 2018, 19).
Despite such investments, the RSAF continues to view airpower in terms of manned flight,
and drones are often treated as “prestige assets” linked to plans for broader economic reform and
the creation of a domestic defense industry (RUSI 2021). Here, drones offer an opportunity for
defense exports rather than a strategic and clearly delineated operational purpose within the
military. Drones are largely under the purview of the RSAF, and drone operators serve primarily
as a status symbol. In practice, the RSAF continues to rely on traditional air power for operations
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(RUSI 2021). Moreover, the RSAF’s C2 architecture and Typhoon and F-15 fleets are not
compatible with the programing and systems of the drones acquired from China, making them
difficult to integrate into RSAF operations, and making the surveillance data difficult to utilize
(RUSI 2021).
Finally, the drones are distributed haphazardly across regional commanders in both the RSAF
and ground forces, and thus lack a clear chain of command. The authority to access and operate
remote platforms is primarily linked to a commander’s social and professional connections, and
serves as a “symbol of status” rather than as part of a broader operational strategy (RUSI 2021).
Thus, the SAAF’s integration of drones is partial, retaining the primacy of traditional manned
flight. Given that the SAAF is a military with low levels of inclusion, this preliminary finding
corresponds with my hypothesis (H1).
The UAE drone program can be traced back to the 1990s when the South African tactical
reconnaissance Seeker was acquired in 1996 (Yates 2020, 256). After the US Congress rejected
the UAE’s request to purchase Predator drones from General Atomics in 2002, the UAE began
developing its own drones. A UAV Research and Technology Centre was established in 2003 and
by the following year, a squadron of Seeker IIs was deployed to the Bagram Air Base in
Afghanistan (Yates 2020, 256). Over the years, the UAE Armed Forces has acquired a range of
drones from the U.S. and China (Frew 2018, 20-21). While smaller drones, like the Black
Hornets, used by individual soldiers or, like the 6kg Puma, used for medium-range land and
maritime surveillance, larger drones are controlled by the Air Force (Yates 2020, 256, fn. 118)
Notably, during this time the UAE has become increasingly involved in UN-led gender
mainstreaming and gender balancing efforts: “On the sidelines of the 73rd session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the UAE
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Ministry of Defense, the General Women's Union and the UN- Women, to build and develop the
capabilities of Arab women in the field of military action and peacekeeping” (UAE 2019, 23).
For example, Khawla Bint Al Azur Military School specializes in the training of women for
military action, and in February 2019 it organized a military training course for “more than 100
civil women from seven Arab countries and the UAE” (UAE 2019, 24). Moreover, according to
an Emirati National Report on the implementation of the UN Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, female engineers made up 50% of the military industry’s engineers in 2019 and
showed “a high level of creativity, innovation and achievement” (UAE 2019, 28). As a result, the
report concluded that demand of Emirati women to work in national military industries is
expected to increase.
Thus, preliminary accounts indicate that as the UAE has increased their investment into the
integration of remote platforms, they have also begun to invest in gender reform. More research
into the successes and failures of the drone program itself, the prestige of operators and career
advancement opportunities might shed light on the relationship between such reform and the
challenges of drone integration in the UAE. Moreover, the timing of the reforms suggests that
drone integration may have driven inclusion in this case. I will investigate this relationship further
in Chapter 5.
CONCLUSIONS
The integration of remote platforms requires a significant reorientation in education, training,
and culture, and an elevation of new positions and areas of expertise. Such reorientations are not
easy for military organizations that place a high premium on traditional understandings of combat
and warrior ethos. While the IDF has invested substantial financial and organizational resources
into the integration of drones, the elevation of remote operations has challenged entrenched
gendered hierarchies. Both the IAF and Artillery Corps have struggled to provide operators with
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the necessary set of skills, recognition, and operational climate to integrate drones across their
communities. My preliminary findings suggest that the gender inclusion (and exclusion) regimes
of the IAF and Artillery Corps played varying roles in each organization’s approach to the
integration of drones over time.
As the IAF was just beginning to open its doors to female soldiers, it was also expanding its
drone operations. During this period of low to mid- levels of gender inclusion, integration efforts
were largely focused on making the operation of drones a respected and desirable military role,
while maintaining the prestige of pilots. Despite their flight suits, badges and “first class” bases,
operators were nonetheless viewed as a “squadron of failures” with limited career pathways and
opportunities within and outside of the IAF when compared to those of pilots. Moreover, initial
attempts to align drone operations within the IAF combat culture proved challenging to maintain
as operations shifted from intelligence and surveillance to targeted strikes and lacked the
emotional skills required to perform the missions at hand.
During this time, the Artillery Corps was taking limited steps towards integrating a much
smaller drone operation within the service. Here, the training and integration of operators lacked
the same degree of planning and forethought as the IAF, and was of a lower priority. Operators
were treated like any other Artillery soldier, except without the necessary combat training to be
perceived as successful within the service. Indeed, while the IAF’s inclusion regime was opening,
the Artillery Corps remained a highly male-dominated and masculine community: prestige was
heavily premised on a soldier’s combat skills, physical strength, and exposure to risk. In short,
while the approach to integration emphasized the maintenance of the existing masculine
hierarchy, not unlike that of the IAF, here there was less of an emphasis on training, and the
creation of clear career pathways, with important implications on the battlefield as well as for
operators entering the civilian workforce.
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In the mid to late 2000s, the IAF inclusion regime was continuing to open and the
organization was making greater efforts to account for the full range of skills required of
operators. While more women were entering the flight academy, squadrons maintained elements
of a combat culture – with the flight suits and badges they donned, and an increasing emphasis on
the salience of their roles in the changing conflict environment. At the same time, the IAF
leadership also began to increasingly emphasize the human element of operations, likening
operators to pilots. However, there was also a notable shift the IAF approach to the emotional
readiness of operators, and adaptations were made to accommodate the psychological
implications of missions. Thus, while some things changed in the IAF approach to drones, such as
the increased attention to the full range of skills required of operators (regardless of whether or
not they align with traditional approaches to emotion in the military context), others would stay
the same.
During this period, drone technology was changing rapidly in the Artillery Corps as the IDF
began investing heavily in lighter, tactical drones carried on soldiers’ backs. The Artillery Corps
was also opening certain roles to female soldiers for the first time. As other combat services were
increasingly recruiting female soldiers to occupy lower status positions so as to free up male
soldiers for more advanced training, the Artillery Corps embarked on their own public diplomacy
campaign which appeared to employ the same strategy. Artillery leadership presented drone
squadrons as “cutting edge” for both their innovative technology that would make the drones
easier for female operators to carry, as well as their inclusive climate. Drone squadrons were
framed as the frontier of female inclusion in a historically male-dominated service. In reality,
however, few women could serve in such units and the culture remained markedly combatoriented and masculine. In short, the approach adopted in the late 2000s appears to be that of
attempted strategic gender segregation.
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One important question is the degree to which the IAF and Artillery Corps faced different
challenges. Were the gendered challenges to integration smaller in the Artillery Corps than the
IAF ex ante? In other words, how difficult was it for the two services to justify the integration of
drone operations within their respective hierarchies and cultures? While my findings indicate that
the IAF was better able to justify drone operations, the task at hand for the Artillery Corps was
easier given that the tactical drones they operated were far closer to the “fight” and involved a
greater degree of physical strength. One might argue that the gendered challenges of drones are
less substantial when operators serve alongside the front-line infantry.
On the other hand, the Artillery Corps may have faced challenges with the integration of
drones unrelated to gender hierarchy. In the Artillery Corps, drones were largely used as another
tool to assist with a range of existing operational tasks. In the IAF, however, drones were
integrated within a broader theory of warfare: they would provide intelligence and eyes-on the
ground, and then manned aircraft would engage and shoot. Moreover, while the majority of
personnel in the IAF had never flown a drone before, those in the Artillery Corps had never flown
anything.
I also find that leadership was a constraining factor in both cases. In the IAF, the investment
in drone integration was top-down, but no one in leadership had experience operating remote
platforms or had an understanding of the range of skills and organizational needs required to do
so. In the decentralized Artillery Corps there was little guidance from leadership regarding career
pathways: drones were integrated as a tool like any other, with the assumption that soldiers would
figure out how best to implement them.
Another lingering question that remains for future analysis is why drones were integrated into
the Artillery Corps to begin with. Why not the Armored Corps? In other words, why was the
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Artillery Corps the only other service allowed to operate remote platforms outside of the IAF?
Possible explanations include a desire to enhance the prestige of the Artillery Corps, to increase
motivation for drafted conscripts, and/or to address specific operational concerns.
Finally, this analysis could also benefit for more detailed data on the inclusion regimes of the
two services. This includes protocols and monitoring of sexual harassment and assault, any
variance in family leave policies, as well percentages of female officers and total female
conscripts. The latter measure will also allow for greater clarity on my second hypothesis: if a
service has higher percentages of female personnel but restrictions on the basis of occupation and
rank, I would expect to see the gendered segregation of labor.
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CHAPTER 4 : POPULATION-BASED COUNTERINSURGENCY
“…a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful that a machine gun, a soldier
trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed
wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen” (Galula 1964, 66).
In the mid-2000s, the U.S. military was undergoing a reorientation. The doctrine,
education, training, and culture of the organization had historically prioritized the destruction of
military targets, but setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan during the early years of the “War on
Terror” demonstrated the increasing importance of unconventional military operations. Rather
than focusing on massing firepower at the right time and place, population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns would require a variety of tasks beyond combat in order to
win the support of the populace. The armed forces would need to conduct operations that
included stability operations and reconstruction. Thus, the counterinsurgency soldier would need
to “be ready both to fight and to build” (FM3-24, 1-105). By year’s end, the publication of the US
Army and Marines Counterinsurgency Manual (FM3-24) would signal the implementation of an
approach involving psychological and information operations and the integration of aid and
governance to win over a largely uncommitted civilian population.
While readiness to fight (and not flee) under painful and uncertain conditions is a
common starting point for theories of combat motivation and effectiveness, readiness to build,
negotiate, and win over hearts and minds typically falls outside of common and reoccurring
constructions of “warrior values” within military organizations. As discussed in Chapter 2,
warriors are expected to risk death, be able to endure pain and suffering, and be physically strong
– traits which have long been gendered, reflecting and reinforcing a dichotomous understanding
of masculinity and femininity (Goldstein 2001). These gendered roles are performed within a
militarized culture that privileges institutions and individuals who embody masculine values
(Tickner 1999; Enloe 2000, 2004; Sjoberg 2013).
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Implementing COIN doctrine, on the other hand, requires officers and service members
to rethink the traditional lines drawn to distinguish between civilian and military, the home front
and front lines, governing and military strategies. Unlike the conventional combat soldier, the
counterinsurgent requires a different set of skills – those of “a social worker, a civil engineer, a
schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout” (Galula 1964, 88). The elevation of lower-status tasks
associated with containment, mediation, dialogue with local residents, and humanitarian
assistance requires qualities that fall outside the purview of traditional “warriors.” Moreover, by
placing civilians as objects of military operations in doctrine and practice, COIN brings women,
non-combatant men, and spaces of home life to the battlefield. The struggle for the allegiances of
the local population and reconstruction of their social world challenges the binary categorization
which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about war, where “civilian (feminine) is the
opposite of combatant (masculine)” (Khalili 2010, 1473-4). Finally, counterinsurgents
responsible for both lethal and nonlethal operations operate in a high-risk environment, often
requiring them to engage in direct ground combat. This dynamic creates unique challenges for
military organizations that impose occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, with important
implications for the training and retention of personnel and, as a result, the effectiveness of
operations.
Thus, even militaries that view the best path to defeating an insurgency as one that
involves a “hearts and minds” approach may resist adopting COIN because it poses a challenge to
traditional norms and hierarchies within the organization. I argue that such resistance is more
likely to occur in institutional contexts that are less committed to gender inclusion. Militaries that
invest in institutional commitments to inclusion – for example by reducing sex-based
occupational restrictions, expanding family programs, and implementing sexual assault and
harassment monitoring – are more likely to have the needed flexibility when it comes to the
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elevation of roles that fall outside of the combat warrior framework, and thus greater success with
the integration of COIN.
To test this theory, I examine two comparative cases of military organizations that
participated in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan, with
varying levels of institutional commitment to gender inclusion – the Turkish Armed Forces
(TAF) and the Australian Defense Force (ADF). While both militaries have historically relied
heavily on the performance of gendered roles in service to the nation, the TAF has remained
resistant to any institutional reforms aimed towards inclusion overtime. The TAF gender regime
rests on the maintenance of the nuclear family and future generations of Turks, with particular
attention paid to the duty of women as patriotic mothers and the sexual orientation of soldiers. On
the other hand, ADF efforts to recruit and retain a female force began, in earnest, at the end of the
20th century, with the most substantive changes to their gender regime occurring in the midst of
the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. These shifts involved substantive institutional reforms,
concluding with the opening of all occupations to female soldiers in 2014.
I find that the TAF – a military with low levels of institutional commitment to inclusion –
resisted the integration of COIN into its mainstream operations. Instead it retained a masculine
definition of combat by taking a civilian-led approach to International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, while maintaining an enemy-centric approach at
home against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Such reconstruction efforts were framed in
Turkish national reports as feminine work fit for female personnel, as opposed to the enemycentric operations conducted at home by male combat soldiers and private contractors. While the
ADF originally drew clear distinctions between the enemy-centric counterinsurgency operations
conducted by Special Forces and reconstruction activities, this approach would change in the
years following the publication of FM 3-24 as it became increasingly clear that combat soldiers
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would need to harness a more diverse set of skills – including those of engineering, diplomacy,
cultural awareness, and the occupational training of the local population. However, despite the
publication of their own COIN field manual in 2009 and attempts to implement gender-based
strategies through the use of FETs, the ADF faced practical barriers. The continued primacy of
Special Operations and their lack of oversight, as well as occupation restrictions on the basis of
sex, would make it difficult to successfully integrate COIN doctrine. As the ADF began to invest
more heavily in gender policy reforms, however, their implementation of COIN would improve.
THE CASE OF COIN
The strategies and practices applied by military organizations seeking to fight irregular
combatants supported by a civilian population vary widely. From enemy-centric “scorched-earth”
tactics, to efforts to forcibly alter the ethnic balance of a rebellious region, to more hands-off
containment approaches, to population-centric policies, operations against insurgents can take
many forms (Watts et al 2014, 9). Enemy-centric approaches are predicated on the use of
violence to deter civilians from cooperating with insurgents.183 Here, the use of kinetic force
aligns with traditional (and, as I argue in Chapter 2, gendered) approaches to war fighting. This
paradigm sees insurgency along the lines of conventional warfare and defeating the enemy as the
counter-insurgent’s primary task (Paul et al 2016, 1023). Population-centric doctrine, on the other
hand, seeks to persuade the civilian population to defect to the counterinsurgent forces, deemphasizing kinetic force and traditional “warrior” roles and emphasizing psychological and
information operations, and the integration of civilian and military efforts (Kilcullen 2009, xv;
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For example, the French use of mass violence in the Algerian War of Independence would constitute a
counterinsurgency strategy of coercion against the National Liberation Front (FLN) and pacification of
Algeria (Plakoudas 2018, 12).
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Nagl 2005, 28). Indeed, existing scholarship tends to view counterinsurgency through these two
core philosophical lenses (Kilcullen 2007).184
The following analysis will focus on the population-centric, or “hearts-and minds” approach,
advocated in the Western counterinsurgency community. This approach relies on three factors: 1)
the accommodation of the reconcilable opposition, 2) the discriminate use of violence against
irreconcilable armed groups, and 3) the provision of public goods to the general population
(Watts et al 2014, 11-12). The application of these factors requires the combination of military
and civilian efforts, where non-military means are often the most effective elements (U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide 2009, 2). Here, counterinsurgency is defined as the
“military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a
government to defeat insurgency” (U.S. Department of the Army 2006, 1-1). The mission at hand
is the protection of the population and the “conflict will be won by persuading the population, not
by destroying the enemy” (McChrystal 2009). The population-centric view theorizes that if the
environment and population within it are controlled, the insurgents will lack the support they
need to fight (Paul et al 2016, 1022). In the sections that follow, I explain why this approach
constitutes a military innovation, and the specific gendered challenges it poses.
COIN AS A MILITARY INNOVATION
Population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) represents a lengthy process of change at the
operational level of war. Theories surrounding the “best practices” behind this approach emerged
long ago. Scholars and military officers began to examine and theorize about conflicts between
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Arguably, this dichotomous approach does not fully capture the reality of counterinsurgency operations.
In practice, counterinsurgency often involves a blend of the two philosophies, with actors seeking to
simultaneously reduce the number of insurgents through arrest and attrition and deny the insurgents support
of the population (Paul et al 2016).
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insurgents and colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, yet it would take years of trial and
error before early “classics” of the cannon such as David Galula and Robert Thompson would be
resurrected (Marston and Malkasian 2008, 13). This long and repetitive history of learning and
relearning best practices is exemplified by the U.S. experience. While the written fundamentals of
population-based counterinsurgency remained remarkably static within and across the Vietnam
era and the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (emphasizing civil-military relations, small
unit operations, and intelligence gathering), U.S. counterinsurgency operations have traditionally
been conducted in a markedly different manner, relying heavily on firepower (Long 2008, 1).185
U.S. failures during the early years of the War on Terror set the stage for a series of bottom-up
experimentation on the field by individuals such as H.R. McMaster and David Petraeus,
representing an important step in the innovation process (Horowitz and Pindyck 2020). Yet it
would not be until the publication of the US Army and Marines Counterinsurgency Manual
(FM3-24) in 2006 when this approach and the relevant professional education would be adopted
across the U.S. military, representing a significant top-down reorientation (Long 2006, 15;
Kalyvas 2006; Ucko 2009; Horowitz and Pindyck 2020).
The implementation of COIN required not just a fighting force trained in a new set of skills,
but also the pooling, coordination, and resources to implement them. It is at this point that the
scale of the required change was the most evident: after years of neglect, counterinsurgency
would be prioritized and stability operations re-casted as integral to national security, “rather than
as missions that detract from combat readiness” (Ucko 2009, 19). Here, top-down leadership was
needed to define the agenda at hand and oversee the necessary recruitment and promotions,
thereby affecting self-identification and culture. Thus, this analysis rests on the understanding that
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This gap between doctrine and implementation by the U.S. military is exemplified by the Army’s postVietnam preparedness for fighting armored wars (Jensen 2016a, 214)
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the publication of the 2006 field manual signified the U.S. adoption of a doctrinal innovation
requiring a change at the operational level of war.186
This reorientation was unsuccessful. The military’s ability to be a “full spectrum force” was
and continues to be called into question (Long 2008, 1). History teaches us that while new
innovations might promise enhanced military power, they might not deliver on that promise when
actually put into practice (Horowitz and Pindyck 2020). In the case of COIN, it can be argued that
successful counterinsurgency depends on good relations with local civilians and the development
of on-the-ground information networks (Wilson and Lyall 2009). However, success also depends
on a variety of other factors. The characteristics required for the effective application of COIN
include not only the decision-making capabilities and initiative required for all military
operations, but also civil-military skills geared towards interaction with nonmilitary personnel,
including an awareness of local history and culture (Ucko 2009, 21). As explained below, such
skills run counter to deeply rooted systems of award and commendation within military
organizations.
THE GENDERED DIMENSIONS OF COIN
In many regards COIN operations are the opposite of military innovations that are more
technologically advanced, mechanized and removed from battle. Put simply, the
counterinsurgency soldiers’ boots are very much on the ground. COIN campaigns involve a
difficult operational environment where the local police structure is weak, the language barrier is
high, and the insurgents are indistinguishable from the general population. Such operations pose
several gendered challenges: 1) the expansion and elevation of roles that fall outside of combat,
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While some may contest the degree to which COIN represented a substantial doctrinal shift (Long
2008), it nonetheless required a change in conduct of warfare (Horowitz and Pindyck 2020).
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2) the constraints of local cultures and gender hierarchies within the local population, 3) the
strategic use of female soldiers, and 4) the risk posed to noncombat or support units, especially
for militaries with occupational restrictions on the basis of sex. In Table 4-1, COIN operations
reside in the top right-hand cell – they require a high degree of risk but also the elevation of
operations that do not necessary require physical strength, such as intelligence and support
operations.
Table 4-1. Classification of COIN Based on Risk and Physical Strength

Physical strength
requirements

Low

High

Soldier exposure to risk
Low
Nuclear weapons
Drones
Precision strike; C4ISR
Cyber-warfare
Longbow; Crossbow
Medical (Ambulances)
Artillery

High
Fighter planes
Poison gas
COIN
Suicide terrorism
Swords
Bayonets
Amphibious landing

“Touchy-feely” missions and a different set of skills
Winning the support of the populace requires the expansion of nonlethal activities. However,
as many scholars have noted, it has historically been challenging for military organizations to
allow kinetic force to take the backstage. In Vietnam, the term “other war” was used to describe
operations to pacify the population, as opposed to the “real war” – i.e. search and destroy (Long
2006).187 Much later, in August 2000, then Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Sir Charles
Guthrie cautioned that “too many humanitarian missions could turn the British Army into a
‘touchy-feely’ organization, more concerned with widows and orphans than fighting” (Hills 2002,
5 in Khalili 2010, 1488). Such “touchy-feely” missions, however, are crucial to COIN where the
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The U.S. Army’s view of counterinsurgency operations as “secondary” to conventional operations
during the Vietnam war is used as an example of bureaucratic culture and promotion patterns within
military organizations that inhibit change (Nagl 2005; Krepinevich 1988)
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soldier and insurgent compete for the loyalty of civilians, which is premised on their protection.
This requires the effective mobilization of all available resources – involving the marshaling of
humanitarian aid, the recruitment of civilians, and the deployment of development – in order to
achieve goals. Given that military organizations are primarily responsible for the implementation
of COIN, the incorporation of such nonlethal activities into the military strategy “can be
presented as fundamental changes, which soften (read: feminizes) the military” (McBride and
Wibben 2012, 203).
Unsurprisingly, such activities are often those that receive the least amount of recognition and
reward within military organizations. Take, for example, the role of military engineers. The
process of logistics and provisions does vital political work in operations aimed towards
convincing residents that an occupying force is in their best interest and reinforcing local power
constellations (Khalili 2017, 96-7).188 The construction of roads, for example, connect distant
communities to administrative centers, ease transportation between markets and sites of
production, enhance access to food and medicine, and impose a security regime that separates
armed fighters from the populations (Khalili 2017, 96; Kilcullen 2008). However, when faced
with the choice of increasing one’s logistics footprint at the expense of combat troops, for
example, militaries tend to focus on kinetic operational planning – often with disastrous
consequences (Erbel and Kinsey 2018). Moreover, given that the professional hierarchy within
military organizations tends to ascribe logisticians and engineering corps a lower status than
traditional combat soldiers, they are often excluded from top-level operational planning – with
important implications for the effectiveness of implementation on the ground. For example, the
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While this was certainly the strategy of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, infrastructure can also be used to
isolate populations from local and the global market – evident in Israel’s use of bypass roads to block
Palestinians from accessing regional trade networks and facilitate transportation between Israeli settlements
(Khalili 2017, 97).
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US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program’s (LOGCAP) contractors did not have the
security clearance required to participate in the planning for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, as a
result, then had little time to meet the requirements that had been set by the military (Erbel and
Kinsey 2018, 538; Rasor and Bauman 2007, 15). These avoidable time pressures resulted in an
equipment shortage during the early phases of the operation.
Strategic awareness of local gender regimes
Missions in civilian spaces also force militaries to adapt themselves to the constraints of local
cultures (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2018, 146). Here, the population is transformed into
“human terrain which can be made visible, knowable, and malleable” (Khalili 2010, 1477). For
example, the US military’s Human Terrain System (HTS) coupled military officers with social
scientists responsible for interviewing the local populations, determining not only their needs,
wants, and kinship structures, but also their gender relations and ways of living – information that
is then transformed into military intelligence (Khalili 2010, 1478). Cultural mappings of Iraq and
Afghanistan brought civilian women under the purview of military strategists (Ali 2016, 19). Due
to culture difference, the interaction between male service members and the female population
was limited, precluding not only the ability of male personnel to conduct searches and screenings
for explosives and illegal items, but also to access important intelligence and win over the entirety
of the local population (Beals 2010). According to a 2011 U.S. Army study, a recurring complaint
among Afghan soldiers was that Western troops failed to respect such “female privacy,” taking
photographs of local women even when asked not to (Economist 2021). This is an example of
how awareness of the gendered norms, customs, and hierarchies of the population in which the
counterinsurgent operates can lend to a broader understanding of the environment and, as a result,
assist with campaign planning (Hardt and von Hlatky 2020, 138).
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Notably, this approach also tends to present women as a counterbalance to male violence and
radicalization –i.e. as more efficient, less warlike, and better for economic development. Winning
the war through a willing majority (rather than a disruptive minority) requires “coopting neutral
or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programmes,” which will, in turn, build
“networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents…Win the women
and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the
population on the side of the counterinsurgents” (Kilcullen 2006, 103-8).189 Thus, a significant
element of COIN is the provision of social services allocated to women, which will in turn assist
with winning over of a local population (Khalili 2010, 1477; Bernard et al 2008, 13).
The role of female soldiers
Given the primacy of the female population in COIN operations, efforts towards increased
gender mainstreaming in the armed forces are also framed as central to military intervention and
counterterrorism (Bernard et al 2008; Byrd and Decker 2008, 96, 100; Khalili 2010, 1477). In
other words, “winning the women” would require the strategic use of female military personnel
for general communication and intelligence. These efforts were supported by UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, along with resolutions that followed in subsequent years and
are collectively referred to as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. They rest on the
assumption that military actions can impact men and women differently and that an increased
participation of women in the management of conflict will enhance operational effectiveness and
the likelihood of peace (Hardt and von Hlatky 2020, 138). Indeed, the same 2011 U.S. Army
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David Kilcullen’s “Twenty-Eight Articles” was used to supplement FM 3-24 (2006), bringing the
engagement of Afghan women into the calculus of ISAF. The manual would be republished as
“Counterinsurgency” in 2010.
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study cited above notes that Afghan soldiers viewed female American soldiers “as having better
attitudes and being more respected” (Economist 2021).
However, as I note in Chapter 2 and will discuss further below, this gender-difference
approach may serve to maintain existing masculine hierarchies rather than disrupt them, lending
to the segregation of military occupations on the basis of sex. While working with local gender
regimes requires increasing the role of women, I will argue below that such changes are often ad
hoc in nature and rarely include doctrinal and institutional change.
Risk without recognition
In irregular warfare, frontline combat is not delineated and can occur anywhere and at any
time. In other words, a COIN environment is one with no forward battlefield: direct physical
contact can occur on routine air missions, convoys, and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Unlike
conventional warfare, where support to ground combat units occurs in a rear secured area, away
from the enemy, the COIN battlefield is congruent, without a front line or rear area. As a result,
the degree of risk soldiers face, while different from those introduced by conventional warfare,
are high regardless of whether they serve in combat or in support roles.
The nature of such risks introduces challenges to military organizations that impose
occupational restricts on the basis of sex. For example, the nonlinear and irregular nature of the
battles in Iraq and Afghanistan shed light on the risk faced by noncombat units (as was the case in
the Gulf War), challenging the definition of “direct ground combat” in the 1994 US Direct
Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, or “Risk Rule” (Kamarck 2016, 7).190 In a
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According to DoD, direct ground combat is defined as: “engaging an enemy on the ground with
individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct
physical contact with the hostile forces personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward of the
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declassified 2007 interview, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno asserted that traditional rules
regarding the gender-based nature of roles in conventional warfare do not apply in COIN,
recounting how female personnel in logistical and MP roles faced as much of a threat from IEDs
as men in infantry roles in Iraq (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Declassified Transcript,
46-48). Similarly, the Lioness Teams created in 2003 to conduct searches on Iraqi women and
inside Iraqi homes, were routinely placed at risk – an action that did not coincide with DoD and
Marine Corps policy. While both the Army and Marine Corps trained and employed Lioness
teams in 2005 that performed door-to-door patrols and worked directly with the infantry, their
roles were officially defined as defensive. The Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1300.8R restricted
women from filling roles in “any unit within which they will routinely become engaged in direct
ground combat operations as a primary mission” (U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Personnel
Assignment Policy, September 4, 1994).
At the time, the lack of institutional acknowledgement of the roles performed by female
soldiers had important implications for both the effectiveness of operations, as well as for the
recruitment and retention of those soldiers to fill roles without formal opportunities for award and
advancement. Lioness teams were often created in an ad hoc fashion, utilizing women already
deployed in country who were fulfilling other roles (Beals 2010). Early teams were usually taught
“on the job,” receiving minimal training with the exception of basic search techniques (Beals
2010).191 In 2005, the Army introduced the Combat Action Badge (CAB), which would recognize
soldiers – typically in combat support roles, who engage the enemy but do not qualify for the

battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect”
(U.S. Department of Defense 1994).
191
Multi National Forces West (MNF-W) officially established Task Force Lioness in 2006, publishing
guidance on staffing. From then on, the female marines were drawn from the Marine Logistics Group
(MLG) and Marine Aviation Wing (MAW) and received five to ten days of training before being split up
into teams of four or five and sent to support a ground combat unit (Beals 2010).
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Combat Medical Badge or Combat Infantry Badge (Lilley 2016). As a result, women in ground
operations who were technically serving in noncombat positions were increasingly qualified for
CABs. By 2007, hundreds of female soldiers had received a CAB (Harrell 2007, xvii).
Nonetheless, given that the experiences of these women could not be formally recognized as that
of combat, their pathways for promotion were very limited.192
Notably, the challenge of strategically utilizing female soldiers to conduct COIN operations
when sex-based restrictions are in place will be the most salient to militaries that have already
opened some roles to women. In other words, it exists because of the way in which a military has
responded to prior gendered challenges (by turning combat support into an occupation populated
by female soldiers). While an all-male military would struggle with the gendered aspects of
completing lower-status civilian roles, it would not need to consider the risk posed to female
soldiers restricted from combat.
COIN INTEGRATION PREDICTIONS
How will militaries integrate COIN? According to my theory, those with higher levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion will opt for solutions that elevate noncombat
operations, such as intelligence gathering and cultural awareness. Those militaries will thus find
the changes associated with the integration of COIN to be less disruptive, and will be most
effective at addressing the gendered challenges of COIN. Militaries with middle levels of gender
inclusion, on the other hand, will seek to integrate COIN while keeping the character of combat
masculine. This might include emphasizing the risks soldiers face, and the lethal aspects of their
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In 2012, Major Mary Jennings Hegar, Colonel Ellen Haring, Captain Zoe Bedell, and Command Master
Sergeant Janice Baldwin, were joined by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to file a suit arguing
that the restriction on women from serving in combat roles violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The
Obama administration did not contest the suit; instead announcing in 2013 that all roles would be opened to
women by 2016 (Sankey 2018, 285).
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roles (as opposed to non-lethal, “hearts and minds” tasks), or recruiting female soldiers to
perform the “softer” aspects of COIN. While this approach may serve short-term needs, without
new means of promotion, career advancement, and official recognition of roles performed, these
gains will be partial at best. Indeed, relying on female soldiers to interact with the local
population but simultaneously restricting their ability to perform combat roles will make it
difficult to implement COIN. Here, a military will seek to implement COIN but do so
inefficiently. Finally, militaries with very low levels of gender inclusion will place little value on
operations that challenge a masculine, kinetic understanding of war fighting. Such organizations
will resist the integration of COIN, opting for a more masculine, enemy-centric form of
counterinsurgency. This approach is to not implement COIN: here a military will neither
encounter the gendered challenges of integration nor its benefits for combating an insurgency.
These responses are conditioned upon higher levels of institutional commitment to gender
inclusion. These points are the basis of my first hypothesis:
COIN Integration Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more institutional commitment to gender inclusion a
military organization makes, the more effectively it will respond to the gendered challenges of
COIN.
There are varying ways in which the level of inclusion will make innovation integration more
or less successful. In particular, I predict militaries with low, middle, and high levels of inclusion
will adopt different approaches to the integration of COIN, and experience different difficulties.
Militaries with low levels of inclusion will not adopt COIN, those with middle levels will
partially implement COIN, and those with high levels will fully implement it. These differences
are outlined in the following sub-hypotheses H1a-c:
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COIN Integration Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Military organizations with low levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion will exhibit greater resistance to the
integration of COIN.
COIN Integration Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Military organizations with middle levels of
inclusion will partially integrate COIN, utilizing gender difference in an ad hoc manner
without the necessary institutional and doctrinal changes to do so effectively.
COIN Integration Hypothesis 1c (H1c): Military organizations with high levels of
gender inclusion will be more likely to fully integrate COIN, elevating noncombat roles,
establishing new promotion patterns, and/or considering redefinitions of combat itself
As discussed above, distinctions between combat and non-combat, or the “front” and the
“rear,” that serve to justify the sexual division of labor, are increasingly difficult to sustain in the
face of modern warfare. I expect this to be especially true in military organizations that seek to
integrate COIN while nonetheless maintaining existing masculine hierarchies. Take, for example,
the US Marine Corps (USMC). The freedom of movement of Iraqi women through manned entry
control points (ECP) and traffic control points (TCP) throughout Iraq provided insurgents with an
avenue to exploit (Beals 2010, 4). Given the cultural insensitivity of contact between men and
women, USMC’s response was the creation of Task Force Lioness: Teams of female Marines in
multiple key cities of Al Anbar province were tasked with searching female Iraqis for concealed
weapons and contraband items. What began as a female search function would soon evolve to
engagement with women in different sectors of Iraqi society, “harnessing the difference of
women” to build the trust and confidence of women in the area and open up lines of
communication (Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 390). By early 2009 female marines were requested
in Afghanistan in Female Engagement Teams (FETs) to support cordon and knock operations in
Farah province (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014, 7). Such initiatives would play a significant role
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in not only the adoption and integration of COIN doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the
development and institutionalization of a “gender perspective” by military organizations to
enhance operational effectiveness, and a broader move towards gender mainstreaming (Kirby and
Shepherd 2016, 389-390; NATO 2012, 3).
Here, the recruitment and incorporation of women to win local “hearts and minds” occurs not
as a step towards equality or a dismantling of gendered hierarchies within military organizations,
but rather because women, as women, are framed as adept to fill such lower-status roles. From
this perspective, the strategic use of female soldiers in COIN operations – for engagement (FETs)
and cultural support (CSTs) – can be cast as a military innovation in its own right. In other words,
femininity itself is weaponized for greater military effectiveness and gender roles are leveraged to
enhance battlefield outcomes (NATO 2012, 3; Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 389-390).
However, military innovation takes time – it is a process in which changes in war fighting are
invented, incubated through experimentation and ad hoc applications, adopted systematically and
through top-down implementation, and diffused across other organizations (Horowitz and
Pindyck 2020). As discussed above, the FETs deployed by the U.S. and U.K. in Iraq and
Afghanistan were largely applied on an ad hoc basis, with varying degrees of success
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014). While field manuals do occasionally mention the strategic use
of female soldiers on the basis of their gender difference, women often serve in such roles on a
rotating basis, with little to no standardized training (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014). In other
words, the strategic and organized use of gender difference seems to be a military innovation that
is incomplete and remains a work in progress. The occupational segregation of noncombat roles
in COIN operations is, thus, the basis of the following hypothesis:
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COIN Integration Hypothesis 2 (H2): Military organizations that seek to integrate COIN while
maintaining an existing masculine hierarchy will devote resources towards the development of a
complementary innovation - the professionalization of gender segregation
Approaches towards the integration of COIN that seek to strategically utilize female
personnel may also invest in smaller technological changes to further enable such participation.
For example, female U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan cited the weight and shape of ill-fitting
body armor, which was designed for men, as encumbering their ability to perform operations
(Londoño 2012). Thus, a provision in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act – co-written
by Senators Tammy Duckworth and Joni Ernst – directed the armed services to coordinate efforts
to track data on injuries caused by ill-fitting gear and equip women with armor that actually fits.
Here, inclusion efforts extend from designing body armor and bomb-disposal suits for narrower
torsos, helmets that can accommodate a hair bun, maternity flight suits and urinary disposal
devices (Vanden Brook 2020). This argument is summarized by the following hypothesis:
COIN Integration Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Military organizations with more institutional
commitments to gender inclusion will invest in technological changes that can make such
inclusion successful.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The universe of potential cases for analysis includes military communities that have sought to
adopt and integrate COIN doctrine in their operations. Given that this analysis conceptualizes
COIN as the population-centric approach adopted by the U.S. military, its focus is the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan during the time period directly
preceding and following the publication of FM 3-24 in 2006. Indeed, the U.S. approach to
counterinsurgency initiated a wave of doctrinal innovation across NATO, diffusing across the
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ISAF coalition in Afghanistan.193 By focusing on this population and moment in time, I am able
to examine a specific, contained instance in which a range of militaries with varying levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion had to decide how best to incorporate COIN
doctrine within their respective military organizations.
While the majority of ISAF participating countries had their own counterinsurgency doctrines
in the years before and directly after the manual’s publication, there were increasing demands to
develop a common doctrine and integrate the COIN mindset and subsequent techniques in a
standardized way across the coalition. Alliance warfare is a difficult task – especially when it
requires a doctrinal consensus across organizations. Given that doctrine often influences the
equipment, training, and education of forces, dissimilar doctrines make it more difficult for forces
to fight together, increasing friction (Kronvall and Petersson 2016, 286). As a result, the operation
in Afghanistan proved challenging for NATO’s unity of effort (Farrell and Rynning 2010). With
over forty countries, three international organizations, and many other agencies and
nongovernmental organizations, NATO’s ISAF mission was populated with a diverse set of
actors with competing priorities. Moreover, military actors included conventional, general
purpose and special operations forces that at times struggle to cooperate (Lamb and Cinnamond
2010).
From 2009 onwards, the Obama administration took a firm grip over the military operations
in Afghanistan, and COIN was adopted as the path forward. The partners of the coalition were
expected to follow the directives of ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal (Kronvall and
Petersson 2016, 287). In October of that year, NATO’s military authorities were tasked with
constructing a common COIN doctrine and training requirements for operations in Afghanistan,
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For more on the diffusion of COIN, see special issue Security Studies; Volume 39, Issue 2
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and a Counter Insurgency Task Force (COIN TF) was set up in January 2010. While NATO’s
COIN doctrine – the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4 was not
ratified until February 2011, the basic principles of COIN doctrine nonetheless guided operations
in Afghanistan from 2009 onwards (Kronvall and Petersson 2016, 286-7). By 2010, the
discussion of counterinsurgency approaches in Afghanistan began to treat women as “the magic
bullet” (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014, 23). The idea that a ‘vast pool of natural allies’ lay in
50% of the population, was given prominence in the Commander’s Guide (2011) and FETs were
presented as a crucial advantage over the Taliban (Pottinger et al. 2010).
Thus, the time period following the publication of FM3-24 offers a unique opportunity to
examine how ISAF countries, with varying levels of gender inclusion, grappled with the gendered
challenges associated with implementing COIN into their existing doctrines. Put simply, this time
period is characterized by a common impulse among ISAF participating organizations towards
implementing COIN, yet there are differences in how effectively the gendered challenges
associated with implementation were addressed.
In the sections that follow I discuss my selection of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and
Australian Defense Force (ADF) as cases, and I explain how they are used to test my theory.
Then I examine the inclusion regimes of each military in greater detail and show why they are
consistent with my case selection strategy. Finally, I discuss several alternative explanations for
the respective approaches of the TAF and ADF towards the integration of COIN.
CASE SELECTION: INCLUSION VARIANCE ACROSS ISAF FORCES
In order to examine how gender inclusion affects the integration of COIN, I employ a
comparative case analysis of two countries that played an active role in ISAF operations and have
varying levels of institutional commitment to inclusion. I address the following question: Did
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participating militaries with low, medium, and high levels of inclusion have different responses to
the gendered challenges of integrating COIN?
While there is a great deal of similarity between ISAF participating countries, there is also
substantial variation in their gender inclusion regimes. Here, I utilize an original dataset of
Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) to select cases that maximize variation on my
independent variable. As I will discuss further in Chapter 5, this cross-national and temporal
dataset measures the extent of institutional commitment to gender inclusion across a series of
possible indicators, including occupational restrictions, formal rank restrictions, family programs,
harassment policies and monitoring procedures, and LGBTQ+ exclusions.194 Figure 4-1 charts the
ICI index score across ISAF participating countries from 2006 to 2016. Most of the changes take
the form of sharp increases in the index. On average, from 2006 to 2016, the countries that score
lowest across my measure of inclusion are Turkey, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, and those
that score highest are Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Norway. Notably, Australia shifts from a
score in the middle to the high range, allowing me to examine both H1b (middle level of ICIs)
and H1c (high level).
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For more information on how the ICI index score is calculated, see Chapter 5.
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Figure 4-1. Institutional Commitment to Inclusion: ISAF Participating Countries, 2006-2016
Canada

18

Institutional Commitment to Inclusion (higher = more inclusive)

Australia
16

US

14

Germany

Norway

Spain
Sweden

12

UK
10

Netherlands
Czech Rep

8

France
Hungary

6

New Zealand
Denmark

4

Lithuania
Italy

2

Romania
Poland

0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Turkey

Of course, a military may invest in ICIs but still retain very few women. Thus, the actual
presence (or lack thereof) of women soldiers is another indicator of gender inclusion. Figure 4-2
highlights further variation across de facto, as opposed to de jure participation of women in
military organizations. Here, countries are grouped by the percentage of female soldiers serving
in their total active force. Notably, despite its investments in gender-based reforms, Sweden has
been unable to recruit women in substantial numbers. Australia and Norway, on the other hand,
are in the middle range and Turkey appears to have low levels of both de jure and de facto
inclusion.
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Of these countries, I select two on which to test my theory – Turkey and Australia. Both the
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and Australian Defense Force (ADF) were actively involved in
ISAF operations across all stages. TAF participation in ISAF operations served as an opportunity
to build ties with Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond. The ISAF mission for Turkey
represented an intersection of overlapping domestic and foreign policy shifts in Turkish politics,
as well as transformations in the geopolitical landscape in Eurasia (Vamvakas 2011, 243).
Australia made a comparatively proportional contribution to ISAF operations, contrary to the
proposition that they may be involved only as ‘onlookers’ because they are non-NATO members
(Marton and Hynek 2012, 464). The ADF’s “forward defense” policy relied heavily on alliances
with the United States and United Kingdom. Moreover, the ADF made significant changes to
their inclusion regime during the period of analysis and thus can constitute both a case of middle
levels of inclusion (H1b) as well as higher levels (H1c) from 2014 onwards.
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Table 4-2 compares the TAF and ADF across their average ICI score from 2006 to 2016,
as well as the component indicators. While both the TAF and ADF have historically imposed
occupational and rank restrictions on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, ADF reforms during
the 21st century and investment in family leave and harassment monitoring and prevention
reforms would ensure the recruitment and retention of more inclusive force. The TAF has the
lowest ICI score across all ISAF NATO member and partner participating countries, and thus I
anticipate it will have the most difficulty addressing the gendered challenges of COIN. The ADF,
however, is in the middle of the range, with variation between the indicators of inclusion and over
time. Thus, not only do I expect to see the ADF relatively more successful than the TAF with the
implementation of COIN, but also as a military with middle levels of inclusion, more likely to
implement a strategy of COIN integration that seeks to maintain the existing masculine hierarchy.
This strategy is likely to include strategic gender segregation through the use of FETs.
Table 4-2. Case Variation Across Independent Variable, 2006 -- 2016
Turkish Armed Forces

Australian Defense Force

Inclusion Index Total Score
(2006-2016 Average)

6.5

15.5

Occupational Restrictions O

4

4; 5 (2011); 6 (2014)

Rank Restrictions R

1

2

F

1

2

0

5

0

1; 2 (2010)

0

3; 4 (2014)

Family Programs

Sexual Assault and Harassment S
LGBTQ+ Restrictions L
Percentage of Total Active Force

P

O

Positions open to female soldiers: 0 = Complete exclusion, 1 = Non-combatant (nurse), 2 = Combat service (clerk;
cook), 3 = Combat support (instrument fitter; radar operator), 4 = Combat (pilot; weapons operator), 5 = Direct ground
combat (tank crew; infantry), and 6 = Special Forces (marine commando; ranger).
R
0 = total; 1 = partial, 2 = none
P
0 = 0 to 2% participation; 1 = above 2 to 5%; 2 = above 5 to 10%; 3 = above 10 to 15%; 4 = above 15 to 20%; 5 =
above 20%
F
0 = none; 1 = few; 2 = many
S
0 – 5 score (1 = yes; 0 = no for following indicators): Harassment and gender equity monitoring, harassment
regulations, training programs, harassment advisors and investigators, protocols in place for victims
L
0 = legal restrictions in place, 1 = gay, lesbian, and bisexual personnel unrestricted; 2=+transgender explicitly
unrestricted
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Inclusion in the Turkish Armed Forces
Since the emergence of the modern Turkish nation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal,
elected as the first president in 1923 and given the title Ataturk, or “Father of Turks” in 1934,
gendered roles have been crucial to the transformation of the country and, subsequently, the
military as a professional force. The political program of Kemalism relied on secular
modernization, embracing a state feminism in which women had a duty to the nation to become
productive, educated citizens and mothers (Sankey 2018, 266). Soldiers were taught the Kemalist
reforms, including loyalty to the state, submission to authority, and the rights of citizens.195
Women in the TAF initially worked as civilian personnel in positions as nurses and doctors in
military hospitals, or secretaries and translators in the headquarters staff, and were excluded from
the professional cadre of the military until 1955, when a group of women noticed that admission
to military academies was for “Turkish students” under the law.196 The women challenged the
written regulation in court and won – largely thanks to the country’s entrance to the NATO
Alliance in 1952 and subsequent modernization reforms (Toktas 2004, 259; Sankey 2018, 267).197
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For example, the 1934 ‘Handbook of the Soldier’ lists the characteristics of the Turk as hardworking,
honest, good-mannered, respectful, rational, and strong: “He loves and serves his nation…respects his
family and women…is a lion to his enemies and a calm sheep to his friend…is not destructive but
constructive…loves science and arts…is strong and powerful” (Toktas 2004, 250).
196
There was, however, one notable exception. In 1935, Ataturk’s adopted daughter, Sabiha Gokcen, was
the first and only female student in the Turkish air academy (Toktas 2004, 255). A special training plane
with closer pedals was made to accommodate her smaller stature, and she soon went on to serve with
uniformed pilots, joining an air force regiment in Eskisehir. In 1937 she served in the month-long bombing
campaign against Kurdish rebels in Dersim as the first woman combat pilot attached to a national army
(Sankey 2018, 266-267). The subsequent year she flew to all of the Balkan capitals on a goodwill tour,
demonstrating Turkish aerial mastery and the opportunities for women under the regime. In reality,
however, such opportunities remained largely limited to one token woman serving as an exception to the
rule: despite her visibility in uniform, Gokcen was not granted military rank (Toktas 2004, 259).
197
During these reforms, the number of military decreased from 700,000 to 400,000, and new schools were
established to train soldiers for advanced war technologies. Notably, this period was marked by a change in
promotion criteria: while soldiers were previously promoted on the basis of rank and years of service, the
criteria changed that that of performance and education. These modernization reforms provided an
opportunity for comparison to other NATO forces with female officers, suggesting that some degree of
inclusion was a “benchmark” the Turkish Military felt pressured to meet (Toktas 2004, 255-256).
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However, in 1960 this policy was reversed and the entry of women to the TAF was again
prohibited.198 Although female civilian personnel were assigned to headquarters staff, social
services, and technical fields, it was not until 1982 that female students were allowed entry into
military medical and nursing schools and assigned to officer ranks in military hospitals. Women
remained shut out of the military until 1992 when Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel’s True Path
Party initiated a period of modernization that began with the readmission of women to the Air,
Naval and Army Academies, and female university graduates were permitted to join
noncombatant positions in the military (NATO 2000, 53; Sankey 2018, 267: Toktas 2004, 257).
In the years that followed, women remained shut out of direct ground combat positions and on
submarines, and the military made little effort to provide family leave opportunities as well as
monitor, prevent, and prosecute sexual assault and harassment (NATO 2015, 2016; Turkey 2006,
2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). Unsurprisingly, women consistently represented less than 1% of
the total active force (Figueroa et al 2015, 26).
The TAF also continues to impose significant restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation.199
While there is no provision in the Turkish legal system that prohibits homosexual men from
entering into military service, the Health Regulation for Turkish Armed Forces states that if the
draftee has a sexual behavior disorder ‘explicitly seen and diffused all over his life,’ it must be
determined by medical observation and documentation (Article 17; ‘psycho-sexual disorders’).
The process of determining sexual orientation includes psychiatric consultations, personality
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The 1960 coup, considered a severe attack on the hierarchical system of the TAF, asserted the need to
re-establish the unity of command structure, rather than focusing on innovative projects like women’s
inclusion (Toktas 2004, 257).
199
Military service is a symbolic payment of “debt to the nation” (vatan borcu) which, along with
circumcision, first sexual intercourse with a women (referred to as “becoming national” or milli olmak),
getting married and setting up a business, is perceived as a rite of passage for “real men” (Biricik 2012, 77).
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tests, and, in some cases, rectal examinations (Biricik 2012, 80).200 The resulting report, referred
to as a ‘rotten report’ or pink discharge paper, is used to establish whether a potential conscript to
the Turkish Army is homosexual (i.e. ‘rotten’) and should be exempt from military service
(Biricik 2012, 76). Given this discussion, Turkey is at the low end of the range of gender
inclusion in the military.
Inclusion in the ADF
Women in the ADF similarly served primarily in auxiliary noncombat roles as medical,
clerical, administrative, and communications staff, and were not formally integrated into the
military until 1950.201 While the military implemented reforms in 1975, allowing women to
remain in uniform after becoming pregnant, they nonetheless maintained strict no-combat
limitations (Sankey 2018, 20-21). In the following years, women’s divisions in the Air Force
(1977), Army (1979), and Navy (1985) were merged into the mainstream service, but the 1984
Sex Discrimination Act granted the services an exemption: 60 percent of trades would remain off
limits to women on the grounds that they were combat or combat-related, and where women were
allowed to serve they would be paid 80-85 percent of men’s salaries (Sankey 2018, 21-22).
In 1986 the ADF implemented a ban on gay and lesbian personnel serving openly in the
military, instituting a policy guiding officers to discretely ask gay and lesbian service members to
resign. In 1990, however, a junior naval officer was reported by one of her peers as being
involved in a same-sex relationship and subsequently threatened to be discharged for being a
lesbian. She denied the charge and brought a complaint against the ADF to the Australian Human

200

Authorities may also require at least two photographs taken during sexual intercourse with another man
where the applicant is positions in the ‘passive’ role, as evidence of ‘moments of explicit deviancy’ (Biricik
2012, 81).
201
As the nation contributed forces to the Korean War, manpower shortages prompted the establishment of
permanent women’s divisions of the army, navy, and air force, with numbers capped at 4 percent of the
total number of men, later lifted to 10 percent by the air force and navy during the 1960s (Sankey 2018, 20)
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Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, and the ban was lifted in November 1992 (Goldberg
2010, 522). In the same year, a government review of the ADF in light of its post-Cold War
defense strategies and personnel shortages, recommended that all positions be available to female
personnel (Sankey 2018, 22). In the end, however, women were permitted to serve only in
combat-related support roles, including service on warships and as pilots (Wittwer 2019, 571).
During the 1990s, Australia sent troops to Iraq and to Peacekeeping Missions in Western
Sahara (1993), Rwanda (1994–1995), and East Timor (1999). Accepting that the military support
systems needed to evolve with changing personnel demographics, separate service centers were
merged into the Defense Community Organization in 1996 and reoriented to the needs of a more
diverse range of military families. By the beginning of the 21st century, 13.8 percent of the ADF
was female (Sankey 2018, 22). As I will discuss further below, a wave of further institutional
reform aimed at inclusion efforts would occur in subsequent years. In 2011 all combat roles were
opened to women and by 2014 this also included Special Forces (NATO 2016, 106). This shift
posed a marked contrast to the TAF, which continued to avoid such reforms, with important
implications for their approach to COIN.
Alternative Explanatory Variables
The Turkish and Australian militaries introduce variation across three alternative sets of
explanatory variables – force structure, hierarchy, and threat. The ADF is a volunteer force that
plays an important domestic role supporting state and territory emergency response personnel to
assist with natural disaster response, and is often deployed to assist with floods and bushfires
through the near region. The TAF, on the other hand, is a large and comparatively hierarchical
conscript army, facing a higher level of domestic threat as the country is fighting a domestic
counterinsurgency operation within its borders against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). As
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illustrated in Table 4-3 below, alternative explanations would suggest that contrary to my
hypotheses, the TAF should be better at implementing COIN. Bureaucratic incentives, however,
may serve as a mediating or constraining variable.
Force Structure
As discussed in Chapter 2, the degree to which force structure contributes to the successful
integration of military innovations is unclear. With regard to counterinsurgency in particular,
Eliot Cohen (1985) argues that long-term professionals, as opposed to short-term conscripts, are
better able to perform counterinsurgency. The reason is that longer campaigns require longer
periods of enlistment and, as noted above, counterinsurgency operations often require a set of
skills that include technical expertise. Put simply, conscripts rarely serve long enough to be
effective counterinsurgents. Rather, conscripts are better suited for conventional warfare where
replacements are needed quickly and in large numbers. Thus, an additional explanation for the
relative success of ADF in COIN operations when compared to the TAF is its force structure.
However, conscript militaries that emphasize professionalism and career advancement and
training are arguably equally capable of integrating COIN across their organizations. While the
TAF is a conscript force, it also relies heavily on professionals – beginning in the early 1990s, the
Turkish Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie began to boost their ranks with more officers,
noncommissioned officers, and specialists in job positions that required extensive training
(Varoglu and Bicaksiz 2005, 583). Thus, Turkey was arguably capable of performing COIN
operations given the forces available. Regardless, of force structures, both the ADF and TAF had
the capacity to integrate COIN.
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Table 4-3. Alternative Explanations

Force
Structure

Hierarchy

Bureaucracy

Threat

Turkish Armed Forces

Australian Defense Force

Conscript military but relies heavily on
professionals and invests in long-term
training.
Capable of performing COIN

Volunteer force. Soldiers have time
and resources to develop necessary
skillset.
Capable of performing COIN

Centralized
Better equipped to implement COIN at
directive of ally

Decentralized
More likely to face resistance to
integration to COIN

Routines strictly followed
Constraining factor with integration of
COIN

Routines often overlooked
Allows for more flexibility with
integration of COIN

High
Should be more open to/interested in
implementing COIN

Medium/Low
Should be comparatively less
interested in COIN

Hierarchy
In the case of Turkey, the 1960 coup, considered a severe attack on the hierarchical system of
the TAF, resulted in a perceived need to re-establish the unity of command structure (Toktas
2004, 257). From this perspective, all military operations (including administrative support)
should remain under the purview of one commander. In the subsequent years, a National Security
Council (NSC) was established to make recommendations to the government with regard to
national security policies.202 The General Staff of the TAF is not only responsible for operational
readiness, military intelligence, training, and logistics, but is also in command of the Special
Forces.
The ADF’s internal hierarchy, however, is far less centralized, with a joint-command
structure that emphasizes the capacity to deploy task forces that comprise of elements from its

202

The NSC included the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and several other
ministers. In the years following each subsequent military intervention, constitutional amendments would
continue to expand their responsibilities. While some of the reach of the TAF into the political sphere was
arguably restrained due to the prospect of EU-membership, the TAF has continued to play an active role in
Turkish politics (Ünlü 2009).
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three services as a ‘force multiplier’ (Horner 2001). “Plan Beersheba,” for example, sought to
restructure the Army’s 1st, 3rd, and 7th Brigades to form “multi-combat brigades,” and thus make
the Army part of the amphibious force and improve deployability (Galliot 2016, 171; Australian
Army 2015). Given the small size of the ADF, middle and lower-level commanders are provided
with a greater degree of autonomy and information, lending support to a move away from “a
traditional tree-shaped structure and towards the development of one that is relatively thin and
flat” (Galliot 2016, 171). This approach emphasizes horizontal communication between
commands as a means of achieving a combat effect disproportionate to its size.
Given that the motivation for population-based COIN is coming from an ally, I expect the
more hierarchical military – the TAF – would be better positioned to implement the innovation
(assuming that commanders want to see it happen). For the ADF, implementing such changes
from the top down may be more challenging, with more opportunities for pushback than in a
more hierarchical military organization such as the TAF.
Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic obstacles and organizational rigidity may also block the integration of COIN.
While routines are strictly followed within the TAF, the ADF may be more open to trying new
tactics and personnel performing roles outside of traditional areas of expertise. Here, bureaucratic
flexibility may allow the ADF to assign a higher value to COIN operations outside of traditional
combat. In other words, when it comes to seeing how COIN will work on the ground,
bureaucratic obstacles may serve as a constraining factor on the part of a military like the TAF
but less so in the case of the ADF. This, of course, assumes that both militaries seek to integrate
COIN.
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Threat
Australia’s military experience during the 20th and early 21st centuries consisted largely of
“junior partner alliance warfare” (Evans 2008, 112). From 1999 to 2005, 68,000 ADF personnel
were deployed globally, “including contingents to East Timor, Bougainville, Afghanistan, Iraq,
and the Solomon Islands” (Evans 2008, 119). The 2000 Defence White Paper, describes Australia
as “a secure country, thanks to our geography, good relations with neighbors, a region where the
prospect of inter-state conflict is low, our strong armed forces and a close alliance with the United
States…[where] the chances of an attack on Australia remain low” (Australian Department of
Defense 2000, 23). Notably, the ADF also helps in sea search and rescue, fighting bushfires, and
in responding to other types of natural disasters.
Turkey, on the other hand, has been engaged in ongoing conflicts with its neighbors – with
Cyprus and Greece over the Aegean and Northern Cyprus, with Syria, Iraq, and Iran over the
PKK and water resources, and with Bulgaria over Turkish minority rights. Such conflicts,
coupled with political instability and domestic economic crises have resulted in a high level of
perceived threat within Turkey (Buhari Gulmez 2020). Arguably, this difference in threat
perception between the two militaries may also influence the ease with which COIN operations
were integrated across their respective organizations: the TAF, as a military with a higher level of
perceived threat, may be more open to modifying their organizational routines if deemed
necessary for military effectiveness (Welch 1992; Rosen 1991). Indeed, higher perceptions of
threat may also heighten manpower concerns – resulting in more openness to the inclusion-based
components of COIN (Segal 1995; Carreiras 2006; Obradovic 2014). 203 If success in
implementing COIN is a function of threat perception, the goal at hand would be to conduct

203

A critic might argue, however, that greater threat may constrain a military’s willingness to pivot away
from conventional tactics.
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counterinsurgency operations as effectively as possible. Here, a threat-based argument would say
that because Turkey faces a greater threat, it would be motivated to integrate an innovation that
improves its ability to counter an insurgency, while in comparison Australia should be less
motivated.
The subsequent analysis relies on government and NATO reports, field manuals, semistructured interviews with military personnel, military journal articles, and news reports to locate
gendered challenges, the responses to these challenges and the extent to which these responses
helped or hindered the successful integration of COIN. I was able to conduct only three
interviews for the ADF case, fewer than I would have liked. However, the Australian Army
Journal was a useful primary source for the time period in question. Similarly, while an
advantage of the TAF case was its variation on my independent variable, a significant
disadvantage was that data concerning military internal politics and operations is extremely
limited.
ANALYSIS
Although ISAF forces were originally deployed in Afghanistan to provide the “soft side” of
winning hearts and minds while the US and a few allies would manage combat operations, by the
second half of 2006 their presence and role would gradually expand. In the years that followed,
ISAF partners became increasingly engaged in fighting a growing insurgency while trying to help
Afghanistan rebuild, struggling to reconcile their own organizational imperatives and
counterinsurgency practices with the population-based approach espoused by FM3-24.
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Table 4-4. Summary of Findings

Prediction

Turkish Armed Forces

Australian Defense Force

Lower inclusion. Resist integrating
COIN (H1a)

Mid-Higher inclusion. Partial
integration of COIN (H1b). As
become more inclusive, improve
ability to integrate COIN (H1c).

•
•
•
Key
Evidence
•
•

Conclusion

Civilian, non-combatant
Enemy-centric at home; PKK
Reconstruction fit for female
soldiers but little effort towards
inclusion reform
“Integrity of families,” assignment
restrictions
“Rotten reports,” recruitment
challenges

Resist integrating COIN. Keep combat
masculine at home while feminization
of civilian reconstruction abroad.

•
•
•
•

Elevation of Special Forces (SF)
Kilcullen, HUMINT, engineers,
“chick bricks”
2009 field manual, LWD 3-0-1
COIN effort at odds with
occupational restrictions; 20102014 restrictions removed

Integrate COIN while maintaining
masculine hierarchy. Face gendered
challenges and seek to overcome them
as invest in institutional gender
reform.

In the analysis that follows, I examine how the TAF and ADF – two militaries with varying
institutional structures that were both actively involved in ISAF operations – approached COIN
operations in the years directly preceding and following the publication of FM3-24. I find that
while both militaries initially sought to clearly delineate between enemy-centric
counterinsurgency operations and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, the ADF invested
resources in institutional and doctrinal changes during the late 2000s, seeking to draw from both
lessons learned in Iraq as well as the increased need for engineers, cultural awareness, and female
personnel arising in the field in Afghanistan. The effective implementation of COIN operations
would become a significant area of interest in the ADF as resources were increasingly devoted to
the formalization of a counterinsurgency doctrine. At the same time, the organization also sought
to remove restrictions on the basis of sex and invest in sexual assault and harassment monitoring
protocols and procedures. The TAF, on the other hand, continued to staunchly resist such reform.
As an organization with lower levels of inclusion, the TAF chose to invest resources not in a
population-centric, but rather in an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency at home. While
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Turkey did allocate resources to reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, these were primarily
civilian-led and the TAF was able to retain its traditional, masculine hierarchy and emphasis on
kinetic operations.
THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES
Turkey’s approach to the gendered challenges of COIN in ISAF operations was conditioned
by the country’s domestic enemy-centric response to Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK)
insurgent attacks, a national reliance on a system of male conscription and the preservation of the
national familial structure, and the emergence of a new Turkish identity which is no longer
confined to the territorial constraints of the 1923 state (Vamvakas 2011, 250). While initially
Turkey cited its experience fighting the PKK as an explanation for its ability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it was soon clear that these operations would look
very different than those at home. Unlike enemy-centric counterinsurgency operations against the
PKK, Turkey’s approach to the ISAF mission was largely civilian-led – before and after the
publication of FM3-24. This approach put a heavy emphasis on linking ISAF missions involving
peace building, cultural awareness, and other “soft” skills, which were framed as especially wellsuited for female soldiers – despite the absence of female soldiers from operations in
Afghanistan.
2001-2005: civilian-led reconstruction abroad, enemy-centric at home
Since the creation of the ISAF mission Turkey has played a visible role in the reconstruction
of Afghanistan, facilitating meetings and discussions and engaging in wider regional diplomacy.
Thanks to the Ecevit administration’s initial commitment to the mission, Turkey took over ISAF
Command from June 2002 to February 2003 (ISAF II) (Vamvakas 2011, 250-253; Republic of
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). However, the transition to the administration of Recep
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Tayyip Erdogan in 2003 ushered in a new approach to ISAF assistance – one that relied heavily
on a steady increase in civilian, as opposed to military support. This approach was based on a
two-pronged argument: 1) Turkey’s territorial integrity was endangered by the PKK and 2)
Turkey was unwilling to conduct violence against the Muslim states of Iraq and Afghanistan
(Vamvakas 2011, 252). In the years following 2004, Turkey increasingly insisted that the
country’s contribution be limited to predominantly civilian, non-combatant participation,
differing markedly from the TAF’s domestic approach to counterinsurgency: efforts to eliminate
PKK insurgents during the 1990s were largely enemy-centric, or “iron-fist” in nature, involving
intense military action (Ünal 2016, 75). In July 2004 the PKK resumed its armed struggle,
capitalizing on the new Islamist government’s struggle against the Kemalist establishment as an
opportunity to rebuild its military forces and reorient its political ideology (Plakoudas 2018, 30).
From February 2005-August 2005 (ISAF-VII), Turkey once again assumed a leadership role,
commanding 8,000 personnel from 30 countries, including 1,450 Turkish personnel (Kaya 2013,
24). The following November, Lt. Gen. Ethem Erdagi, commander of ISAF-VII, cited the value
for ISAF operations of Turkey’s counterinsurgency experience fighting the PKK at home, placing
an emphasis on the risks Turkish soldiers were willing to accept to command respect from the
local population:
Turkish forces were able to bring to bear valuable counterinsurgency experience learned in
the campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization. Turkish
soldiers took it as a duty to demonstrate to the Afghans that they are not occupying forces in
the country. Accordingly, for instance, they chose to patrol on foot and not in cars, and when
they patrolled, they never wore bulletproof jackets, even if it meant putting their lives on the
line. For the locals, this meant respect (Erdagi 2005).

However, unlike the counterinsurgency operation at home, Turkey’s role in ISAF was
explicitly one of nation-building – aimed at re-establishing state institutions, supporting economic
reconstruction efforts, providing humanitarian assistance, establishing disarmament mechanisms
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and counter-narcotic operations, and providing safety and security (Erdagi 2005). Unlike the
U.S.-led Coalition Forces (CFC-A) mission, which focused on carrying out military offensives
against remaining Taliban or other terrorist suspects within mainly southern and eastern
Afghanistan, the ISAF mission at this time was primarily concerned with building up and
maintaining a secure environment to facilitate the re-building of Afghanistan.
Such social and cultural contributions relied heavily on civilian (as opposed to military)
support. The Wardak Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was established in November 2006
and, unlike other PRTs which were military-led, was the first to be run by civilian diplomats. The
Wardak PRT cooperated with the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
(TiKA), seeking to bolster interactions with local authorities and local people, and enable them to
leverage common values and cultural ties. The PRT relied heavily on civilian agencies to promote
socio-cultural projects in the fields of education, health, and infrastructure, restoring and building
schools, hospitals mosques, bridges, and roads, conducting health checks for people who live far
away from city centers, and training Afghan women as midwives or nurses, Afghan military and
police forces, judges, prosecutors and mayors (Kaya 2013, 24; NATO Channel 2009; Vamvakas
2011, 255).
At the same time, the ISAF mission was increasingly framed as better suited for female
personnel. In a 2005 report to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, Turkey cites female
soldiers in ISAF II as “key in accomplishing the basic targets and principles in certain fields”
(Turkey 2005, 3). While these “fields” were primarily administrative, health and medical
services, and communications, they also include missions necessitating the participation of
women due to the local cultural landscape. Here, female soldiers were presented paradoxically as
simultaneously equal to and different from their male colleagues: they were not only “the image
of modern women,” but also uniquely able to approach and interact directly with local women,
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enabling them to prevent the use of Afghan women for explosives and weapon trafficking, and
provide Afghan women and children with medical care:
Turkish women officers in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) serve in all branches except the
armoured units, infantry and submarine. In appointments, promotions and training…an equal
practice is carried out…as an example of these practices…Woman soldiers contributed to the
ISAF operations…[in] certain administrative and support missions that necessitated the
participation of women…The woman soldiers in the Turkish unit primarily worked in the
field of health and served as technical personnel in communications branch to maintain the
strategic communication… The women soldiers drew the image of modern women walking
on the same way as their male colleagues in the eye of the Afghan people…the presence of
the women soldiers created an affirmative atmosphere…women soldiers were the only ones
who could approach the Afghan women. In this way they were prevented to be used for
explosives and weapon trafficking…The same conditions were applied in the field of health
as well (Turkey 2005, 3).

Thus, by emphasizing civilian and female-led state building, peacekeeping and human
intelligence in Afghanistan, Turkey was able to focus on “real” counterinsurgency operations at
home. However, while this approach showed the value of female soldiers in ISAF operations,
gender-based military reform efforts at the time were primarily focused on the maternity of
female soldiers and their responsibility as citizens to bear the next generation of Turks. Such
policy changes included: 1) legal amendments to maternity authorizing nine weeks of paid leave
and 1.5 hours of breastfeeding leave each month, 2) Navy regulations removing female soldiers
“documented to be pregnant by health report” from on-board roles and reassigning them to their
unit headquarters until “the end of the breast feeding leave,” 3) Air Force restrictions taking
pregnant officers from flight duty until the flight doctor finds a suitable amount of time has
passed after giving birth, 4) restrictions on the assignment of female officers and NSOs married to
their colleagues, “so utmost care is given to the integrity of families,” 5) the permission of leave
without payment for women officers with spouses appointed to posts abroad, and 6) changes of
services of women officers whose spouses are serving in different services “in order to protect the
integrity of their family” (Turkey 2005, 1-2).
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These legal amendments related to maternity leave were aimed not towards enhancing the
ability of personnel to balance home and work life, but rather to further restrict the assignment of
pregnant soldiers, new mothers, and female officers with spouses in the military, highlighting the
primacy of the nuclear family. In other words, despite the gender mainstreaming approach
espoused in NATO reports, in practice the TAF continued to place minimal institutional effort
towards the recruitment and retention of female soldiers, let alone their deployment abroad.
2006-2016: maintaining masculine hierarchies within the TAF
In the years following the publication of FM 3-24, as ISAF leadership began to increasingly
emphasize the implementation of COIN doctrine across the coalition, the TAF was shifting its
counterinsurgency approach at home. From 1984 to 1999 the PKK was treated as an armed
militant group. Thus, the thinking was that an effective fight against these militants would be
enough to end the insurgency. While this enemy-centric counterinsurgency campaign was
initially successful and significantly weakened the PKK militarily, it did not lead to the
disintegration of the organization, nor a complete end to the insurgency. Despite setbacks in the
1990s, the PKK would promote itself as a political organization seeking to defend Kurdish rights
(Kayhan Pusane 2015).204 While TAF leadership acknowledged that asymmetric warfare had
altered the “tactical landscape,” requiring a change in strategy, in practice the PKK problem
would be primarily addressed through the use of continued tactical and kinetic force against PKK
militants both in Turkey and in Iraq during the subsequent years (Kaya 2012, 532; Kayhan
Pusane 2015).
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By the early 2000s, the PKK had grown into a complex organization composed of armed units, sister
parties in Syria, Iran, and Europe, and special branches to organize women, recruit, train, and fundraise
(Kayhan Pusane 2015)
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The stress of repeated deployments abroad as well as a long history of counterinsurgency
operations against the PKK had a significant impact on Turkish conscripts. Despite the social
stigma that accompanies being granted a pink “rotten report” excusing one from service, men
were increasingly attempting to evade conscription (Sankey 2018, 268). Moreover, in 2007 the
PKK formed the umbrella organization of the Kurdistan Union of Communities (KCK), striving
to coerce Turkey into a negotiated settlement. At this time, the PKK shifted to strategic and
asymmetric applications of violence as a means of indirect challenge in against Turkey for
political compromise (Ünal 2016, 57). Here, the focal point of the insurgent campaigns was the
commodification of violent attacks as a means of mobilizing popular support and achieving
political gains (Kalyvas 2004). A new strategy emerged characterized by strong social and
political engagement combined with violent attacks, keeping the threat in the foreground of the
government’s agenda (Ünal 2016, 64).
In response to the new PKK strategy, as well as the increasing number of ‘rotten’ conscripts,
the TAF shifted from large-scale operations to targeted military operations with a smaller number
of more flexible and mobile professional units. Unlike the cordon and search strategy employed
by the TAF against the PKK in the 1990s, a new monitor, locate, and engage concept emerged
(Ünal 2016, 65).205 As opposed to earlier operations that relied on conscripted soldiers, now hired
professional noncommissioned soldiers under the command of commissioned officers conducted
operations. By 2011, ranger units of five major commando battalions in the Turkish Army were
fully comprised of these professional groups (Ünal 2016, 65). The TAF’s increased reliance on
targeted strikes placed little emphasis on winning the support of the populace and, despite the
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Such targeted operations involved the gathering of actionable intelligence with increased use of signals
intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) using uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and human
intelligence (HUMINT), was coupled with rapid deployment via air cavalry and a higher response rate for
targeted killings – as used by coalition forces in Afghanistan (Unal 2016).
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high volume of incapacitation, popular support increased for the PKK (Ünal 2016, 75). While
violence has been an important measure of strength for both parties, defeating the PKK on
military terms proved insufficient to put an end to a conflict containing social, psychological,
economic, diplomatic, and political terms (Unal 2016, 77).
In the ISAF mission, however, Turkey’s stated goal remained winning the hearts and minds
of the Afghan people, and the establishment of a stable state (Vamvakas 2011, 243). This goal
would be instructive in defining the Turkish approach in Afghanistan – one that was
diplomatically crafted and put into practice in the Wardak PRT and later in participating in the
Kabul Regional Command rotation since 2006, as well as the establishment of the civilian-led
Jawzjan PRT in Shibirgan in 2010 (Vamvakas 2011, 243-244). During the period following the
publication of FM 3-24, cultural awareness, and local gendered environments continued to be
characterized as outside of the domain of the TAF – or at least outside of the domain of male
soldiers. ISAF operations continued to be presented as better suited for female soldiers, who
reportedly had a calming and peaceful influence on both their fellow soldiers and local
populations: the presence of female officers “created a positive impression regarding ISAF-II
operation both among their units and local people” (Turkey 2007, 6). In the years that followed,
the citation of the successes of female officers during ISAF II operations and reported reliance on
female soldiers in other peacekeeping tasks would continue.206
In sum, as an organization with low levels of institutional commitment to inclusion, the
TAF’s approach to COIN was one that sought to maintain the status quo and resist integration of
the innovation: the TAF remained focused on enemy-centric operations against the PKK while
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For example, Turkey’s 2007 National Report to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives notes
how female officers were “informed of social, historical, geographical and cultural structure and features
for the successful achievement of the mission,” and thus well suited for such tasks (Turkey 2007, 7).

177

reconstruction in Afghanistan was largely under the domain of civilian-agencies. Despite framing
such ‘soft’ roles abroad as opportunities for inclusion for female service members to the NATO
Committee on Gender Perspectives, little effort was made to implement this in practice. This is
consistent with my hypothesis H1 above: military organizations with low levels of institutional
commitment to inclusion will resist the integration of COIN.
THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES
In the period following the Second World War, the ADF was engaged in several operations
requiring proficiency in fighting insurgencies. The New Guinea campaigns of World War II
would shape the military’s training and doctrine for irregular warfare in the years to come,
ensuring that the Army would prioritize small unit operations in close terrain. The Army also
focused on the fighting skills of individual soldier – although these skills would be weakened
during the emphasis on conventional operations in the 1980s and 1990s (Leahy 2008, 11).
The Army also fought in Vietnam, and the doctrinal basis for its operations was the pamphlet
Counter Revolutionary Warfare, which was first published in 1965 (Grey 2008b, 24). The series
in which the pamphlet was published, The Division in Battle, sought to highlight the variety of
environments battle groups might face, ranging from conventional battle to guerrilla warfare. It
also “reflected the tension within the Army organizationally: a small force intended to be both
conventional and counter-revolutionary and to fight both on the atomic battlefield and in the
jungle” (Grey 2008b, 24).207 By the time the ADF withdrew from Vietnam, they had accumulated
substantial experience fighting insurgencies that would inform operations in Somalia, Timor
Leste, and the Solomon Islands: “In each case our soldiers were able to rapidly isolate armed,
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politically motivated groups from the population, undertake aggressive patrolling, and create
conditions for civilians to take the lead in governance and the provision of security” (Leahy 2008,
12).
Nonetheless, the ADF approach to counterinsurgency in the early 2000s was one that relied
heavily on enemy-centric operations conducted by Special Forces. Such operations were seen as
separate from the reconstruction activities. At the same time, however, Australian experts were
participating in as series of workshops and conferences reviving classical population-centric
theories of counterinsurgency. Such discussions and deliberations would inform what would
become U.S. military doctrine in 2006 and Australian doctrine in 2009. The mid- to late-2000s
were also characterized by an increased reliance on teams responsible for Human Intelligence,
civil engineering, access to gendered spaces and female populations, as well as the training of
local populations.
However, up until 2011, the ADF was characterized by a strong culture of extra-legal
exceptionalism as an institution – with limited attention to sexual assault and harassment as well
as a heavy emphasis placed on combat culture and the primacy of Special Forces. Female
personnel were formally restricted in the roles and risks they could occupy and be exposed to, yet
such restrictions did not match practical realities or needs. As the impetus for the FET concept
was initiated by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), there was increasing pressure to deploy
groups of military women to build rapport with, and support from, Afghan women and thereby
their families and communities. The ADF did take ad hoc steps to deploy female soldier in such
roles during the 2000s, but it became clear that they would need to make institutional changes to
their gender regime in order to do so effectively and in the long-term. By the 2010s the military
was taking steps to formalize FETs, open combat roles to women, and implement a new COIN
field manual.
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2001-2005: kinetic expertise, and Kilcullen’s best practices
While the ADF had been actively employed in kinetic roles in Afghanistan from 2001 to
2002, Australian forces did not return to the theatre of operations in 2005. The Australian special
operations forces (SOF) were among the first to enter Afghanistan after the U.S. in the winter of
2001-2 (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, 181). The SOF was largely seen as the better option for
combat operations given their elite qualities, experience, and reputation for effectiveness: the
deployment of the Special Air Service (SAS) and commandos enhanced Australia’s reputation for
forward leaning operations and flexibility (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, 181). At the time,
counterinsurgency was viewed as an enemy-centric operation requiring a great deal of kinetic
activity: missions defined as reconstruction and mentoring were seen as separate from
counterinsurgency operations, which required special operations.208 By the end of 2002, however,
ADF troops withdrew from Afghanistan, due to impending action in Iraq. Until September 2005,
there were no Australian units serving in Afghanistan (Maley 2012, 127-128).
During this period former serving ADF Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. David Kilcullen was
engaging in the discussions and deliberations taking place in the United States that would result
in the development of a counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24: A series of irregular warfare
conferences, follow-on briefings, and meetings from 2004 to 2005 brought together a diffuse
network of military officers, analysts, and defense officials. At a 2004 conference, for example,
Kilcullen gave a briefing entitled ‘United States Counterinsurgency: An Australian View,’ and in
June 2005, was invited along with John Nagl, Elliot Cohen, David Petraeus, Conrad Crane and
Kalev Sepp to attend a workshop in Basin Harbor in Vermont to discuss counterinsurgency
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(Jensen 2016a, 220). At the workshop, Kilcullen began to build ties with a powerful intellectual
group of scholars and military personnel from Britain, Australia, and the U.S. These “COINistas”
drew primarily from experiences in Iraq to make the case for a return to the basic elements of
counterinsurgency as espoused by Galula and others years earlier, drawing from the British and
French tradition of expeditionary colonial warfare.209 Over the course of 2005, Kilcullen and Nagl
would further open discussions of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency within the Department
of Defense. Kilcullen’s 2006 manual, “The Twenty-Eight Articles,” later developed into a book,
would supplement the new US military doctrine on counterinsurgency (FM 3-24). These “best
practices” would stress not only the importance of gaining the support of the civilian population,
but the role of Afghan women in this calculus.
In Kilcullen’s analysis, the private, “hidden” world of Afghan women is not just distinct from
the public world of men, but also assumed to hold the key to battlefield success: By “winning the
women,” the counterinsurgent could bring 50 percent of the population, as well as male children,
into the fold of a legitimate Afghan government, with the expectation that the men would
inevitably follow. Put simply, the implementation of COIN would be impossible without women,
requiring groups of military women to build rapport with, and garner support from, Afghan
women and thereby their families and communities (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014, 4-5).
However, implementing this approach would not only take time, but also prove challenging in
practice given the ADF’s continued emphasis on the primacy of SOF forces and occupational
restrictions on the basis of sex.
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2006 – 2010: Bottom-up changes, challenges and new field manual
In the wake of the deteriorating security situation, ADF SOF returned to Afghanistan in
September 2005, with a more substantial commitment as evidenced by the deployment of a
Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) from August 2006 to October 2008. The strategy was to
provide a low-risk deployment responsible for “the tasks typical of the ‘soft’ aspects of COIN
while allowing the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG), the U.S. and Dutch forces to assume
the more dangerous roles of fighting the insurgency” (Rice 2014, 6). The RTF was engaged in a
wide range of nation-building and reconstruction tasks, treading “a difficult path between kinetic
and non-kinetic elements of the military contribution to counterinsurgency operations” (Ryan
2007a, 127; Grey 2008a, 281). Here, conventional forces were staffed and led by engineers,
supplemented with some combat capability to provide security and, unlike the SOF, primarily
concerned with reconstruction (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, 181).
The new deployment in the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan,
highlighted opportunities and constraints associated with the integration of military and
reconstruction activities in pursuit of both the achievement of broader stability and effective
counterinsurgency strategies (Maley 2012, 134). The deployment included a reinforced
engineering unit, whose primary task was infrastructure (i.e. bridges and schools) construction,
and, after the Dutch limits became apparent, included the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG)
to provide force on the ground that could handle patrolling, disrupting Taliban networks in the
area and other violent sides of the operation: “From that point on, there were two Australian
forces deployed in Uruzgan: a SOF unit to do the fighting and another unit to do the noncombat
mission of the day” (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, 181). Members of the RTF explain that what
made the operation complex was not so much the physical terrain but more the human terrain.
The intricacy of the human dimension of Uruzgan was frequently cited as a challenge in their
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entries of the Australian Army Journal (e.g. Ryan 2007b, 127). For some engineers, this would
explicitly include the status of local women – specifically, their reintegration into the work force
(Major Michael Scott, Autumn 2007, 55).
Thus, beginning in 2006, ADF forces would increasingly rely on soldiers whose roles and
areas of expertise fell outside of traditional combat operations. Thanks to bottom-up changes in
the field, four teams of personnel would become crucial: 1) Human Intelligence Teams
responsible for understanding the characteristics, dynamics and affiliations of local tribes, 2)
Engineer Project Teams responsible for large scale civil engineering projects, 3) Trade Training
Teams to train local men in basic trades, and 4) what was referred to as “Chick Bricks” – four
person teams of eclectically selected female personnel who could access populations and
locations out of the purview of male soldiers (such as the women’s wing of a hospital, for
example).210 Notably, given that the Engineer Task Force had a higher percentage of female
personnel (approximately 5%), “chick bricks” were often comprised of engineers.211 These
female service members, while facing the risks associated with the irregular battlefield, were still
formally restricted from combat roles at the time, limiting not only their capacity to conduct
counterinsurgency operations, but also to be formally recognized for such tasks (Wittwer 2019,
571).212 In short, regardless of gender or rank, all deployed personnel needed to be prepared to
take up arms if called upon. Here, women were officially serving in lower-risk noncombat roles
that were nonetheless high-risk in practice, with little institutional guidance and clear coherent
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Such challenges were nothing new: since the Gulf War, ADF deployments have highlighted the
disparity between the reality of the roles ADF women have undertaken overseas and the occupational
restrictions at the time. Given the unbiased nature of asymmetrical warfare, women were tasked within high
threat areas, fulfilling jobs outside of their job description, including roles such as community engagement,
patrolling, and security piquets that traditionally were in the domain of combat-related corps (Evans
2013a).
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strategy for maneuvering such restrictions. Aside from existing combat restrictions, the ADF had
yet to take formal steps to account for the blending together of engineer, infantry, and human
intelligence operations, or acknowledge the gendered dimensions of COIN. Indeed, given the
lower status of Engineering Corps within the ADF, it was difficult for such personnel to ascend to
command roles, and as a result, planning continued to emphasize combat roles as distinct from
and elevated in comparison to, reconstruction efforts.213
In 2007, Australia increased their force contribution to Afghanistan, redeploying a Special
Operations Task Group of 300 personnel into Oruzgan (Grey 2008a, 281). From October 2008 to
February 2010, a Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF) succeeded the
Reconstruction Task Force. At this point, the emphasis shifted towards mentoring the Afghan
National Army through observer, mentor, liaison teams (OMLTs), resulting in the restructuring of
the conventional force including two combat teams that could engage in security operations.
Nonetheless, the bulk of the combat performed by the Australians was still conducted by the
SOTG: Australian OMLTs, for example, carried more combat power through dedicated rifleman
to limit such risk, and operations were kept to Uruzgan – forces on the ground were hesitant to
cross provincial borders (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, 182-184).
Given the struggles of personnel seeking to reconcile their understanding of enemy-centric
counterinsurgency paired with a separate reconstruction effort with the realities arising in the
field, it was increasingly clear that the ADF needed to provide its own manual. In February 2008,
the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, convened a joint, multi-agency seminar
on COIN at Puckapunyal “to re-evaluate what we think we know about counterinsurgency…[and
develop an] up-to-date, relevant COIN doctrine…to equip our soldiers with the intellectual and
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cultural disposition to operate effectively ‘amongst the people’” (Leahy 2008, 14). Indeed, the
2008 document, Land Warfare Doctrine One (LWD 1) – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,
identified the battle for hearts and minds to canvass support of domestic and international
audiences as one of the major challenges of land warfare. The 2008 winter edition of the
Australian Army Journal was entirely dedicated to counterinsurgency, making the broad case for
the fashioning of an Australian doctrine: “In seeking to acculturate a new generation of US
officers into thinking about counterinsurgency, the authors of FM 3-24 have consciously invoked
the historical record…we can and should do the same” (Grey 2008b, 25).
While the COINistas from Iraq and Afghanistan viewed COIN as a strategy, ADF leadership
treated this approach with skepticism, instead viewing COIN as a methodology.214 The head of
the Army Research Center at the time, Professor Michael Evans, who had attended the 2005
workshop in Basin Harbor, took the lead in writing, using Staff College students to quickly
produce a manual in four to five weeks. This would form the basis for the endorsed doctrine
document that Evans would later serve as the lead author of. The subsequent 2009 field manual
Counterinsurgency, LWD 3-0-1. Unlike FM3-24, which integrated the role of intelligence across
all chapters, LWD 3-0-1 had one chapter on intelligence, delineating it as clearly under the
purview of the Intelligence Corps. Moreover, LWD 3-0-1 contained no mention of gender or
Kilcullen’s earlier prescriptions to “win the women.”
In the same year, the concept document Adaptive Campaigning, AC-FLOC was published,
which reflected on these ideas with the intention of “getting the Army to think about military
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operations beyond just the military.”215 A fundamental premise of Adaptive Campaigning is the
ability of the land force to influence the population and conduct operations in a complex
environment. The document sought to confer “universal capabilities” onto the land force,
integrating “conventional combat, stabilization, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, security, civilmilitary cooperation, and humanitarian and peace support operations” (Australian Army 2009, 34). These full-spectrum capabilities were to be enabled by five interdependent and mutually
reinforcing lines of operation: joint land combat, population protection; information actions;
population support; and indigenous capacity building. Notably, of these five lines – one was
military and four were not. From this perspective, stabilization operations would require
improved area studies, cultural awareness and language skills (Evans 2011, 36). In the years to
come, this doctrine and the historical record from which it was derived would slowly become
institutionalized across the ADF: beginning in 2008, the Australian Defence College introduced a
“five-school methodology” for the study of COIN (Evans 2011, 36).
2010-2016: organizational gender reform and implementation of FETs
By 2010, ISAF leadership was increasingly seeking to implement the best practices of COIN,
with the goal of reproducing what they regarded as successes in Iraq (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam
2014, 4). In that year, the ADF’s ‘Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force’ was succeeded by
a new document, ‘Mentoring Task Force.’ In the 2011 Commander’s Guide, Kilcullen’s guidance
on women was given prominence, applying his logic to argue for the expansion of the FET
approach to counterinsurgency.216 In order to meet these imperatives, the Australian provincial
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Here, ISAF units would capitalize on NATO 1325 gender mainstreaming efforts to build relations with
Afghan women. Thus, these teams served a joint military and civilian role – as an important part of
evolving counter-insurgency strategy and force multiplier, as well as to ensure the participation of women

186

reconstruction teams in Uruzgan deployed Female Search Teams, Female Engagement Teams
and also Female Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams (Vedder 2010). Here, teams of
approximately three female personnel (a team leader, a scribe and preferably a female interpreter)
would conduct engagements with the local female population in a ‘culturally respectful manner’”
(Australian Human Rights Commission 2012,193). However, in order to actively engage with this
population, female members were required to 1) perform these tasks in addition to their normal
duties, and 2) operate in high-risk areas from which they had previously been restricted (Evans
2013b, 48).
Thus, with these changes came a broad institutional reevaluation into the ADF’s gender
regime, beginning with an initial ADF Action Plan on the Recruitment and Retention of Women in
the ADF in 2009 (Figueroa et al 2015, 32). In 2010 restrictions on transgender service members
were lifted and in September 2011, due to mounting public pressure from the Australian Defence
Force Academy (ADFA) Skype scandal, the Australian government removed the gender
restrictions on the remaining ADF combat roles with the exception of special operations.217 The
scandal in which a cadet secretly transmitted video feed of himself on Skype having sex with a
fellow cadet, would also herald the conduct of two independent reviews in 2011 and 2012 by the
Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth Broderick, into the treatment of women at
the ADFA and in the ADF (Sankey 2018, 22; Wittwer 2019, 571). The subsequent reviews
brought to light a culture still marked by rigid career structures and high degree of occupational

in conflict and post-conflict settings to help build more equitable, peaceful, and democratic societies. In
taking this approach, ISAF was able to implementing a 1325 strategy including not only practical measures,
but also leadership opportunities for women on the ground (Wittwer 2019, 571-2).
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These remaining combat roles previously excluding women were (Navy) Clearance Divers and Mine
Warfare and Clearance Diving Officers, (Air Force) Airfield Defence Guards and Ground Defence
Officers, and (Army) Infantry and Armoured Corps, some Artillery roles, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Squadrons, and Combat Engineer Squadrons. Together, these roles represented 7 percent of total
employment trades in the ADF (Wittwer 2019, 571)
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segregation, and poor leadership and unacceptable behavior, including exclusion, sexual
harassment, and sexual abuse: while the formal barrier restricting the employment of women in
direct combat roles was gone, “the practical impact on women’s participation” remained unclear
(Australian Human Rights Commission 2012, 114).
These reviews also highlighted the role of FETs, FHETs, and FSTs in demonstrating the
“specialist skills” of female personnel, finding that “opportunities to ‘go outside the wire’ (i.e. on
patrol), including opportunities to be involved in FETs” were being denied to women, “unless
accompanied by a man to ‘protect’ them, in part because of paternalistic attitudes of commanding
officers and a reluctance to be the first to have a woman in their unit killed on patrol” (Australian
Human Rights Commission 2012, 193). Despite the fact that the focus of FET roles were of a
non-combatant nature – e.g. in support of education programs, economic development and the
provision of healthcare services – these tasks occurred in an area where the risk of direct
confrontation with the enemy was likely. As a result, women could not actively assist with day
patrols outside of the Forward Operating Bases, but their male counterparts (equally qualified in
the same combat support service) were permitted to do so (Evans 2013a).
The government approved a five-year implementation plan which opened combat related
roles to female soldiers in June 2012, and the Defense Minister announced that all gender
restrictions would be removed the following September. These changes allowed female Staff
Cadets to elect combat duty postings after graduating, as well as in-service transfers for currently
serving Non-Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks who were able to meet physical standards
requirements, filling the combat ranks with women ‘from the top down’ (Evans 2013a). These
reforms were reflected in statements made by senior leadership within the ADF, reinforcing the
message that women are fundamental to the future capability of the ADF. In a widely covered
address to his troops in 2012, Chief of Army LTGEN David Morrison stressed that female
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soldiers in Afghanistan “are vital to us maintaining our capability, now and into the future”
(Figueroa et al 2015, 34). These steps had, at the outset, promising results: For example, in
2013/14, the Army recruited more women in the first six months of the year than it had in the
previous 12 months (Figueroa et al 2015, 34). Nonetheless, there was little in the way of
institutional acknowledgement of FETs. Written doctrine and articles published in the Australian
Army Journal made no mention of the use of female soldiers for engagement with local women in
counterinsurgency operations until a 2013 “Culture Edition.” Here, the utilization of “the intrinsic
characteristics of members such as gender, race (native language proficiency and ethnicity)” are
described as enhancing capability in Afghanistan (Evans, Culture Edition 2013, n. 34, 56). In
another article, “hyper-masculine culture” is framed as “both a barrier to gender integration and a
risk in counterinsurgency” (Knight 2013, 65).
In short, the ADF approach to COIN’s gendered challenges relied heavily on increased
recruitment and retainment of female soldiers in practice, but not in formalized doctrine. As an
organization with middle-levels of inclusion, and substantive restrictions on the roles such
soldiers could employ, the application of their solutions faced practical challenges – without clear
means and methods of career advancement and recognition for the realities of such roles, the
strategic use of female soldiers to “win the women” and assist with reconstruction would be a
short term approach until institutional gender reforms could take place. Nonetheless, a clear result
of the ADF approach was the application of female soldiers in COIN operations on the basis of
gender difference. This is consistent with my hypothesis H2 above.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
While alternative explanations for TAF and ADF’s approaches to the integration of COIN (or
lack thereof) suggest that the TAF should be better at implementing COIN, the findings discussed
above demonstrate that this was not the case. In alignment with my hypotheses, I find that
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militaries with lower levels of inclusion will resist and/or struggle to integrate the “softer” aspects
of COIN. However, I also found some evidence that sheds light on several alternative
explanations. In addition to force structure, hierarchy, and threat perception, the discussion below
also considers two additional explanations: legacy and religion.
Force Structure
One potential explanation for why the TAF chose to rely on civilian agencies for the
contributions to ISAF COIN operations was that their conscript force lacked the skillset required
to conduct such operations. However, they also struggled to produce the sufficient manpower
with the skillset required to conduct enemy-centric operations at home and thus were in the
process of transitioning to a more professional fighting force. In other words, the TAF chose to
shift their counterinsurgency strategy despite their reliance on mandatory male conscription,
suggesting that they could have applied a COIN approach if they had wished to. The fact that they
nonetheless did not, however, lends to the broader theoretical argument surrounding the
disruptive nature innovations such as COIN to gendered hierarchies.
The challenges to integration of COIN appear to be not force structure but the gendered set of
expectations and preferences surrounding career advancement opportunities: In militaries where
the skills required for effective COIN operations are not prioritized and gender-based restrictions
are in place, it may be challenging to recruit and retain personnel in both a professional conscript
and volunteer force to fill such roles. My findings indicate that the ADF was struggling to recruit
a sufficient number of soldiers because potential recruits were also fiercely sought after by the
civilian sector, which could offer more congenial working conditions and higher salaries (Grey
2008a). The professionalism of the ADF did contribute to the skillset of their engineers and
logisticians – who were crucial in reconstruction efforts – yet the organization struggled to
prioritize the necessary cultural training and other aspects of the “human terrain.” Thus, while
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both militaries may have had the resources to develop the skills necessary to perform COIN
operations successfully, such roles may nonetheless be devalued in terms of professional
opportunity, as well as in the operations themselves.
Threat Perception
I find that the domestic threat posed by the PKK did not result in more flexibility on the part
of the TAF, but rather a return to traditional enemy-centric practices. Moreover, while the
ANZUS alliance had been long important to Australia, the ADF’s contribution to ISAF was
initially limited (Australian Department of Defense 2013, 86). Despite the ADF's commitment to
operations in Afghanistan, the goals of deployment and anticipated costs remained ambiguous:
“Afghanistan was largely considered a fluctuating, political mission” (Rice 2014, 10).
Nonetheless, the mission did result in a large degree of doctrinal and institutional changes by the
mid-2010s. In other words, despite the fact that the ADF should have been comparatively
uninterested in integrating COIN (according to a threat-based argument), they nonetheless did
invest substantial resources towards the integration of the innovation.
Hierarchy and Bureaucracy
The decentralized hierarchy and lack of bureaucratic obstacles on the part of the ADF did, in
fact, play an important mediating role in the implementation of COIN strategy. The decision of
whether or not to seek out and engage with Taliban insurgents targeting Australian task groups,
for example, was often driven “more by the personality of key commanders rather than as part of
a directed strategy or campaign plan” (Rice 2014, 10). Similarly, early ADF efforts towards
gender-based engagement with the local population was able to occur in an ad hoc manner; this
was in large part because of the autonomy given to units in the field and the lack of “red tape”
they encountered. However, without institutionalized doctrine and clear promotion patterns along
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with the lifting of occupational restrictions, such experimentation offered only short-term benefits
for implementing COIN.
I find that the TAF, a military with a more centralized hierarchy and thus potential advantage
for implementing an innovation at the behest of an ally, did not seek to integrate COIN. Rather,
the decentralized ADF sought to integrate COIN and invested substantial resources in doing so.
This would then imply that a hierarchy argument gets it wrong in both these cases.
Legacy and Religion
Two additional potential explanations for the TAF and ADF’s approaches to COIN arose in
my analysis – that of legacy in the case of the ADF, and religion in the case of the TAF. For the
ADF, reconstruction operations were nothing new due to their long history of civilian-centered
missions. As a result, it was arguably relatively easier for the ADF to pick up COIN operations
due to their legacy of peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts.218 However, one potential
explanation for this legacy is the relative inclusiveness of the ADF itself. Indeed, if the ADF was
better prepared to perform COIN operations because they were more inclusive, my broader
argument is strengthened by their legacy of civilian-centered operations.
My findings also show that Turkey was hesitant about engaging in violence against Muslim
communities in Afghanistan, which may have played a significant role in the decision to focus
TAF resources at home while relying on civilian agencies in Afghanistan. Here, this analysis
would benefit from insight into the internal discussions of Turkish leaders. Indeed, the clearest
evidence for the case would be instances of internal pushback between Turkish leadership in
response to the request for increased military involvement in Afghanistan. While further analysis
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will hopefully be able to address this alternative explanation, it is also worth noting that a COIN
where Turkish soldiers may kill not only Taliban operatives but also Muslims in protection of the
local population would not be hard to imagine. Thus, if the TAF invested in a COIN approach,
their framing would arguably similarly emphasis their protection of local Muslims.
CONCLUSIONS
The development of the gender inclusion (or exclusion) regimes of the TAF and ADF played
varying roles in each military organization’s approach to COIN. At the outset of the publication
of FM3-24, the TAF was a male-dominated organization with restrictions on the basis of both the
sex and sexual-orientation of soldiers. All institutional efforts towards inclusion were largely
designed to protect the hetero-normative nuclear family, and focused on the ability of both male
and female soldiers to serve their country and also produce the next generation of Turks. While
female soldiers were framed as uniquely well suited for peace building and reconstruction
activities in Afghanistan on the basis of their ability to approach Afghan women, little effort was
taken on the part of the TAF to recruit and retain personnel to fill such roles. Indeed, the Turkish
role in ISAF reconstruction relied heavily on civilian-led organizations such as TiKA. Similarly,
although the Turkish military emphasized the risks its soldiers were willing to accept in ISAF
operations, based on their experience in counterinsurgency operations against the PKK, the
civilian-led reconstruction efforts abroad were markedly different from the enemy-centric
approach the TAF applied at home.
As COIN doctrine was increasingly emphasized across ISAF leadership, the Turkish
approach aligned with my hypothesis H1: as a military organization with low levels of inclusion,
the TAF sought to maintain the status quo, resisting the integration of population-based
counterinsurgency altogether. ISAF reconstruction efforts remained in the domain of civilian
agencies, with an increased focus on adjustments to counterinsurgency operations at home –
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despite conscription challenges and an increased reliance on targeted strikes, the TAF continued
to make little effort to incorporate “hearts and minds” in their military operations, even though
more of a population focus would have been more appropriate given the evolution of PKK
strategy. Such soldiering stands in contrast to the civilian-led “soft” solutions associated with
gender inclusion, ensuring that existing gendered hierarchies persist. Women remain restricted
from serving in direct combat occupations.
Despite recent changes to their inclusion regime, opening up combat support roles to women
and taking institutional steps to meet the needs of a more diverse set of military personnel, at the
outset of the publication of FM 3-24 the ADF excluded female service members from combat
roles. As a result, the organization was ill-equipped to match these changes to the evolution of
COIN doctrine. Despite an increasing awareness of and emphasis on the “hidden” world of
Afghan women as the key to winning the support of the local population, this strategy failed to
align with the roles female service members were permitted to occupy. Nor did it provide
recognition of the risks they nonetheless faced. ADF operations relied on a division of labor in
which Special Forces handled the fighting and conventional forces, including female soldiers,
were responsible for the noncombat operations. Over the years, the ADF took increasing steps to
incorporate the strategic use of gender difference in their operations, removing restrictions on
combat roles and reevaluating barriers to women’s participation.
In short, the ADF approach to COIN’s gendered challenges relied heavily on increased
recruitment and retainment of female soldiers. However, as an organization with middle-levels of
inclusion and substantive restrictions on the roles such soldiers could employ, the application of
their solutions faced practical challenges. Nonetheless, a clear result of the ADF approach was the
application of female soldiers in COIN operations on the basis of gender difference. This is
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consistent with my hypothesis (H2). The ADF invested institutional resources towards addressing
the gendered challenges of COIN.
In both cases, the discourse surrounding military engagement in reconstruction efforts has
emphasized the significance of women and femininity for the forces (Kronsell and Svedberg
2011). However, only the ADF made concrete efforts to follow through on these sentiments –
investing institutional resources into recruiting and retaining a female force. While Turkey’s
gender inclusion regime has remained unchanged, the last barrier to women’s service in the ADF
was lifted in 2016, and with it a top-down response to the persistent culture of resistance to
inclusion: by 2016 the percentage of women serving increased to 15.8 (Sankey 2018, 23). Indeed,
in the years following the implementation of FETs across ISAF participating countries and the
2011 ratification of Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4), there is a
substantive cross-national increase in inclusion. As demonstrated in Figure 4-3, there was a sharp
spike in institutional commitment to inclusion across ISAF participating countries taken as a
group in 2013-2014.

195

Figure 4-3. Institutional Commitment to Inclusion (ICI) Scores Jumped after Allies Issued Joint Doctrine
for Counterinsurgency in 2011. ISAF Participating Countries, 2006-2016
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Note: This figure shows the average ICI score over time. Averages are computed across all
countries for each year.

Thus, it is also possible that military organizations will learn from the effectiveness (or
ineffectiveness) of their chosen solution, and are likely to then take further steps to make the
organization more inclusive. In other words, the integration of COIN may enable higher levels of
institutional commitment to gender inclusion. By this logic – i.e. with the targeted recruitment of
women to fill noncombat or “feminine” roles on the basis of gender difference – we might also
expect to see militaries that have adopted COIN to take steps to increase their institutional
commitment to inclusion. Inclusion may both affect – and be affected by – the integration of
COIN in a military organization. This would especially true along the dimension of participation
– i.e. the removal of occupational and rank restrictions and the percentage of women serving.
Does military innovation drive inclusion? I test this theory in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 : DOES MILITARY INNOVATION DRIVE GENDER INCLUSION?
Change does not come easy to military organizations. The bureaucratic structures that provide
the controls and procedures required to command armies can also lock in processes and ways of
thinking about warfare. Military organizations are often conservative and inflexible, selecting
means and methods of operation that are familiar and practiced (Boot 2006, 465; Posen 1984, 30;
Farrell and Terriff 2002, 265; Pierce 2004; Horowitz 2010). This conservatism is reflected not
only in the way militaries conduct their operations but also in the institutional resources (or lack
thereof) invested in the recruitment and retention of a gender inclusive force. Put simply,
organizational changes are challenging for militaries. And organizational gender-based changes
are especially challenging.
The link between soldiering and masculinity has been remarkably consistent over time, and
as a result, so has the subordination, dismissal, and degradation of military personnel on the basis
of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity (Enloe 2000; Percy 2019). The institutionalization
of gendered distinctions and restrictions have been preserved through various segregation
mechanisms, limiting the range of occupations and ranks open to women, homosexual, and
transgender soldiers (Cohen 1997).219 Despite the formal incorporation of women into military
services in most countries following World War II and during the early days of the Cold War,
there were strict quotas and regulations limiting the number of female soldiers and the jobs they
could do.220 There were also formal and informal mechanisms of exclusion on the basis of a
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For example, women were prevented from voluntarily handling lethal weapons for much of the 20th
century (Mlinarevic 2011, 2). In World War II, women in the British army were not allowed to learn how
to fire weapons or anti-aircraft guns.
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It is worth noting that in most cases women had been serving in military roles for decades beforehand.
However, such work was often “unofficial” and unacknowledged. Louisa May Alcott, for example, was
one of an estimated 3,200 women provided nursing services during the Civil War – for which “most
received no pay” (Enloe 2000, 207). And while there are stories of 400-1,000 women who disguised
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soldier’s sexuality, including (but not limited to) restrictions regarding access to confidential
documents and leadership roles, and the performance of certain tasks, such as officer and recruit
training (US GAO 1992). For example, while the Australian Defense Force did not have an
official ban on admiting homosexual soldiers, a 1986 military policy instructed commanding
officers to ask soldiers found to be homosexual to resign. If the soldier did not comply,
commanders were to initiate actions to terminate their career (US GAO 1993, 19).
Nonetheless, many militaries have made significant transformations to their gender regimes.
Since the 1970s and early 1980s, military organizations have extended the positions available to
women under national equal opportunity laws and regulations, especially in the context of
employment opportunities and cases of voluntary service (Mlinarevic 2011, 4). While some
militaries were also removing restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation at this time, others
took longer. The first country to explicitly permit LGBT individuals to serve in the military was
the Netherlands, in 1974, and the U.S. policy of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) was not repealed
until 2011.
In 2000, the process of fully integrating women in military organizations was aided by the
passing of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on “Women, Peace, and Security”
(WPS), which placed an international focus on the roles and experiences of women during war
and called for their increased participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict. Many
governments sought to comply with UNSCR 1325 and the four subsequent UN resolutions under
the umbrella of the WPS agenda (UNSCR 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960) by increasing female
recruitment and representation, sometimes referred to as “gender balancing,” and adopting
legislative and policy reforms with gender in mind, referred to as “gender mainstreaming.”

themselves as men and fought during the Civil War, there are also likely more cases that remain unknown.
As Goldstein (2001) aptly points out, the history books only document the women who were discovered.
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However, the extent and nature of the gender inclusion regimes of military organizations
continues to vary substantially. Progress has not always been linear; exclusionary policies on the
basis of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity have been removed but then sometimes
reinstated (Segal 1995).221 There is also considerable variation across countries – even amongst
those with shared histories and similar political and economic arrangements (Obradovic 2014,
147). For example, UNSCR 1820, issued in 2008, reiterated many of the themes of UNSCR 1325
in denouncing rape as a tactic of warfare, and called on governments and their militaries to take
responsibility for educating their forces about refraining from sexual violence and coercion.
However, as of 2013, only 40 of the 192 signatories to 1325 had presented National Action Plans,
and the proclamations had little effect on harassment and assault within military organizations
(Sankey 2018, xii). Most militaries still resist changes in their gender regime, preserving a
gendered division of labor that privileges men and masculinity.
What accounts for the expansion and contraction of institutional gender reform? Most
scholars agree that a variety of variables are at work. Indeed, the military sphere is subject to
many causal processes of change, rooted in “different, though interlinked spheres or systems”
(Kümmel 2002, 626). Broadly speaking, these variables fall into three categories – (1)
organizational environment, (2) domestic environment, and (3) threat environment. The
organizational environment refers to the force structure of the military, such as whether soldiers
volunteer for service or are conscripted. The domestic environment refers to gender reform in
domestic political and economic spheres, as well as the political ideology of those in power. The
threat environment incorporates the perception (and reality) of military threat and the probability
of war or conflict.
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A recent example of such a reversal is the Trump administration’s transgender ban.
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This chapter argues that one important component of the organizational environment that has
not been sufficiently examined is investment in the adoption of innovative technologies and/or
tactics that require a change in the conduct of warfare. The theory outlined in Chapter 2
demonstrates how military innovations often require a fighting force with a different set of skills
in order to actually increase military power. Indeed, throughout history militaries have adopted
new technologies and tactics that incorporate organizational realignments. Chapters 3 and 4
examine examples of such innovations – drones remove soldiers from the battlefield and
population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) requires the elevation of skills associated with
engineering, cultural awareness, and human intelligence gathering. Such innovations have led
directly to changes in the characteristics needed to be an effective soldier, and have even changed
the way warfare is organized. In the case of complex weapons systems, such as Israel’s Iron
Dome missile defense system, experts are increasingly relied on for development and operation –
skills that the commander of the 947th Battalion responsible for operating the system, Lt. Colonel
Yehonatan, refers to as not requiring “the lifting of heavy weights and stuff like that,” equating
the challenges for male and female soldiers” (Shaham 2021).222 Military innovation has also
contributed to the rise of specialization in militaries and narrowing of roles (Huntington 1957;
Rosen 1991). As demonstrated in the case of COIN and Female Engagement Teams (FETs), such
specialties are often segregated on the basis of gender differences.
In previous chapters, I demonstrate that a military’s gender inclusion regime can influence
the manner in which innovations are integrated across the organization. Here I show how this
process can also work in the opposite direction; the integration of innovations can incentivize
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According to Lt. Colonel Yehonatan in a February 2021 interview, approximately 55-60% of the new
recruits for the 947th Battalion were women (Shaham 2021).
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militaries to invest in the recruitment and retention of a more inclusive fighting force. In other
words, gender inclusion can both affect – and be affected by – the adoption of military
innovations. Indeed, the previous chapter offers preliminary evidence that the integration of
COIN influenced gender policy reform in the case of the Australian Defense Force (ADF). This
chapter examines the longer-term influence of military innovation on gender reform.
I test this argument by re-examining another innovation that reduces the need for exposure to
risk and physical strength – the introduction of drones. Using an original cross-national dataset of
Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) across all NATO-member and partner countries
from 1991 to 2016, I examine whether militaries that have successfully integrated drones are
more likely to 1) have a higher percentage of women in their military, and 2) invest in
institutional gender reform. As you will recall from Chapter 1, this study is primarily concerned
with de jure institutional changes to the gender regimes of military organizations. Institutional
commitments to gender inclusion are policy reforms militaries make to assist with the recruitment
and retention of a more inclusive force – on the basis of sex, sexual-orientation, and gender
identity. The ICI index that I have constructed measures the extent of institutional commitment to
gender inclusion across a series of possible indicators, including occupational restrictions, formal
rank restrictions, family programs, harassment policies and monitoring procedures, and
exclusions on basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. This study contrasts such
institutional commitment reforms with the actual presence of female soldiers in the military.
While percentages and policy changes are often conflated in existing analyses (Obradovic 2014;
Carreiras 2006), I argue that they are measuring very different aspects of inclusion. I find that
even when accounting for existing explanations of inclusion, the role of innovation integration
(specifically, the integration of drones) is still a powerful explanator of gender policy reform.
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WHAT INFLUENCES INCLUSION?
There have been numerous explanations for when and why changes to a military’s gender
regime occur. Cumulatively, the literature has put forth a laundry list of possible and interlinked
independent variables. Beginning with Mady Wechsler Segal’s explicit attempt at theory
building, such explanations broadly focused the structure and culture both inside and outside of a
military organization (Segal 1995, 758). Segal was the first scholar who sought to examine the
factors affecting the participation of women in the military. She argued that the expansion of
women’s roles was driven by the need for more personnel due to the shift to volunteer forces, and
by shifts in cultural values supporting gender equality. In the years that followed, a robust
literature developed, further expanding and building upon the variables that might explain shifts
across time and space in gendered policies and practices (Iskra et all 2002; Kümmel 2002;
Carreiras 2006; Obradovic 2014).223 However, while some scholars have theorized about the role
of technological innovation (Kennedy-Pipe 2000; Obradovic 2014; Van Creveld 2000), none
have tested its effect on gender policy reform in military organization.
In what follows I introduce a new variable for consideration – the introduction of military
innovations. I argue that technological and tactical changes that reduce the need for personnel to
be physically strong or willing to face risk may drive militaries to invest in institutional
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Iskra et al (2002) expand Segal’s 1995 model by introducing a set of political variables: civil-military
relations, political ideology of those in power (and subsequent public policies regarding women and
minorities), and sources of political change other than armed conflict. Kümmel (2002) adds another set of
variables – those relating to the international system, and argues that international security circumstances
and the way threats change over time should also influence the participation of women in the armed forces.
Carreiras (2006) follows Kümmel’s proposal, but opts for a large-N analysis of eighteen NATO states of a
more parsimonious set of variables. Her quantitative analysis remains entirely focused on the military,
socio-economic and political factors. Obradovic’s 2014 study was the first to quantitatively measure the
relationship between states’ integration of women into national militaries and international variables.
Obradovic (2014) builds on Segal (1995) and Carreiras’ (2006) models, delineating four explanatory
categories – military manpower requirements, political and economic factors, cultural factors, and
international pressures. For a full list of all variables considered across these models, see Appendix.
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commitments to gender inclusion. I then present alternative explanations for inclusion put forth in
the literature. While this study does not contend that such arguments in the current literature are
incorrect, it does assert that they fail to recognize the impact of military innovation.
MILITARY INNOVATION
Technological and tactical changes in the conduct of warfare can reduce the exposure of
soldiers to risk as well as the need for physical strength, and thereby negate two common
justifications for restricting the roles in which female soldiers were permitted to occupy in
military organizations. For example, women have historically been kept out of combat roles on
the grounds that their presence would cause men to jeopardize mission efficacy in order to protect
their female comrades (Van Crevald 2000; MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin 2006; Fenner and
deYoung 2001). The basis of this rationale is what Beardsley and Karim (2017) refer to as the
“protection norm,” in which female personnel are portrayed as weak and in need of protection by
their fellow soldiers (26). Similarly, average disparities in physical strength and load carrying
stamina between men and women have been used to justify the exclusion of women from military
roles (Goldstein 2001). From this perspective, military innovations have the power to upend
occupational restrictions on the basis of sex.
Notably, the set of skills introduced by innovations that reduce exposure to risk and the need
for physical strength have generally had the lowest status within the military profession (HarriesJenkins 2002). In times when manpower is scarce, lower-status positions such as those in
information technology, logistics, and medicine are more difficult to fill. It is in these times when
we see militaries make concentrated efforts to recruit and retain women in these positions.
However, as militaries increasingly rely on and invest in technological and tactical changes, it
is possible that they will realize the value in recruiting and retaining a more inclusive force with a
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wider set of skills than traditional combat “warriors.” Military organizations may very well learn
through trial and error or observation of other organizations, that making institutional investments
in gender inclusion will enhance their ability to successfully integrate an innovation, and then
take further steps to make the organization more inclusive. This dynamic is evident in the case of
population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) examined in Chapter 4. There we saw that the
successful implementation of COIN was premised on the targeted recruitment of women to fill
noncombat or “feminine” roles on the basis of gender difference – as demonstrated in the
proliferation of Female Engagement Teams (FETs). However, findings indicate that such an
approach has produced significant long-term challenges to military effectiveness without
institutional practices aimed towards gender awareness and inclusion. Thus, we might also expect
to see militaries that have invested financial and organization resources towards the adoption of
COIN to take steps to increase their institutional commitment to inclusion. The conclusion here is
that when the adoption of a salient military innovation requires the expansion of support or other
non-combat professional positions, we would expect to see military organizations take
institutional steps towards gender inclusion so as to increase the percentage of female personnel.
This is the basis of the following hypothesis:
H1: The integration of innovations that challenge established gender hierarches by a military
organization will result in greater institutional commitment to gender inclusion and higher
percentages of women serving.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
As I mentioned earlier, the drivers of inclusion that have been proposed in the literature can
be grouped into three categories – organizational environment, domestic environment, and threat
environment. These designations serve as useful theory building blocks – fruitful areas for
analysis of their relative strengths, weaknesses, and interactive effects across time and space.
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Existing explanations for the determinants of a military’s inclusion (or exclusion) regime can be
thought of across dimensions of supply and demand: while domestic environment influences the
supply of female personnel, the level of external threat, force structure, and innovative changes
resulting in the need for soldiers with a specific set of skills influence the demand for female
personnel. These considerations lead to a set of hypotheses associated with each of these
categories.
Force structure
In addition to the ways in which a military adopts and integrates innovation, another aspect of
the organizational environment that may motivate institutional gender reform is the force
structure. Whether a military conscripts its soldiers or instead relies on a volunteer force can
influence its gender regime and how personnel are recruited.
The end of the Cold War introduced an opportunity for militaries to restructure their forces
for the 21st century. Throughout the 1990s, militaries around the world reduced personnel, cut
defense budgets, closed military bases, and formed new volunteer-based forces. Without massive
land wars to fight, or a tax-paying and voting population interested in supporting the conscription
of a large standing army, most states shifted their emphasis from large, conventional forces, to
lighter, high-quality and high-tech forces (Obradovic 2014; Sankey 2018, xi).
The abolition of conscription and an increasing reliance on paid recruits also marked the
beginning of an increase in the integration of women in roles that were previously considered
“masculine” and, in some cases, led to an increase in women’s enlistment rates (Haltiner 1998).
In France, for example, women constituted 7.5 percent of the armed forces in 1995, but after the
abolishment of conscription in 2002, this number rose, reaching 15.2 percent by 2012 (France
2012, 3). After making the shift to professional militaries, most countries faced a shortage of
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manpower. The subsequent decline in recruitment rates made it necessary for military
organizations to turn to populations that had not been enlisted in the past. As a result, these
militaries became more inclusive in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, and class (Iskra et al., 2002;
Moskos 1993; Segal 1995). Indeed, demographic trends such as shortages of male labor have
historically operated as an incentive for women to enter the workforce generally, but also the
military.224
The increase in all-volunteer forces, shrinking youth cohorts, and economic opportunities in
the private sector may also influence military recruitment and retention of personnel. From this
perspective, volunteer-based armed services compete for the best candidates in a shared labor
market (Moskos and Wood 1988; Moskos 2000). Here, personnel within professional militaries
operate under a “liberal contract, which shapes their expectations toward social mobility through
acquiring education or a profession in return for their service” (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy
2018, 140). The military offers enlistment and promotion tracks that shape entry-level positions.
In order to attract and retain higher-quality soldiers, states remove legal limitations on the basis of
sex and sexual orientation, and invest more resources in reconciling structural barriers – such as
maternity leave and flexible hours – as well as informal exclusion mechanisms – such as the
naturalization and perpetuation of socially constructed differences between men and women
(Carreiras 2006; Sasson-Levy 2011, 401).
It is unclear, however, whether these efforts have resulted in higher levels of participation.
Despite the transition of Western militaries from conscription to professional enlistment, the
percentage of women in some Western All-Volunteer Forces (AVFs) is low (Lomsky-Feder and
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Professionalization, demographic variables, and unemployment in the civilian sector have all been
theorized as positively associated with the growing number of women in the armed forces (Segal 1995;
Iskra at al 2002; Kümmel 2002; Carreiras 2006; Obradovic 2014).
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Sasson-Levy 2018, 141). Germany, for example, passed legislation in 2005 to develop
mechanisms that would assist with the balancing of family life in the military, and in 2014
announced a push for more family friendly conditions in the Bundeswehr that included a
reduction in the frequency of relocations. Yet as of 2016, women represented only 11.3 percent of
the German force. Moreover, while formally welcome, women still constitute a tiny minority
among combat soldiers (Carreiras 2015). Thus, I predict that while some militaries may have
higher percentages of female soldiers than others, they may also have more restrictions with
regard to where such personnel can serve and fewer policies aimed at retention. This discussion
can be distilled into the following hypothesis:
H2: Military forces that are volunteer-based will make more institutional commitments to gender
inclusion and have higher percentages of women serving than those that conscript soldiers.
Domestic environment
Gender roles in the domestic political and economic spheres, as well as the political ideology
of those in power, can influence defense policies, practices, and oversight. As such roles are
developed, spread, and become institutionalized, they are internalized and performed across a
range of environments (Hudson et al., 2012). Military gender regimes have political significance
– enlistment into the military and battlefield performance is an expression of commitment to the
state and the gendered organization of the military is tied up with gendered and hierarchical
conceptions of citizenship (Pateman 1989, 11; Sasson-Levy 2003; 2011). Thus, general societal
trends toward increased gender equality and emphasis on women’s and/or LGBTQ+ rights can
also bring about change in a military’s gender inclusion regime. Public opinion concerning the
adequacy of women’s military participation and attention to sexual harassment can pressure
military change. In other words, egalitarian social values about gender may very well extend to
and influence military organizations (Segal 1995, 770).
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For many years, studies have suggested that the increased representation of women in state
and local legislatures makes governments more responsive to women’s issues and concerns.225
The level and characteristics of female participation in the labor force is also considered to
influence women’s military roles, given that same factors can affect both activities (such as male
labor shortages), and the increased involvement of women the workplace introduces cultural and
structural change (Segal 1995, 766-7). Here, not just the degree but also the nature of such
participation is of concern: high levels of gender segregation in the civilian labor market may
result in a military that relegates women to “feminine” tasks. This dynamic is compatible with the
argument put forth in Chapter 2: “women’s work” in the civilian sphere is often reflected in
military organizations where female soldiers are relegated to clerical roles and restricted from
more elite combat position. By comparison, a military may rely on women to perform the same
tasks they do in the civilian labor market (Carreiras 2006, 14). Thus, while a more integrated
occupational structure is expected to yield a more gender egalitarian culture, gender segregation
in the civilian workplace is expected to be negatively associated with women’s military service
(Segal 1995, 766-7).
Much of the discourse surrounding the opening of combat roles to women in the last fifteen
years has been on the basis of encouraging equal opportunities and progress (Lomsky-Feder and
Sasson-Levy 2018, 143). This could include attempts to address group inequalities and achieve
justice for minorities and to demonstrate liberal thinking and broad-mindedness. Given that
institutional commitment to retaining female soldiers involves, like other areas of employment,
attention to family leave and childcare policies, state assumptions about the responsibility of
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Much of this literature focuses on “critical mass,” or the idea that the election of an adequate number of
female politicians will result in governance more responsive to women (Kanter 1977). However, recent
scholarship argues that women’s inclusion in the public sphere – in political decision-making roles, for
example – often fails to alter existing power asymmetries (Ellerby 2017; Arat 2015; Karim and Hill 2018).
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social provision has the potential to trigger changes in gender roles, promote women’s economic
independence, and reduce socioeconomic disparities among women and families (Htun and
Weldon 2018). Iskra, Trainor, Segal and Leithauser contend that the more liberal the ideology of
the political leadership, the greater will be women’s representation in the armed forces (2002,
731). Using data from Zimbabwe, Australia, and Mexico, they demonstrate that left-wing parties
tend to stand for a more inclusive and equal citizenship, and are more likely to adopt genderequality issues as part of their political agenda.
The state’s role in ensuring equality of opportunity, regardless of sex, is often linked to
domestic advocacy – specifically, strategic partnerships between women in parliament, women’s
groups, and women’s policy agencies (Weldon 2002). Women themselves have also engaged
forcibly in politics to demand their inclusion in the process of ensuring political and social
changes to gendered structures of power (Htun and Weldon 2012; Kummel 2002, 617),
facilitating the integration of women into security forces (Soules 2020). In the 1970s, most armies
transitioned to the voluntary induction of women, largely as part of the demands of feminist
movements (Duncanson and Woodward 2016).
The relationship between domestic context and the participation of female personnel,
however, is not straightforward. Lana Obradovic points out that domestic politics fails to explain
why states such as Liberia, Libya, Italy, Botswana, and India – states with traditional and
patriarchal societies – integrated women into their militaries. Similarly, Bolivia, Chile, and
Guatemala allowed women in combat prior to the United States, and Eritrea, Malaysia and Peru
draft women into the army. Thus, while countries with higher levels of empowerment may put
pressure on their militaries to remove occupational and rank restrictions on the basis of domestic
equal opportunity acts or other broad moves towards workplace equality, these shifts will not
necessarily translate to the increased recruitment and retention of female soldiers. At the same
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time, even more inclusive militaries are definitively masculine domains. Women in countries with
greater empowerment will also have alternative (and perhaps more appealing) employment
opportunities. This discussion can be distilled into the following hypotheses:
H3: Military organizations are reflective of the country they protect. Countries with higher levels
of women’s empowerment will have militaries that make more institutional commitments to
gender inclusion, but need not have higher percentages of women serving.
Threat environment
A second strand of the literature contends that countries are more likely to incorporate
women into the military in the face of a severe external threat (Moskos 2000, 16). During times
of national emergency, when there are shortages of men, most nations increase women’s military
roles (Segal 1995; Kummel 2002, 617).226 The enlistment of women has historically been
presented as a necessity for the sake of national security. In South Africa, a shortage of white
males who could fight for the apartheid regime in the border wars led to the inclusion of women
in the armed forces as early as the 1970s (Heinecken and van der Waag-Cowling 2009). Nations
that have conscripted and continue to conscript men rarely require women to serve, yet women
have been drafted during wartime: France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Norway all
conscripted women during World War II (Segal 1995, 760). There is a common idea that the
World Wars opened up new opportunities for women - whether this was in the promulgation of
skilled jobs in heavy industry, government bureaucracies, armed forces, and educational
institutions, or postwar constitutional changes winning women the right to vote. However, while
women’s situations changed, many scholars have demonstrated how relationships of domination
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While Segal (1995) does not explicitly treat international threat as a separate factor that influences
participation, she does examine the national security situation as a variable within her military dimension.
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and subordination remained (Carreiras 2006, 10). The opening up of positions available to
women during times of conflict has been primarily limited to roles in noncombat military
functions (Segal 1995, 760). However, there are exceptions. For example, in World War I, Maria
Botchkareva led the “Battalion of Death,” composed of several hundred women, against the
Germans and, on the eastern front, the Polish military high command gave the Women's
Volunteer League official approval to engage in combat. In World War II, the all-female 588th
Night Bomber Regiment of the Soviet Air Forces (dubbed by the Germans Nachthexen, or Night
Witches) flew more than 24,000 missions and dropped 3,000 tons of bombs (Mlinarevic 2011, 23; Obradovic 2014, 20; Sankey 2018, 236).
Notably, inclusion motivated by conflict (such as a war) has rarely been lasting. After wars
end, gender-based restrictions have historically been reinstated and women expected to return to
more traditional roles. In the aftermath of war, a “cultural amnesia” often takes place – women’s
contributions during emergency situations are constructed as minor or nonexistent and the
military ethos is maintained as a domain of men, with women relegated to the home (Segal 1995,
761).
For example, despite General Charles de Gaulle’s omission of Marie-Madeleine Fourcade’s
name from the 1,038 people designated as resistance heroes at the end of World War II (only six
of whom were women), she was a pivotal player in the French Resistance (Olson 2019). And
while the U.S. government recruited thousands of women in World War II to join the Army’s
WAC, the Navy’s WAVES, and the Coast Guard’s SPARS, once the war ended female military
personnel were largely demobilized.227 In the United States, policymakers crafted rules limiting
women to two percent of the total active-duty force – a norm that persisted throughout the Cold
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Male military personnel were also largely demobilized, of course. Women were just more demobilized.
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War and was kept in place during the Korean and Vietnam wars (Enloe 2016, 84). The Soviet
Union’s military planners took a similar tack, using thousands of women to fight invading
German forces in World War II but implementing policies to bring the Soviet military back to its
“masculinized institutional self, dependent on male conscription” once the war ended (Enloe
2016, 85). Indeed, mobilization during times of war, followed by demobilization and
“remasculinization,” has been common across countries and through time.
We see, then, that it is important not to equate participation in times of conflict with
empowerment, or a destabilization of gender hierarchy. Schroeder (2017), for example,
demonstrates that in instances of interstate rivalry and conflict, women are seen as less capable
than of men of leadership under such threats. This literature suggests that in the absence of
security threats, security organizations can become more hospitable to gender reform (Barnes and
O’Brian 2018). Times of threat and insecurity can be accompanied by “masculinity nostalgia”
(MacKenzie and Foster 2017), and the perpetuation of gender dichotomies, according men with
esteem as security producers (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Thus, the predicted role of
threat in driving inclusion reform may not be immediately evident in the data. Nonetheless, the
discussion above can be distilled into one hypothesis:
H4: Militaries facing higher levels of threat will make more institutional commitments to gender
inclusion and have higher percentages of women serving.
SUMMARY
The discussion above presents my primary explanatory variable, military innovation, as well
as three classes of alternative explanatory variables: 1) military force structure 2) domestic
context, and 3) threat environment. The hypotheses that describe their impacts on gender
inclusion are summarized in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1. Summary of Hypotheses

Military
Innovation

Military Force
Structure

Domestic
Context

Threat

H1: The integration of innovations that challenge established gender hierarches
by a military organization will result in greater institutional commitment to
gender inclusion and higher percentages of women serving.

H2: Military forces that are volunteer-based will make more institutional
commitments to gender inclusion and have higher percentages of women serving
than those that conscript soldiers.
H3: Military organizations are reflective of the country they protect. Countries
with higher levels of women’s empowerment will have militaries that make more
institutional commitments to gender inclusion, but need not have higher
percentages of women serving.

H4: Militaries facing higher levels of threat will make more institutional
commitments to gender inclusion and have higher percentages of women serving.

Environment

RESEARCH DESIGN
The subsequent analysis evaluates the ways and extent to which the integration of military
innovations can account for institutional commitments to gender inclusion. I use three OLS
regression models to examine the changes that occurred in the years following the organizational
integration of drones across NATO member and partner militaries across each of two sets of
dependent variables – 1) percentage of female soldiers in the total active force and 2) institutional
commitments to inclusion.228 The latter includes indicators ranging from occupational and rank
restrictions on the basis of sex, family programs, sexual assault and harassment policies and
protocols, to restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Here, I draw from
an original database of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI), based on both quantitative
and qualitative cross-national and intertemporal data. I will discuss how I collected and coded this
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While my dependent variables are categorical, I nonetheless use OLS because I assume linearity in my
scales.
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data in substantially greater detail below. Official reports, legislative documents and other
primary sources form the basis for the ICI index, which required a close analysis of individual
country reports, summary reports published by the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives,
and a range of other primary sources for each country-year.
In what follows I examine the gender regimes of NATO member and partner militaries in the
years directly proceeding and following their integration of a military innovation that challenges
existing gender hierarchies. While many military innovations that challenge dimensions of risk
and physical strength are relevant to the theory outlined above, each innovation has a different set
of effects and thus must be examined separately.229 Thus, this analysis focuses on one innovation
where the gendered challenges of integration have been established earlier in this dissertation –
that of drones. Given that drone operators conduct missions at a safe distance from the battlefield
and need not be physically strong, drones are an obvious case for my argument. Drone warfare is
also useful for the purpose of this analysis because it is an innovation 1) that emerged during the
period for which I have collected a great of data on the comparative inclusion regimes of NATO
member and partner militaries, and 2) its actual incorporation and use by militaries varies
considerably across countries and time.
THE INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS TO INCLUSION INDEX
Given that data on gender in militaries worldwide is limited and often inconsistent, as well as
the complex and varied nature of “inclusion” in the armed forces, there are few systematic, crossnational analyses of the factors that influence military organizations to make institutional changes
to their gender regimes. While many scholars have written about gender inclusion in military
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As I discuss in Chapter 4, COIN reduces the need for physical strength, but not risk, introducing a
unique set of challenges to military personnel and thus a different set of efforts directed strategically
towards inclusion.
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organizations, especially in sociology, most are concerned with theory-building, basing their
analyses on illustrative case studies (Segal 1995; Iska et al 2002; Kümmel 2002). Only Carreiras
(2006), Obradovic (2014), and Soules (2020) test their theories with quantitative data. However,
Carreiras and Obradovic limit their analyses to NATO countries in a single year (Obradovic looks
at 2008 and Carreiras 2000), and Soules looks at only one aspect of inclusion – the opening of
ground combat roles (Soules 2020). My extended dataset allows me to conduct much broader
tests of the determinants of gender inclusion.
I build on existing analyses to compile an index that will allow for the application of timeseries data of how gender inclusion regimes vary both across countries and over time. While my
relevant universe of cases includes all modern state militaries, this analysis focuses solely on
NATO member and partner countries. This approach is necessitated by the comparative dearth of
data on women in the armed forces in non-NATO countries. However, there are also several
potential advantages of limiting the scope of this analysis. In particular, Carreiras (2006) points
out the convergence effects of a NATO country analysis: global pressures to achieve gender
equality in society at large, professionalization of the military, and common membership in the
Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) constitute a common denominator that
produces “comparable effects in terms of cognitive models, policy orientation, and formalization
of behaviors” (97).
I measure the extent of institutional commitment to gender inclusion within a military
organization across a series of possible indicators.230 These indicators, which I discuss in greater
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These indicators a largely drawn from previous quantitative cross-national analyses of the participation
of women in NATO forces conducted by Obradovic (2014) and Carreiras (2006) – who are building from
Segal’s (1995) model of inclusion in the armed forces. However, my measure of occupational restrictions
and harassment policies/monitoring procedures are more fine-grained versions of the measures Obradovic
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detail below, include occupational and formal rank restrictions on the basis of sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity, family programs, and harassment policies and monitoring
procedures. Table 5-2 summarizes these indicators and the ways in which they are coded.
Combined, these measures produce an index score of institutional commitment to gender
inclusion for each country in each year. Militaries with higher scores have a greater institutional
commitment to inclusion. This approach also allows me to examine differences across the
dimensions of inclusion.
Table 5-2. Measures of Institutional Commitment to Gender Inclusion
Institutional Commitments to Gender Inclusion (ICI) Index
(Highest score is 17, lowest score is 0)
Occupational restrictions (0 – 6)
Formal rank restrictions (0 – 2)
Family programs (0 – 2)
Harassment policies / monitoring procedures (0 – 5)
Sexual orientation and gender identity exclusions (0 – 2)

Occupational restrictions
This indicator captures whether there is an equitable opportunity to ascend the ranks of
professional hierarchy within a military organization. Since combat service usually affords career
advancements in the military, barring women from these combat roles constrains their career
prospects within and, in some cases, outside the military as well. As long as personnel are
excluded from core combat roles, they will experience their military service as at least partial

and Carreiras employ. I am the first to include exclusion on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity as measure of gender inclusion.
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outsiders – what Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy (2018) refer to as a “structural marginality”
(144). Thus, I look at occupational restrictions across the professional hierarchy of military
organizations (where combat is the most valued). While some militaries may only permit female
personnel to serve in clerical or combat service roles, others allow women to serve in combat
specialties such as commando and ranger. Such differences are identified by Harries-Jenkins
(2002) in the typology of roles given in Table 5-3. For a given year, I assign each country a score
from 0 to 6 for the degree to which women serve across these categories where 0 = Complete
exclusion, 1 = Non-combatant (military nurse), 2 = Combat service (clerk; cook), 3 = Combat
support (instrument fitter; radar operator), 4 = Combat (pilot; weapons operator), 5 = Direct
ground combat (tank crew; infantry soldier), and 6 = Special forces (marine commando;
ranger).231
Table 5-3. Typology of Roles in Armed Forces
Category

Examples

1

Non-combatant

Military nurse

2

Combat service

Clerk; cook

3

Combat support

Instrument fitter; radar operator

4

Combat

Pilot; weapons operator

5

Direct ground combat

Tank crew; infantry soldier

6

Special forces

Marine commando; ranger

Source: Harries-Jenkins 2002, 754
Note: Militaries where women are not allowed to serve are coded as “0”
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While Obradovic (2014) measures occupational restrictions on a 0 to 3 point scale (0=total, no women;
1=many, no enlisted women; 2=few, submarines, Special Forces; 3=none), I take a more fine-grained
approach. For a more detailed description of the six categories in my typology score, see the Appendix.
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These roles refer to the generic issue of the recruitment of a female force (Harries-Jenkins
2002, 753). Often, there were explicit restrictions in place regarding the specific roles were
women allowed to fill. For example, Germany admitted women to the military medical services
and musical bands in 1975 but did not open up other career options for women until 1991, when
enlisted women were allowed to serve in noncombatant roles as nurses (Campbell 2012, 320).
Today, the majority of restrictions on female service contain qualifiers such as concerns about
protecting women’s reproductive health. For example, in the case of Poland, these qualifiers
apply to the Missile and Artillery Forces, Navy, and Radio-Technical units; and in the case of
France, to nuclear submarines and mobile “gendarmerie” units.
Thus, this score refers to de jure, rather than de facto occupational segregation.232 The
difference between the two is exemplified by the 2001-2016 US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
where, even when female soldiers in the US were formally excluded from combat positions, they
were routinely assigned to combat operations by their field commanders (Enloe 2010; Mackenzie
2015; Solaro 2006). Notably, the more common disjuncture is in the other direction, with women
de jure permitted in certain roles but de facto largely or totally excluded.
In an attempt to capture the latter, Carreiras (2006) extends this score to include “percentage
of women in traditional functions,” and demonstrates a strong cross-national segregation pattern:
in the year 2000, more than 70 percent of military women in NATO countries were concentrated
in support (personnel, administration, and logistics) and medical functions, 17.5 percent in
technical areas (engineering, communications), and seven percent in operational areas in combat
arms (artillery, infantry, and cavalry) (Carreiras 2006, 105). While my analysis is more finegrained than Obradovic’s 0-3 de jure scale, I exclude such de facto percentages because 1) data is
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Notably, this dynamic poses a challenge to the integration of population-based counterinsurgency
(COIN) and is examined in further detail in Chapter 4.
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limited over time and for a wide selection of countries, and 2) variation in de facto representation
is likely to covary relatively closely with de jure inclusion.
Formal rank restrictions
This indicator measures the existence of restrictions preventing women from reaching the top
of the military hierarchy. Here, each country is coded across a 0-2 point scale (0=total; 1=partial,
2=none) for a given country year. For example, in Italy, women were restricted from the military
until a 1999 law allowed entry into the academies in 2000, as noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
in 2001 and as enlisted volunteers in 2002 (in parallel with phasing out male conscription by
2005).233 Thus, for the years 1991 to 1998 in my dataset, Italy is coded as 0. The years 2000 and
2001 are coded as 1, and 2002 onwards coded as 2.
Family programs
An important aspect of inclusiveness in military organizations is the existence of programs
that address work-life balance. Institutional reforms that institute family-friendly policies that
allow women to join and remain in service with clear promotion tracks, boost morale and help
facilitate diversity in positions of authority (Egnell and Alam 2019, 259). Thus, I compile data for
each country on the presence (or absence) of maternity programs, childcare, paid leave, and
flexibility of hours. Each country is coded across a 0 to 2 scale for a given year (0 = none; 1 =
few; 2 = many). In 2011, for example, female personnel in the Moldovan Armed Forces were
permitted to take a maternity leave and return to military service with the period of leave
excluded from overall seniority and length of employment. However, such leave was not included
in the calendar age of service, restricting the ability to benefit from a pension, and other family-
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Soldiers who serve as “enlisted volunteers” are eligible for the officer corps.
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friendly policies (e.g. childcare) were not reported (CEDAW/C/MDA/4-5 2011, 11). Thus, for the
year 2011 Moldova scores a 2 for family programs.
Sexual harassment and assault policies and monitoring procedures
As discussed in Chapter 1, formal inclusion doesn’t mean much if the climate is hostile to
soldiers on the basis of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity. The privileging of men
and masculinity in military organizations goes hand in hand with sexual assault and harassment.
The culture within military organizations is often permissive towards aggressive and chauvinistic
behavior (Enloe 1983; Connell 1995; Cohn 2000; Sasson-Levy 2003). This culture is evident in
the entry of women into what is perceived as a male domain, which is followed by higher levels
of hostility, harassment, and assault.234 Thus, whether or not militaries place resources into the
monitoring, regulation, and prevention of assault and harassment is an important component of
my measure of inclusion.
As other scholars have noted, assessing the manner in which militaries address sexual assault
and harassment is no easy task. Sexual assault and harassment is frequently underreported and
there is a strong lack of confidence in reporting mechanisms and procedures.235 While policies
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Yoder (1991) finds that increased representation is often followed by more hostility among men who
feel threatened by the large number of women entering their domain. Maruska (2009) characterizes such
behavior as “hypermasculinity,” or “extreme behavior within gender roles, brought about by a reaction to
some internal or external threat” (239). A hypermasculine response to integration is characterized by
violent behavior towards civilians and/or female soldiers, that is outside the bounds of “appropriate
conduct” within the military and the laws of war more broadly, and likely to manifest in assault or
harassment. Much like Cohn’s (2000) findings in her analysis of PT protest, innovations that destabilize
existing gender hierarchies may spur “a variety of negative feelings” which may result in a need to reaffirm
“lost” masculinity by participating in rites of passage, harassment, and hazing (133). In 2015, a Gender
Integration Study conducted by the Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center within the
Department of the Army uncovered such practices, especially within combat arms culture among small-unit
leaders (US Department of the Army 2015, 45). In this case, soldiers react against what they see as an
unacceptable bending of the traditional standards.
235
In a 2019 study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Morabito et al find that when women chose to
report a sexual assault to police, “only 19 percent of cases ever led to an arrest, six percent of reports
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may have been adopted, and resources allocated to workshops and the construction of counseling
centers, sexual discrimination and harassment can easily persist. However, given that this
measure is an indicator of institutional commitments to inclusion, I do not examine quantitative
reports of the number of assault and harassment incidents. In other words, the concept at hand is
that of de jure changes: indeed, the extent to which a military organization will take steps to
monitor and prevent the widespread problem of sexual assault and harassment carries enormous
weight in determining their institutional commitment to gender inclusion more broadly. Given the
salience of this measure, I give it a greater weight in my index score. While Obradovic (2014)
measures harassment regulations as 0 = none; 1 = few; 2 = many, I take more fine-grained
approach. For each of the following five measures, I assign countries a binary (0 = no or 1 = yes)
score: 1) monitoring - i.e. specific offices, reports released, data collection, 2) regulations, 3)
training programs, 4) advisors and investigators, and 5) protocols in place for victims. I total these
measures for each country in each year. In 2009, Latvia, for example, reported taking none of the
above steps, citing “the fact that there is none sexual harassment or gender discrimination case
known and/or investigated” (Latvia 2009, 3). As a result, Latvia scores a zero across all sexual
assault and harassment measures in 2009.
Exclusions on basis of sexual orientation and gender identity
The military’s masculine culture and gender division of labor creates and preserves
hierarchical, binary, and essentialist conceptions of masculinity and femininity, superimposing a
narrow range of gender identities that are available to soldiers (Sasson-Levy 2011, 394). Thus,

resulted in a guilty finding primarily as a result of a plea bargain, and less than two percent ever went to
trial.” In the study, half of all 2,887 sexual assault reports by females over age 12 were cleared by police,
but many of these fell into the category of “cleared by exceptional means” because the victim was “deemed
to be uncooperative or because the police were aware that the prosecutor declined to prosecute.” With such
clearances (about 30 percent of all reports) the cases did not move forward (Morabito et al 2019).

221

when considering gender inclusion in a given military organization, it is important to consider
inclusion as it relates across various groups serving. Many militaries have policies in place to
exclude individuals on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity (Polchar et al
2014, 19). Even where homosexual acts between consenting adults are legal, many countries have
historically excluded homosexuals from service in their militaries or restricted the roles they are
allowed to fill. In Israel, for example, homosexual soldiers were restricted from serving in
intelligence positions requiring a top security clearance until 1993. I code this variable as 0 if
legal restrictions are in place, 1 if gay, lesbian, and bisexual personnel are unrestricted, and 2 if
transgender personnel are unrestricted. There are no cases in which transgender individuals are
unrestricted while gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals are not.
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE
Whether or not a military organization has invested in ICIs, however, does not capture the
variation in the number and proportion of women serving. Institutional gender reform does not
mean that a military is able to recruit and retain female personnel. In other words, while ICIs may
indicate a higher demand for and investment in a more inclusive fighting force, whether or not
this demand is met with a supply of female soldiers is not captured by the ICI index. For example,
a military may remove occupational restrictions on the basis of sex but nonetheless retain very
few female soldiers. Thus, I also consider the total percentage of women in the active force from
1991 to 2016. This number indicates the quantitative presence of women in the armed forces.
Each country-year is coded across a 0 to 5 point scale (where 0 = 0 to 2% participation; 1 = above
2 to 5%; 2 = above 5 to 10%; 3 = above 10 to 15%; 4 = above 15 to 20%; and 5 = above 20%).
There are two notable concerns with this approach: 1) the use of a categorical rather than
continuous measure of de facto participation and 2) the lack of information regarding the grade
and function of female soldiers (e.g. the percentage of female officers). While the use of a
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categorical rather continuous measure does limit the scope of variance for this measure, a
reasonable number of observations fall within each range and it also allows me to combine this
measure across all my indicators and calculate a total score. Notably, the percentage of women in
the total active force presents a limited picture of their participation (Schjølset 2013, 577). Put
simply, a high percentage of female soldiers may be serving in the active force but very few in
positions of leadership. Unfortunately, complete data on grade and function were not available for
most countries, and thus outside of the scope of my data collection efforts. However, as discussed
above, the percentage of female soldiers paired with low levels of ICIs nonetheless serves as an
instructive indicator of the presence of occupation inclusion.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The components of my Institutional Commitments to Inclusion index, as well as the
percentages of women in the total active force are reported for all 41 countries in my dataset.236
Figure 5-1 shows the unweighted average ICI score and percent of women in the total active force
for each year from 1991 to 2016 for all NATO member and partner countries. Average ICI scores
were calculated by generating the mean score (which totals all ICI indicator values) across all
countries, for each year. In Panel A, the ICI score is the sum of all of the ICI indicators, averaged
over the 41 countries for each year. For example, in 1995, the sum of the values for occupational
and restrictions, family programs, sexual assault and harassment protocols and procedures, and
restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation are averaged for that year, yielding an average value
of 4. Recall that the higher is the ICI index score, the more inclusive a military was in that year.
Here, the average value of the index has increased over time, with a sharp increase in the late
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Descriptive statistics in this chapter exclude values with missing data. The ICI score is calculated as the
sum of the several component measures. For cases where one or more component measure is missing (e.g.
due to data limitations), the ICI score is treated as missing as well.
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1990s/early 2000s. In Panel B, the average score for percent of female soldiers in the military is
similarly averaged across countries in each year. As with the ICI index, the average percent of
female personnel has been increasing over time, with sharp increases in the early to mid-2000s.
The figures show that NATO member and partner countries were progressively investing more
resources into recruiting and retaining a more inclusive force.
Figure 5-1a-b. Average ICI Score and Percent of Active Force for all NATO Member/Partner Countries
B: Percent of Active Force
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How do such investments in a more inclusive force vary across indicators? In particular,
in what areas do militaries tend to invest more resources? Table 5-4 shows the mean ICI scores
and percent of female personnel for each ICI indicator.237 On average and for most years, most
militaries tend to allow women to serve in their militaries but still exclude them from serving in
elite combat roles – which, despite the removal of rank restrictions, will limit the positions
available to female personnel and opportunities for ascension within military organizations.
Fewer resources appear to be devoted to sexual assault and harassment monitoring, training, the
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For the mean ICI scores across each NATO member and partner country, see the Appendix.
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installation of gender advisors and protocols in place for victims, with more attention to
establishing clear regulations. Most militaries have removed restrictions on the basis of sexual
orientation but few have explicitly done so with regard to gender identity.
Table 5-4. Mean Scores for ICI Indicators and Percent of Female Personnel
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Occupational restrictions for women (0 – 6)

930

4.698

1.680

Rank restrictions for women (0 – 2)

749

1.648

0.597

Family programs (0 – 2)

490

1.084

0.676

Sexual assault and harassment policies and procedures
Monitoring (0 – 1)

697

0.291

0.455

Regulations (0 – 1)

578

0.519

0.500

Training (0 – 1)

619

0.354

0.479

Advisors (0 – 1)

683

0.296

0.457

Protocols (0 – 1)

682

0.306

0.461

LGBTQ+ restrictions (0 – 2)

608

1.155

0.763

ICI score (0 – 17)

261

11.785

4.899

Percent of total active force (0 – 5)

592

1.993

1.249

Note: For a description of how each indicator is scored, see the above sections.

THE INTEGRATION OF DRONES
Drone technology provides an excellent vehicle for testing the explanatory power of military
innovations in driving gender reform. Limited defense budgets and publics concerned about
casualties have driven many NATO member and partner nations to rely on remote platforms
(Tucker 2014). As discussed in Chapter 5, there are many advantages to integrating drones as
they reduce the human and financial cost of operations and can be used in a variety of settings to
enhance military power. Drone operators engage in warfare from a distance and as a result, need
not travel to dangerous places. Physical strength is also of little importance to the conduct of
remote operations – operators can be male, female, strong, weak, pregnant, injured, or in a
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wheelchair. Rather, operators require a different set of skills than traditional combat soldiers, such
as mental acuity, attention to detail, and patience with lengthy and sometimes repetitive tasks.
Arguably, drones may serve as an equalizer, overturning the “gender protection norm” (Beardsley
and Karim 2017) and introducing a “gender neutral” skillset.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, the skillset associated with drone warfare has also been
associated with femininity and, as a result, the reduction of prestige and career advancement
opportunities within military organizations. In order to integrate drones successfully, militaries
have had to create new training regimens, promotion patterns, and invest in other organizational
changes. Drone operations require extensive time and capital: platform responsibilities must be
allocated between services, chains of command, and units, and operators must acquire the
necessary experience (Singer 2009, 147-63; Young 2014). However, as demonstrated in Chapter
5, a military might seek to integrate drones in a manner that retains the existing masculine
hierarchy, slotting women into low-status and devalued operator roles that lack career
advancement opportunities. This approach is unlikely to work well in the long term, especially as
militaries seek to recruit and retain a sufficient number of skilled operators. As a result, militaries
that adopt remote platforms may increasingly see the value in the recruitment and retainment of a
more inclusive fighting force with a wider range of skills than those of traditional “warriors.”
The gender inclusion regimes of military organizations that have invested in the adoption and
integration of drones vary widely. Consider the total Institutional Commitment to Inclusion (ICI)
score of NATO members and partners with both tactical and advanced drones in their inventories
in the year 2014.238As shown in Figure 5-2, while the militaries of some countries, such as New
Zealand, Denmark, Canada, and Norway, have comparatively high levels of inclusion, others,
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Data on countries with remote platforms in the year 2014 is drawn from Fuhrmann and Horowitz
(2017).
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such as Turkey and Ukraine, have very low levels. Such variation is also evident across countries
with more advanced remote systems in their arsenals: Australia has the highest inclusion score,
followed by the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, and the United States in the mid-high
range. Croatia and Georgia score in the mid-low range, and Turkey has the lowest levels of
inclusion.
Figure 5-2. Institutional Commitment to Inclusion Scores of NATO Member/Partner Drone Adopters, 2014
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Note: Countries with darker bars are in possession of advanced drone capabilities. Data on drone capabilities in
the year 2014 is drawn from Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017). Data on institutional commitments to inclusion is
drawn from my index.

The subsequent analysis examines whether the inclusion regimes of militaries that adopted
drones changed in the years following their attempts to integrate the capabilities across their
organizations. Here, I examine four phases of drone integration across NATO member and
partner militaries – those that occurred in 1) the late 1980s to mid-1990s, 2) mid 1990s to mid2000s, 3) mid-2000s to mid-2010s, and 4) the late 2010s. These phases include not simply when
drones were acquired but when they were organizationally integrated across the military
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organization. I locate key periods of drone integration for each military according to the
establishment of designated drone units, bases, and/or training regimens.239
Figure 5-3. Organizational Integration of Drones by NATO Member/Partners: Periods of Change
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Figure 5-3 groups NATO member and partner militaries with remote platforms across key
periods of change. Notably, these periods mark early investments in drone integration from an
organizational standpoint, which often occur years after the platforms themselves are first
acquired. However, such early attempts often introduce a set of organizational challenges, which
are in turn met with a range of responses that yield varying degrees of success. Available data
shows, first, that even wealthy and advanced countries like the United States and its NATO allies
have struggled to employ remote platforms ranging from loitering attack munitions (LAMs),
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance drones (ISR), and unmanned combat autonomous
vehicles (UCAVs) (Gilli and Gilli 2016). Thus, I expect to see a significant lag in ICI changes in
the years following the organization integration of drones, marked by a period of trial and error.
For example, in Chapter 5, I find that while Israel has been using drones since the 1970s, its
armed forces only began to address the gendered challenges of drone integration in the early (and
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This analysis uses Dan Gettinger’s 2019 databook for the years 1) the state acquired a “Class I” military
drone and 2) a designated drone unit and/or training regimen was established.
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then again in the late) 2000s. Similarly, the 3rd Management and Targeting Division of the Royal
Danish Artillery Regiment was responsible for the military’s drone battery in the early 2000s, but
was then deactivated in 2005 due to technical difficulties and mismanagement. The Danish
military only began to invest substantial organizational resources in drones 2014 (Gettinger 2019,
93).240 Basically, the acquisition and integration of drones is a lengthy process. The timeline of
platform acquisition, the training of personnel, and implementation in the field can vary
substantially across militaries.
In light of these time lags, I measure drone integration by the number of years since drones
were organizationally integrated in a military (i.e. dedicated drone units and training regimens for
operators). For example, in 2016 it had been twelve years since Belgium organizationally
integrated drones, but in 2008, only four years.
CONTROL VARIABLES
I control for a variety of potentially confounding variables. While the primary explanatory
variable is the integration of military innovations, I also account for the alternative explanatory
variables put forth in the existing literature in the categories of threat environment, domestic
environment, and force structure.
I measure threat environment by the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) a
military organization is involved in. A MID is a “a set of interactions between or among states
involving threats to use military force, displays of military force or actual uses of military force”
(Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). Thus, MIDs represent any instance in which states threaten or

240

Poland is another example of a military that initially struggled to organizationally integrate drones. In
2006 the Air Reconnaissance Squadron, 1st Tactical Aviation Brigade was activated by the Army to use
drones for surveillance and reconnaissance. However, the unit was deactivated in 2015, and responsibility
for UAV operations was transferred to the Air Force (Gettinger 2019, 130).
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use military force against each other, including shows of force that fall short of war.241 Given that
major open war is a relatively rare occurrence, this measure provides a more complete description
of the threat environments than a variable that only counts major open wars. Here, I employ a
backward-looking measure of the number of MIDs a country was involved in over the previous
ten years.
In order to examine variation in gender (in)equality and domestic gender hierarchy, I use a
broad measure of women’s empowerment. Following Webster et al’s (2019) exhaustive crossnational analysis of women’s empowerment in the international system from 1900 to 2015, I
utilize the Women’s Political Empowerment Index (V2X_Gender) from the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) Project to broadly measure women’s influence in society (Coppedge et al
2016). This measure incorporates civil liberties, social roles, and political power.242 Notably, this
measure does not capture anything about inclusion in the military and thus reverse causation is
not a concern.
I measure force structure by grouping militaries by whether they utilize conscription or rely
on a volunteer-force. Here, I draw from Toronto’s (2014) military recruitment dataset, which
codes a country for whether it satisfies its military manpower requirements primarily through
forced or voluntary enlistment (conscript = 1; volunteer = 0). Previous versions of this data have
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While one explanation for such variance in the size and scope of crises occurs attributes the decisions of
those responsible for overseeing and conducting operations and the response of adversaries (Weisiger 2013,
34), another approach would be to consider the role of gender hierarchies.
242
The Women’s Political Empowerment Index (V2X_Gender) is an aggregated index ranging from 0 to 1,
which takes the average of three, equally weighted, intermediate indices: the Women’s Civil Liberties
Index (V2X_Gencl), the Women’s Civil Society Participation Index (V2X_Gencs), and the Women’s
Political Participation Index (V2X_Gencpp). Countries are grouped from low to high across a scale of 0-1.
0-0.9 is low, and above 0.9 is high. Scores are 1991-2016 averages. (I also use a more recent average from
2000-2016 and find the scores to be the same.) Here, the data is converted into a categorical variable.
Future analyses, however, would benefit from the use of a continuous measure.
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been used in several studies of conscription (e.g., Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam 2011; Asal,
Conrad, and Toronto 2017; Horowitz, Poast, and Stam 2017).
ANALYSIS
Tables 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 show regression results for each of my dependent variables –
variables reflecting institutional commitments to inclusion, and the percent of female personnel –
and the integration of drones. For each indicator of inclusion, I first consider only the years since
a military has organizationally integrated drones independently. I then include the control
variables – threat, empowerment, and force structure. Given that gender inclusion is increasing
over time, I also include time fixed-effects in all my models.243 While I don't know for sure that
there are secular (exogenous to my treatment) changes in gender inclusion over time, I do suspect
there might be, so I use time fixed-effects to control for time-specific confounders. Finally, in
order to account for unobserved between-unit variation, I also include a model with country
fixed-effects.
As the results show, the organizational integration of drones is positive and statistically
significant (p < 0.01) for some but not all measures of institutional commitment to inclusion
(ICI). In most cases, the findings contradict my hypothesis once I add country fixed-effects. This
is not surprising; the combination of both time and country fixed effects could easily swamp the
variation in the other explanatory variables and the dependent variable. It could be that the
decisions surrounding gender form may be somewhat idiosyncratic to the individual countries (in
addition to the general explanations I propose), introducing the possibility of unit-level
confounders out there as well as the secular time trend in gender integration. On the other hand, I
also find that drones are negatively associated with the percent of women in the total active force
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Without time-fixed effects, I find that the organizational integration of drones is positive and significant
in all regressions.
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when country fixed-effects are included, and insignificant otherwise. This is inconsistent with my
hypothesis that militaries that have invested in drones will be better able to retain many female
personnel.
This contradictory finding is suggested by the graph in Figure 5-3, which shows the.
Institutional Commitment to Inclusion Scores of NATO member and partner drone adopters, for
the year 2014. In the graph, countries with darker bars are in possession of advanced drone
capabilities. Some of the countries with advanced drone capabilities (e.g., Australia) have high
ICI scores, and some (e.g., Turkey and Georgia) have very low scores.
As expected, I find that militaries in countries with a higher degree of women’s
empowerment have more women serving in the military and make more ICIs. A higher threat
environment corresponds with a lower percentage of women in the military as well as more
occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, and on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. Family programs and sexual assault and harassment monitoring, policies and procedures,
however, are positively associated with higher levels of threat. Volunteer forces have higher
percentages of female personnel and invest in more ICIs – with the exception of occupational
restrictions, which are positively associated with conscription.
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE
Contrary to H1, I find that militaries that have a longer history with the organizational
integration of drones are not more likely to have a higher percentage of women in their total
active force. The drone variable is insignificant in Models 1a and 1b and negatively associated
with the percent of female soldiers in Model 1c with country fixed-effects. As discussed in
Chapter 3, drone operators require a set of skills that are very different than that of a traditional
combat soldier. One might expect militaries seeking to integrate drones while retaining existing
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masculine hierarchies (i.e. keep combat masculine and male) to recruit female personnel to fill
operator positions, thus resulting in higher percentages of female personnel. However, in both the
cases of the Israeli Air Force and Artillery Corps most operators were male, regardless of the
public diplomacy initiative undertaken by the Artillery Corps to pair the integration of lighter
Skylark platforms with the opening of the units to women.
Introducing the four control variables also yields mixed results. I find that militaries in
countries with higher levels of domestic gender empowerment have higher percentages of women
serving (H1; H1a). This finding indicates that even in countries where women have more career
opportunities, the military remains able to competitively recruit and retain personnel – which may
very well be because these countries also happen to invest more in ICIs (see Tables 5-6 and 5-7
below). Interestingly, a higher threat environment does not seem to correspond with a higher
percentage of women in the military (H2). In Model 1b, threat is positive but insignificant and in
Model 1c it is significant but negative. This suggests that despite a long history of increased
reliance of women in times of war and conflict, military organizations that engage in more
international disputes are less willing to rely on female soldiers, and thus tend to have lower
percentages of female personnel. This supports scholarship which argues that when militaries are
engaged in disputes they are less hospitable to gender inclusion (Barnes and O’Brian 2018;
MacKenzie and Foster 2017; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). On the other hand, I find that
military organizations that rely on conscription do, as expected, have fewer women serving
compared to volunteer armies (H3).
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Table 5-5. OLS Regressions of Percentage of Female Soldiers in Total Active Force on Drone Integration
and Controls
Model 1a
Integration of drones

Model 1b
Drones and control
variables

Model 1c
Drones and control
variables, country
fixed effects

-0.0009
(0.0055)

-0.0062
(0.0054)

-0.0466***
(0.0160)

Threat

0.00422
(0.0056)

-0.0275**
(0.0113)

Empowerment Low

-0.4235***
(0.1051)

-2.278***
(0.4248)

Conscript

-1.1496***
(0.0863)

-0.2272
(0.2388)

Independent Variables

Drone Years

Constant

0.9005**
(0.3678)

1.2930***
(0.3378)

3.8994***
(0.5592)

Observations

592

511

511

0.1955

0.4084

0.8168

R

2

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p <.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: All Models use time-fixed effects. In Model 1c, country fixed effects were dropped from the United
Kingdom and United States because of collinearity

INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS TO INCLUSION
Tables 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 show the relationship between my independent variables and each of
the ICI indicators – occupational and rank restrictions, family programs, sexual assault and
harassment monitoring and procedures, and restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity. I find that the results vary across indicators and between models.
The results for the relationship between drone integration and the removal of occupational
restrictions on the basis of sex are mixed. While Model 2b is consistent with my hypothesis and
the drone variable is positively associated with the opening of roles, it is negative in Models 2a
and 2c. One possible explanation for why the integration of drones does not go hand in hand with
the opening of combat roles to female personnel is that operator roles are considered by most
militaries as “combat support.” In other words, a military that seeks to recruit a more inclusive
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force that will be trained as drone operators has little incentive to open up combat roles (at least
not until drone operations are considered “combat”).
In Models 3a and 3b, the removal of sex-based rank restrictions is consistent with my
expectation – the drone variable is positive and significant. Once I include country fixed-effects,
however, drones are negatively associated with rank restrictions. Family programs are positive
and largely consistent with my hypothesis (although barely significant in Model 4b). As expected,
sexual assault and harassment monitoring, policies and procedures are positive and significant,
indicating that militaries that invest in the organizational integration of drones similarly invest in
institutional changes to prevent and prosecute sexual harassment within their ranks. Restrictions
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity are also consistent with my predictions,
until the country fixed-effects are added in Model 6c.
Introducing the alternative explanatory variables also provide interesting results. In
accordance with H1, I find that militaries in countries with lower levels of gender empowerment
are less likely to invest in the recruitment and retention of a more inclusive fighting force. With
the exception of occupational restrictions on the basis of sex (which is positive), conscriptionbased militaries are less likely to invest in ICIs.
A higher threat environment corresponds with a lower percentage of women in the military as
well as more occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, as well as sexual orientation and gender
identity. Family programs and sexual assault and harassment monitoring, policies and procedures,
however, are positively associated with higher levels of threat. Volunteer forces have higher
percentages of female personnel and invest in more ICIs – with the exception of occupational
restrictions, which are positively associated with conscription.
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Threat, however, has a negative and statistically significant association with occupational
restrictions on the basis of sex, as well as restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. This result contradicts Soules’ (2020) finding that countries are not more likely to allow
women in combat roles when they face significant external threats. Soules attributes that this
finding to the fact that countries with higher levels of women’s status are less likely to engage in
and escalate conflicts (e.g., Caprioli 2000; Caprioli and Boyer 2001). However, threat is
positively associated with investment in family programs, with mixed results for sexual assault
and harassment monitoring, policies and procures.
Table 5-6. OLS Regressions of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (1) -- Occupational and Rank
Restrictions on the Basis of Sex -- on Drone Integration and Controls
Occupational Restrictions

Rank Restrictions

Model 2a
Integration
of drones

Model 2b
Drones and
control
variables

Model 2c
Drones and
control
variables,
country
fixed
effects

Model 3a
Integration
of drones

Model 3b
Drones and
control
variables

Model 3c
Drones and
control
variables,
country
fixed effects

-0.0218***
(0.0084)

0.0196**
(0.0096)

-0.0321**
(0.0138)

0.0083***
(0.0021)

0.00835***
(0.0023)

-0.02911***
(0.0054)

Threat

-0.0288***
(0.0045)

0.0105
(0.0115)

-0.0014
(0.0025)

0.0008
(0.0055)

Empowerment
Low

-.3400***
(0.1063)

-0.3086
(0.3922)

-0.1943***
(0.0421)

-0.3800**
(0.1749)

Conscript

-0.1026
(0.0969)

1.1420***
(0.2850)

-0.1884***
(0.0391)

-0.3557***
(0.0769)

Independent
Variables

Drone Years

Constant

3.0497***
(0.3596)

3.4587***
(0.3645)

2.462***
(0.5214)

1.0739***
(0.1563)

1.2624***
(0.1544)

1.9502***
(0.2370)

Observations
R2

930
0.2536

826
0.2669

826
0.6983

749
0.2646

645
0.3048

645
0.7326

p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p <.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: All Models use time-fixed effects. In Models 2c and 3c, country fixed effects were dropped from the
United Kingdom and United States because of collinearity
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Table 5-7. OLS Regressions of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (2) – Family Programs and Sexual
Assault and Harassment Monitoring and Procedures – on Drone Integration and Controls

Family Programs

Sexual Assault and Harassment

Model 4a
Integration
of drones

Model 4b
Drones and
control
variables

Model 4c
Drones and
control
variables,
country
fixed
effects

Model 5a
Integration
of drones

Model 5b
Drones and
control
variables

Model 5c
Drones and
control
variables,
country
fixed
effects

0.0357***
(0.0046)

0.0068*
(0.0038)

0.0116
(0.0084)

0.0857***
(0.0078)

0.0738***
(0.0069)

0.0807***
(0.0143)

Threat

0.0266***
(0.0024)

0.0125
(0.0062)

0.04314***
(0.0052)

-0.0412***
(0.0125)

Empowerment
Low

-0.4805***
(0.0532)

-0.5691**
(0.2536)

-0.6165***
(0.0854)

-1.4920**
(0.5316)

Conscript

-1.0901***
(0.1440)
1.3219***
(0.2901)

0.04556
(0.0816)

-0.7641***
(0.0872)
0.4800***
(0.1207)

-2.696***
(0.3191)
3.8428***
(0.5516)

388
0.8272

1,018
0.3901

914
0.3966

914
0.7508

Independent
Variables

Drone Years

Constant

0.43834**
(0.1917)

-0.2007***
(0.0441)
0.4293***
(0.1473)

Observations
R2

490
0.3960

388
0.5246

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p <.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: All Models use time-fixed effects. In Models 4c and 5c, country fixed effects were dropped from the
United Kingdom and United States because of collinearity.
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Table 5-8. OLS Regressions of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (3) –Restrictions on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – on Drone Integration and Controls
LGBTQ+ Restrictions
Model 6a
Integration of
drones

Model 6b
Drones and
control variables

Model 6c
Drones and
control variables,
country fixed
effects

0.0136***
(0.0038)

0.0206***
(0.0029)

-0.01572**
(0.0079)

Threat

-0.0409***
(0.0028)

-0.0255***
(0.0071)

Empowerment Low

-0.3522***
(0.0619)

0.2389
(0.2892)

Conscript

-0.1452**
(0.0601)

-1.0638
(0.1917)

Independent Variables

Drone Years

Constant

0.4674***
(0.1394)

0.8621***
(0.1522)

0.6860**
(0.3135)

Observations
R2

608
0.1340

511
0.3814

511
0.7855

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p <.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: All Models use time-fixed effects. In Model 6c, country fixed effects were dropped from the
United Kingdom and United States because of collinearity.
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CONCLUSION
Technological and tactical innovations that reduce the need for soldiers to be physically
strong and/or willing to be exposed to risk often require a different set of skills than those
required of traditional masculine (and male) combat soldiers. Such changes introduce a series of
organizational realignments that may incentivize militaries to invest in institutional changes
aimed at recruiting and retaining a more inclusive fighting force. Thus, this chapter argues that
the introduction of military innovations may also drive gender reform. Notably, this variable has
been largely omitted by existing scholarship. While such scholarship has presented a variety of
interlinking variables relating to a military’s threat level, domestic environment, and
organizational structure as potential drivers of gender reform, the role of military innovation is
absent.
I test my argument by examining an innovation – drones – that has been widely adopted by
military organizations around the world, and effectively eliminates the need for the valued
military traits of strength, courage, and toughness. As discussed in Chapter 5, drone operators
who tap keyboards and are remote from violence play critical roles in combat while avoiding
personal risk or even physical exertion. Many militaries that have invested in remote platforms
have learned that successful integration requires new training regimens and promotion patterns.
Such organizational flexibility is also required for the recruitment and retention of a more
inclusive fighting force.
In order to examine whether the organizational integration of remote platforms drives
militaries to invest in more institutional commitments to inclusion, I have constructed an original
dataset of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI) across all NATO-member and partner
countries from 1991 to 2016. While “gender inclusion” can encompass a range of theoretical and
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conceptual understandings, this dataset focuses primarily on de jure organizational changes. The
ICI index measures the extent of institutional commitment to gender inclusion across a series of
possible indicators, including occupational restrictions, formal rank restrictions, family programs,
harassment policies and monitoring procedures, and exclusions on basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity. In order to consider de facto changes (i.e. shifts in supply) and whether or not
militaries are simply relying on female labor for low-status roles, I also examine percentages of
women in the total active force.
My findings provide evidence for the broader theory that military organizations seeking to
integrate innovations that reduce the need for physical strength and exposure to risk will seek to
recruit and retain a more inclusive force. Consistent with my hypothesis (H1), I find that
militaries that invest in the organizational integration of drones similarly invest in gender policy
reforms, such as increased attention to the prevention of sexual assault and harassment. I find this
to be true with and without accounting for other explanations that appear in the existing literature.
More generally, the results of my regression analysis are mixed. Those results show domestic
environment and force structure to be consistent with my hypotheses: I find that volunteer-forces
in countries with higher levels of gender empowerment have higher percentages of women
serving and invest more heavily in ICI and its components. While a lower threat environment is
positively associated with family programs and sexual assault and harassment monitoring,
policies and procedures, it is negatively associated with the percentage of female personnel and
the removal of occupational and rank restrictions on the basis of sex, sexual orientation and
gender identity.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
As the nature of wars have changed from conventional wars of the twentieth century to lowintensity armed conflicts and the ‘war on terror’ of the twenty-first century, the discourse on
integration has increasingly highlighted the importance of femininity and the unique role women
can play for the forces (Brownson 2014; Kronsell and Svedberg 2011). With the shift from
traditional to non-traditional military operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention,
and state building military operations, an increasing number of military organizations have
extended roles to women (Kümmel 2002, 620; Moskos 2000). Here, the nature of the military
mission is considered to influence women’s participation: (1) the more the armed forces are
involved in peacekeeping missions, the greater will be women’s engagement; and (2) the greater
is the relative importance of war fighting (e.g. ground combat), the less will be the participation
of women (Segal 1995, 762). The likelihood of international deployments may also impact
women’s roles: engagements away from home cannot count on civilian infrastructure, requiring
the deployment of support personnel (positions women tend to occupy). Put simply, given the
nature of more recent threat environments, militaries may be more likely to invest in not only
short-term recruitment, but also long-term retention of a female force.
Thus, future analysis would benefit from continued work to account for the varied results for
threat environment, as well as for the other explanatory factors examined in the existing literature.
For example, a more fine-grained measure of threat would include the kinds of operations a
military is engaged in: deployments abroad and other operations (such as COIN) tend to rely
more heavily on female personnel. Similarly, measuring women’s political empowerment is no
easy task, and a range of other variables could serve as possible indicators (Karim and Hill 2018).
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION
Thus far, the most influential theories of how militaries adopt and integrate innovations
have centered on the roles of civilian and military leadership, external threat, organizational
culture, capacity, and money. The questions addressed include whether a military has the
resources it needs to implement new technologies and/or tactics. Is there support for the
innovation from civilian and military leadership? Which existing areas of prestige and power
might an innovation displace? These issues frame public discussions of military innovation and
our understanding of which countries have the “edge” when it comes to the latest weaponry and
defense systems. They also dominate the models that inform decision-making within military
organizations – the prioritization of one method of warfare over another, for example, can shape
operational planning and effectiveness of operations. Finally, these issues underpin the treatment
of force and power in international relations theory.
However, different militaries try to integrate innovations in different ways, and those
differences cannot be fully explained by existing theories. Why is that some militaries struggle to
integrate innovations even when civilian and military leadership supports the innovation and
substantial financial and organizational resources have been invested in them – in times of both
high and low levels of external threat? I argue that this struggle is especially evident when the
innovation in question removes the need for physical strength and/or exposure to risk. To answer
the question of why such innovations are so hard for militaries to implement as well as to predict
how they will address the challenges of implementation requires a systematic theory of how
gender and military innovation interact.
I have argued that military culture and promotion pathways traditionally reinforce and
reward a willingness to fight and risk one’s life – traits that are often associated with manliness
and masculinity. Thus, innovations that reduce soldiers’ exposure to violence and/or the need for
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physical strength are especially challenging for a military to integrate across its organization. I
argue that the degree to which a military organization invests in recruiting and retaining a gender
inclusive force will influence its resilience to the challenges of integrating such innovations.
Militaries that invest in institutional commitments to inclusion – for example by reducing
occupational and rank restrictions on the basis of sex, expanding family programs, and sexual
assault and harassment monitoring – are more likely to have the needed flexibility when it comes
to the elevation of roles that fall outside of the combat warrior framework. I argue that military
organizations with lower levels of gender inclusion will find it more difficult to integrate low
risk/strength innovations into their operations.
Such innovations may also have a longer-term influence on gender inclusion in militaries.
Militaries may learn through trial, error, and observation of other innovation adopters the value of
recruiting and retaining a more inclusive force for innovation integration. As the “tooth to tail”
ratio increasingly values the share of combat and service support positions in the total military
labor force, militaries may invest in gender policy reforms.
I test different aspects of my theory applying a multi-method research design to a set of
specific innovations. The methodological question is not whether gender and innovative changes
coincide, but how they coincide. Process-tracing methods for establishing causal relations within
cases are well suited to mapping how militaries integrate innovations (Pierson 2000; George and
Bennett 2004). For each innovation, I conduct nested case comparisons across militaries with
varying levels of inclusion, leveraging interviews with military personnel and industry experts
and other primary sources. I then consider the broader implications of innovation integration for
inclusion, developing and utilizing an original index of cross-national and temporal data on
institutional commitments to inclusion for all NATO member and partner countries from 1991 to
2016.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
The findings put forth in this study support the core of the theory and highlight additional
avenues for future research. Gender bias, as it turns out, is markedly inefficient. Chapters 3 and 4
use a nested comparative case approach to examine how gender hierarchies inhibit the integration
of two innovations that reduce the need for risk and/or strength – drones and population-based
counterinsurgency (COIN). For each of these cases, I use process tracing to compare two military
organizations with varying levels of gender inclusion that sought to adopt the innovation.
In the case of drones, I leverage variation between the Israel Air Force (IAF) and the Artillery
Corps. While the IAF was the first service to open combat roles to women in 1995, the Artillery
Corps would not do so until 2014. I find that the gendered hierarchies within both services
introduced challenges when it came to integrating operators across their ranks. Both the IAF and
Artillery Corps struggled to provide operators with the necessary set of skills, recognition, and
operational climate to integrate drones across their communities. However, I find that while the
Air Force showed less resistance to the integration of drones and the delineation of operators as
combat support, this was not true for the Artillery drone operators, who considered themselves to
be “warriors” and felt that the admittance of female personnel into their units reduced their
prestige.
In the case of COIN, I compare the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and Turkish Armed
Forces (TAF) reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as part of the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF). I find that the ADF – a military with higher levels of institutional
commitment to inclusion – took further steps to integrate COIN across the organization, and was
more successful in doing so. Following the publication of the U.S. field manual, FM 3-24, it
became increasingly clear that combat soldiers would need to harness skills associated with
engineering, diplomacy, cultural awareness, and the occupational training of the local population.
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However, the ADF also faced practical barriers – occupational restrictions on the basis of sex
(which were nonetheless more restrictive in the case of the TAF), would make it difficult to
successfully utilize Female Engagement Teams (FETs). The TAF, on the other hand, resisted the
integration of COIN into its mainstream operations, taking a civilian-led approach to
reconstruction efforts. Here, COIN was framed as feminine work fit for female personnel, unlike
the enemy-centric counterinsurgency operations at home against the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) conducted by male combat soldiers and private contractors.
In Chapter 5, I reverse the causal arrows and consider whether the adoption and integration of
low risk/strength innovations drive gender policy reform. Despite the laundry list of potential
variables that may explain changes in gender inclusion offered by existing theories, military
innovation has largely been omitted. Indeed, the case of the ADF (in Chapter 4) offers
preliminary evidence that the integration of COIN influenced gender policy reform. Utilizing my
dataset of Institutional Commitments to Inclusion (ICI), I examine whether militaries that have
successfully integrated drones are more likely to 1) have a higher percentage of women in their
military, and 2) invest in institutional gender reform. Even when accounting for existing
explanations of inclusion, I find that the integration of drones is still a powerful explanator of
gender policy reform.
There are admittedly limits to the theory and empirical tests presented in this study. First, the
theory does not apply to all military innovations. It applies to innovations that remove or reduce
soldiers’ exposure to risk and/or the need for physical strength. This is a necessary condition
because strength and bravery are static components of the construction of military masculinities
(Goldstein 2001). Moreover, this project’s research design focuses on a specific set of ICIs.
Depending on the availability of data, further research might extend this set to include other
measures of institutional change – such as the gender retrofitting of military equipment and bases.
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Further research might also look more closely at the degree to which such measures may have
different effects on the integration of innovations. Occupational restrictions, for example, have a
unique relationship with innovations that reduce the need for strength but retain the salience of
risk. The COIN case is an example of this: the lack of differentiation between the “front” and the
“rear” of battle placed soldiers in combat support roles at a high level of risk, posing a challenge
to militaries that impose restrictions on the roles female soldiers can occupy on the basis of such
risk exposure. Thus, this indicator of inclusion has a different relationship with innovation
integration than sexual assault monitoring procedures, for example.
Another possible extension of this project would be to examine whether this theory operates
differently in states of varying regime types. While several scholars consider how regime type
can affect decisions regarding the use of force and effectiveness of operations (Pollack 2002;
Reiter and Stam 2002; Talmadge 2015), none consider the degree to which gender hierarchies
may serve as a mediating variable. For example, how do the gendered hierarchies of militaries
within autocracies differ from those within democracies? To what degree does this difference
interact with innovation integration? Do autocracies struggle more when innovations disrupt such
hierarchies? Further analysis could also include a test of whether democratic countries (with,
arguably, greater levels of gender equality outside of the military) have higher levels of gender
inclusion within their military organizations.
Extensions of this project might examine the extent to which this theory generalizes to nonmilitary organizations that also retain a rigid gender hierarchy. Industries that have traditionally
been sex-segregated, like auto manufacturing (cited in Chapter 2), may face similar challenges
with integrating innovations that disrupt masculine characteristics that have traditionally been
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rewarded and promoted within the industry – such as the toughness and strength associated with
“heavy lifting” positions.244 Those “heavy lifting” positions have greatly declined in number,
thanks to the introduction of industrial robots on the factory floor. Notably, despite the
introduction of robots and other skill-based technological changes that eliminate the need for
physical strength, recent job gains in manufacturing have been for the most part among men.
Occupational segregation in the manufacturing industry has increased over the last two decades,
especially in developed and emerging countries. Although employment increased rapidly between
1995 and 2015, the share of female employees in manufacturing dropped sharply: While 50
percent of worldwide employees in manufacturing were female in 1991, in 2014 only 38 percent
were female (UNIDO 2015, 189). At its peak in 1990, women’s share of employment in the US
manufacturing sector was only about 32%. Even as the sector has added new jobs (where gender
is deemed increasingly irrelevant), the share of female employees has fallen: Women’s share of
manufacturing employment was 27% in 2013, the lowest it has been since 1971 (US Congress
2013, 3; Hagerty 2013). The workforces of industries with the fastest job growth, such as metal
fabrication and automobiles, have traditionally been, and remain, heavily male. The widening
gender gap in manufacturing poses a puzzle. As explained above, advances in technology have
changed the way goods are produced, and few manufacturing jobs require heavy physical labor or
any other tasks that are viewed as “masculine.” One might think that this transition would
therefore provide more opportunities for skilled workers, regardless of their sex. Yet the
automotive industry has been remarkably unsuccessful in attracting and retaining women
(Deloitte and Automative News 2020).
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Historically, men have held the majority of jobs in manufacturing. Women were a small minority of the
auto manufacturing labor force until World War II, employed mostly in the upholstery departments of body
plants (Milkman 1983).
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Technological changes can also serve to masculinize areas of employment that were formerly
feminized to allow for male entry (Bradley 1993; Lindsay 2007). While math, engineering, and
computer science are often typecast as masculine domains, these fields were historically
dominated by female labor (Beall 2018, 4-5). The word “computer” originally referred to a
workforce of primarily women who calculated ballistic trajectories for the U.S. Army (Beall
2018, 4-5). In 1945, for example, six women working as artillery trajectory computers at the
University of Pennsylvania were recruited to program the world’s first general-purpose computer,
the ENIAC (Kim 2006). As computer programming became an increasingly important skill and
thus a lucrative employment prospect – aided with the rise in personal computers in the 1980s –
the field of computer science would be primarily marketed to men and boys (Donato 1990; Beall
2018, 5; Henn 2014). Today, many argue that the tech workplace continues to be dominated
primarily by men and masculinity: in Silicon Valley, women have reported facing discrimination
in hiring processes, and in how they are compensated, promoted, and valued (Beall 2018, 7;
Mundy 2017).
What we see here is that the introduction of new technologies has also contributed to the
gendering of industries and areas of work. One might argue that a similar logic to the one put
forth in the theory developed in this study applies to private industry as well. Tech corporations,
for example, that take steps to address gender inequalities and maintain an inclusive workspace
may find that they are more effective at recruiting the necessary talent to implement novel and
salient cyber technologies, develop algorithms, and perform other technical tasks.
Finally, further research should examine the degree to which gendered hierarchies within
military organizations interact with other dimensions of demography and disadvantage. A wealth
of feminist literature has emerged on the manner in which individuals sit at the intersection of
race, gender, class, ethnicity and other lived identities (Choo and Ferree 2010; Crenshaw 1989,
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1991; Hancock 2016). The scholarship on military innovation – and security studies more broadly
– has yet to consider the implications of not just gendered hierarchies, but the intersection of
gender with other dimensions of disadvantage, to system and state-level analyses of conflict and
the distribution of power.245 The privileging and marginalization of personnel, policies, and
procedures varies across a range of differences that intersect with gender (for example, Collins
2000). As a result, the kinds of masculinities that are rewarded and promoted within an
organization are constructed from many interrelated forms of inequalities (Wajcman 1991, 29).
Indeed, a range of scholarship notes how the masculinity of subordinate groups such as workingclass men and racial minorities have been emasculated (e.g., Bederman 1995; Belkin 2012).
Returning to the case of the IDF, for example, hegemonic “Ashkenazi” men of European
descent, “Mizrahi” men who descended from Arab countries, and non-Jewish Arabs all constitute
different forms of military masculinity across dimensions of region and ethnicity (Hirsch and
Grosswirth Kachtan 2018, 690). These forms of masculinity have different interactions with
soldiering and the integration of technological and tactical changes. Pilots and paratroopers, for
example, have historically been associated with Ashkenazi personnel. Other infantry roles – such
as the Golani Brigade – have historically been associated with Mizrahim and other subordinate
social groups (Hirsch and Grosswirth Kachtan 2018, 694). Thus, military innovation has the
potential to disrupt masculine roles in varying ways, depending on the service, unit, or individual
soldier.
Degrees of formal exclusion also extend beyond gender to include dimensions of religion and
ethnicity. In the case of the IDF, Druze, Bedouins, and other Arabs were for years limited in rank
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There are however, notable exceptions (e.g Tezcuer 2020)
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and placed in segregated units under the command of Jewish officers (Kanaaneh 2005, 271).
While “minority soldiers” were allowed to hold positions outside of the segregated brigade
beginning in the 1970s (with the exception of those in intelligence or the air force) all units were
not open to the (male) soldiers until 1991, and such de facto segregation would continue
(Kanaaneh 2005, 271; Harel 2001). Israeli Druze, for example, were segregated into their own
unit – the “Cherev” (sword) battalion – until 2015 (Cohen 2015a). Assignments, benefits, and
promotions within the IDF continue to remain unequal on the basis of ethnicity, most clearly
demonstrated by the absence of Arabs in the highest military ranks (Kanaaneh 2005, 271). Thus,
the desired and dichotomous ideals that are rewarded by military power structures tend to
disparage differences or “otherness” on the basis of a range of potential social out-groups
(Whitworth 2004; Herbert 1998, 79).246
WHAT ABOUT OTHER INNOVATIONS?
Thus far, the study has tested my theory of gender and innovation by examining two cases of
military innovation. But what about other innovations? Given the diverse set of potential cases,
how might my theory apply to innovations that differ in the way they vary across dimensions of
risk and strength? Take, for example, another low risk/strength innovation from Table 6-1 below
– nuclear weapons. The development, adoption, and integration of nuclear capabilities introduce
the need for a body of professional expertise and specialized knowledge that military
organizations have no previous experience with (Rosen 1994, 21-22). The development of career
pathways, relevant training, and recruitment of personnel containing the necessary expertise in
the field of nuclear security required a different set of skills than traditional forms of warfare,
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Notably, the rationale for such “othering” may differ. For example, for women discrimination may be on
the basis of their physical capability or purported feminine dispositions, for Mizrahi on the basis of their
capability, and for non-Jewish Arabs on the basis of their suspected disloyalty to the state.
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drawing groups of scientists and political theorists hailing from universities and organizations
such as the RAND corporation (Hurlburt et al 2019, 7). As a result, civilian policymakers,
theoreticians and scientists have had more leeway to influence tactical and operational decisions
concerning the way nuclear weapons should be utilized (or more realistically, threatened to be
utilized). While not “warriors,” the community of (mostly) men responsible for the integration of
nuclear weapons has been associated with masculinity – evident not only in the language used to
talk about the weapons themselves (Cohn 1990), but also in the persistent underrepresentation of
female professionals (Hulbert et al 2019).
To address variation across the universe of cases, and consider the extent to which my theory
can be generalized, I briefly examine an additional innovation – medical-military research
collaborations during the 19th/20th centuries. These research collaborations led to changes that
would significantly reduce the risks posed to soldiers on the battlefield – especially with the
integration of mechanized transport and evacuation procedures (Fazal 2014). Motorized
ambulances, for example, allowed for field hospitals to be set up farther from the front lines
(Fazal 2014, 110). However, medical staff responsible for lifting, turning, and dragging wounded
soldiers would also need to be physically strong in order to perform their tasks. The section that
follows considers how the integration of military medicine has been gendered in the cases of the
U.S. and British militaries.
Table 6-1. Classification of Medical Innovations Based on Risk and Physical Strength

Physical strength
requirements

Low

High

Soldier exposure to risk
Low
Nuclear weapons
Drones
Precision strike; C4ISR
Cyber-warfare
Longbow; Crossbow
Medical (Ambulances)
Artillery
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High
Fighter planes
Poison gas
COIN
Suicide terrorism
Swords
Bayonets
Amphibious landing

MEDICAL MILITARY RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS
While some military innovations have made warfare increasingly lethal, others have
enhanced the survivability of soldiers in the face of grave danger. Military medicine has both
benefited from and been responsible for dramatic worldwide advances in health care science.
Indeed, the incorporation of military medicine has been linked to fewer fatalities (Fazal 2014).
However, building a robust military medical capability has historically faced challenges. Despite
dramatic change between the Civil War and World War I in the understanding of the pathology of
wounds and the development of new procedures for antiseptic surgery, it took time and practice
for many of these advances to be effectively implemented on the battlefield. For example, it took
more than a decade before the germ theory of disease started to affect US Army medicine: the
farmland soil over which World War I was fought was infested with bacteria and the wounds
from exploding artillery rounds caused unprecedented infection (Rostker 2013, 133). Like other
military innovations, the adoption of advances in the treatment of wounded soldiers on the
battlefield would require the development and sufficient production of technologies – such as
motorized ambulances – in conjunction with operational and organization changes.
However, medical military research collaborations also took men and women who were not
trained “warriors” but rather nurses, medics, engineers, and scientists, and placed them in the
battlefield. Unsurprisingly, this displacement challenged existing masculine military hierarchies
and perceptions of prestige. Advances in medicine also challenge associations or toughness and
not succumbing to pain that are inherent in masculine codes of war fighting. Elite units have
historically viewed sickness as sign of weakness and femininity. Indeed, in the case of the
German military in World War II, medicine was often viewed as a form of pampering (Harrison
2004, 5). During the period spanning the two World Wars when medical advancements in the
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care for wounded soldiers surged (with varying success in implementation), there were also
substantial differences within the U.S. and British approaches to such changes.
The U.S. and British militaries
The first three centuries of American military medical practices mirrored those of the British
military, placing medical professionals on a rung far below that of military men and decidedly
under their purview (Chambers and Anderson 1999, 426). Before the American Revolution, a
surgeon would often accompany each regimental-size force of American colonial militia
organizations. Following British practice, the officer class was oriented around an aristocratic
hierarchy, while the medical profession was decidedly middle-class and of lower influence.
Surgeons were regarded as “contract personnel…little more than tradesmen and teamsters who
also accompanied a military column” (Chambers and Anderson 1999, 426). During the
Revolutionary war, this hierarchy remained intact but a split between the perceptions of
physicians in American and British militaries began to grow. While British physicians went
mostly unnoticed during the war, five American medical doctors were signers of the Declaration
of Independence, using their prominence to impress upon the Congress the need to stockpile
medical supplies and create hospitals (Chambers and Anderson 1999, 426).
Nursing and the role of female labor
During this time, knowledge regarding medical technologies also assisted with the creation of
female spaces within male-dominated militaries. Women were able to capitalize on opportunities
to build technological expertise, become essential to military-medical technological system.
However, while medical innovations were a way to legitimize female presence in the military,
they also carried clear hierarchies (Toman 2008). In both the US and British cases, women relied
on feminine ideals and norms to justify their place as wartime nurses, harnessing such norms to
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“smooth their entry into the masculine environs of hospital, military, and war…by upholding the
existing class and race ideologies that defined proper womanhood and thereby excluded men and
non-white women” (Vuic 2013, 23).
In the British military, nursing was historically the job of camp followers, prostitutes, or
injured male soldiers (Sankey 2018). However, in the Crimean War, Florence Nightingale argued
that women’s innate feminine nurturing characteristics could transform hospital efficiency and
patient care, upturning popular conceptions of the “disreputability” of nursing while
simultaneously maintaining clear gendered hierarchies. Such reforms established nursing as a
modern profession for middle-class women. While women were excluded from medical schools
and from serving as doctors in the military, one of the highest ranking military doctors in the mid19th century – Dr. James Barry – was an Irish women who disguised herself as a man to attend
medical school and then join the army as a surgeon (Sankey 2018, 87-91)
In the Civil War, middle- and upper- class women similarly likened nursing to their usual
feminine work in the domestic sphere, “characterizing soldiers as family” and arguing that their
work was “more wholesome and meaningful than that of working-class, African American, and
slave women” (Vuic 2013, 24). But also in this case, female nurses’ assertions of medical
authority brought them into conflict with military officials and male physicians. Such conflicts
varied across hospitals in Scutari, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Shiloh, as women advocated for the
authority to make medical decisions.
Controversial reforms in the late 19th century to early 20th century
Notably, in the United States, naval medical practice differed substantially from that of the
army. While the navy initially relied on the use of contract surgeons, who would sign on to a ship
for a single cruise, the army tied the pay of the surgeons to a major’s salary (Chambers and
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Anderson 1999, 426). In 1847, army medical officers were given commissioned rank, using
military titles for the first time. During the Spanish American War, the navy began to both
enhance the prestige of medical personnel and improve its medical practices more broadly. The
introduction of medical corps into the U.S. Navy in 1898 led to the assignment of medical
officers with commissioned rank and command authority of hospital ships and crews (Chambers
and Anderson 1999, 427). This decision to replace warriors with nautical surgeons was
controversial at the time.247 Moreover, these changes did not match the prestige awarded to the
army’s Medical Reserve Corps. The division between the U.S. army and navy’s approaches to
military medicine was further evident, in 1910, when a Harvard Medical School graduate and
former army physician, General Leonard Wood, became chief of staff of the army – something
that would he unheard of in the navy at the time (Chambers and Anderson 1999, 427).
The Dodge Commission inquiry after the Spanish American War found that medical reforms
of the 1890s, such as the Hospital Corps, the Army Medical School, and the Army Medical
Department, were severely handicapped and ineffectively implemented. The Medical Department
was viewed as an unimportant non-combatant branch and “lacked the plans, personnel,
equipment, and effective doctrine necessary to support an army in the field” (Rostker 2013, 115).
The commission recommended the creation of a large force of medical officers, a reserve corps of
medical officers and nurses, and a year’s worth of medical supplies. As a result, the Army
Reorganization Act of 1901 created a general staff and authorized the Nurse Corps. Notably,
nurses were appointed for a three-year period not commissioned as Army officers until 1947
(Rostker 2013, 118). While the Navy created its own nursing service in 1908, the women of
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Ultimately, Theodore Roosevelt resolved the controversy in favor of the nautical surgeons (Chambers and Anderson
1999, 427)
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neither service were actually considered military personnel but rather as separate and temporary
employees (Sankey 2018, 273-277)
While the U.S. military was taking steps to elevate surgeons and physicians and take their
expertise taken more seriously, the British Armed Forces operated within a hierarchy that had
historically viewed doctors as “one step above a barber” (Chambers and Anderson 1999, 426).
Indeed, in the years before the establishment of the Royal Army Medical Corps in 1898, a
common complain amongst British medical officers was “their lack of authority and status”
(Harrison 2004, 8). From the British perspective, the care of strangers was “disreputable work” –
especially for female nurses (Vuic 2013, 23). During the World War I, the advice of medical
officers in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia was often ignored and they were excluded from meetings
of the headquarters staff and, as a result, there was inadequate medical transport arrangements
and hospital facilities and the sick and wounded soldiers were slow to receive treatment in both
campaigns (Harrsison 2004, 2). In response to “Right to Serve” rallies by women demanding the
opportunity to enlist, auxiliary versions of the army, navy, and air force were created in 1917
(Sankey 2018, 87-91).
World War II: a shift towards the integration of medical expertise
By World War II, medical personnel in the U.S. were becoming widely accepted as playing a
salient role in military strategy. Indeed, during World War II the Office of Scientific Research
and Development’s Office of Field Service placed scientists and engineers in combat units to help
with new technologies, including medical technologies (Thiesmeyer and Burchard 1947). The
Office of Field Service (OFS) – a tactical arm of the OSRD – sent hundreds of scientists into
theatres of war: “as missionaries of new weapons, as training experts, as special repair and
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maintenance and use consultants, as scientific spies, and as the eyes of the laboratories back
home” (Morrison 1947, 38).
In the British military, medical officers were also beginning to achieve substantive
advancements in rank that would place them on par with non-combatant and combatant Army
branches (Harrison 2004, 8). However, officers would continue to disregard medical
arrangements as “dispensable luxuries” and view medical doctors as their inferiors (Harrison
2004, 8). As a result, the advice of medical doctors was largely ignored and the medical staff
received little support: “there were only five medical officers and sixteen orderlies to care for a
force of thousands” during Kitchener’s Sudan campaign and two thirds of the 22,000 British
deaths during the South African War were due to wound infection and disease thanks to a lack of
attention to sanitation, provision of medical supplies, and arrangements for the evacuation of the
wounded (Harrison 2004, 8-9).
However, after the significant losses of World War I, British doctrine increasingly accounted
for the role of medicine in contributing to the manpower economy (Harrison 2004, 4). As a result,
the level of awareness and prioritization of medical and sanitary matters was much higher among
British soldiers during World War II. Such messages took time to “sink in” – the “mention of
hygiene was often met with indifference or mild amusement” and there were widespread rumors
that chemical prophylaxis against malaria caused sexual impotence (Harrison 2004, 282). In the
case of the Chindits, which operated behind the lines in Burma, sanitation and medical
arrangements were neglected and soldiers expected to “endure their illnesses stoically” (Harrison
2004, 5). Nonetheless, between 1939 and 1945, British Army commanders would demonstrate an
increased attention to and awareness of medical matters, arguably providing an advantage over
the Germans and Italians (who had comparatively little experience with sanitation in hot climates
that the British did thanks to their colonial campaigns) in the Western Desert, and over the
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Japanese in Burma (Harrison 2004, 283). Adjunct-General, Sir Ronald Adam, sought to
emphasize the individual role of soldiers in cultivating health, establishing a series of lectures and
demonstration on how to prevent illness as an important component of maintaining the physical
fitness needed to fight (Harrison 2004, 4).
At the same time, nurses were lobbying for the expansion of their military status (Vuic 2013, 26).
Once medical care assumed a strong national identity, becoming an essential part of militaries’
efforts to wage war, nursing became an element of war: during World War II, “medical units
became strategic components of battle plans,” blurring nurses’ noncombatant status (Toman
2008, 85). In the British military, women’s auxiliaries that had been disbanded after World War I
were revived, employing women as nurses – as well as mechanics, drivers, clerks, antiaircraft
crews, cryptographers, and spies (Sankey 2018, 87-91). In the U.S. military, a 1942 bill brought
the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), the U.S. Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (USMCWR), the
Coast Guard Women’s Reserve (SPARS), and the navy’s Women Accepted for Volunteer
Emergency Service (WAVES) into existence. Notably, while not considered combatants, nurses
still faced a high degree of risk, in fact nearly as much as combat troops: “Nurse Frances Slanger,
stepping onto the Normandy beachhead only hours after it had been established by D-day
landings. Slanger, a Polish Jewish refugee from World War I, died when Germans shelled her
field hospital in 1944. In the Philippines, 80 nurses stayed behind at Corregidor and were
prisoners of war under horrific conditions, while military nurses trapped in Bastogne at the Battle
of the Bulge carried on under heavy fire” (Sankey 2018, 273-279).
Conclusion
Much remains to be done to fully understand the differences between American and British
military medical practices, and implications of those differences. The rough overview detailed
above suggests that while the U.S. was quicker to elevate the roles of medical professionals and
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incorporate their expertise in military planning, the British military struggled to do so. Both
militaries, however, albeit with more resistance in the British case, sought to capitalize on female
labor as nurses – with little recognition and reward – on the basis of their purported feminine
attributes. Indeed, in both the U.S. and British cases, the inclusion of women into militaries as
nurses was a solution to the challenges of incorporating medical practices effectively on the
battlefield – specifically, that of acute wartime labor shortages.
GENDER AND THE FUTURE OF WAR
In a 2017 interview, Yann LeCun, the head of Artificial Intelligence (AI) at Facebook, argued
that predictions of Terminator-style robot takeovers are solely human projections. According to
LeCun the “desire to dominate socially is not correlated with intelligence” but rather correlated
with testosterone, “which AI systems won’t have” (Blanchard 2017). There are two important
elements of this statement worth unpacking – the first associates testosterone, or masculinity,
with the desire to dominate and a proclivity towards violence. Ironically, this statement indicates
that either AI machines 1) would be correlated with estrogen, femininity, peace, and thus, uninclined towards violence, or that they 2) would do away with gendered constructs all together.
When considering the role of gender in the future of warfare, the invention, experimentation
with, adoption, and diffusion of novel military innovations is of immense interest to the defense
community. Most narratives concerning AI, cyber security, robotics and other innovative
advances in military technology, focus on how such technologies will replace capital for human
labor.248 Indeed, AI is often defined as the use of machines to perform tasks that usually involve
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Notably, such technological advances need not represent military innovations, but rather as force
enablers. Indeed, as a general-purpose technology, AI enables a range of additional potential innovations in
both the civilian and military spheres (Cockburn et al. 2019; Horowitz 2019).
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human intelligence (Simon 1995). Unsurprisingly, conversations surrounding such advances tend
to focus on how AI can do what humans do with even greater effectiveness. For example, in a
2016 demonstration, an AI-agent “Alpha” beat a combat flight instructor, and in 2020 Heron
Systems’ F-16 AI agent defeated an Air Force F-16 pilot in a series of simulated dogfights five
times out of five (Tucker 2020).
However, this study (as well as the above quote) demonstrates the inherent “humanness” of
such changes. In other words, what kinds of labor does AI produce within the military sphere?
What kind of skills does AI require and what will be the challenges of 1) locating people with
these skills and 2) integrating them across military organizations? What are the organizational
inhibitors to integrating personnel with such skills? When considering the future of war, it is
important to acknowledge that it is not just the replacement of humans that matters – but the
kinds of personnel needed to perform military tasks. Skills associated with technical knowledge,
programming, hacking, developing novel systems, and human-machine integration – which are
not associated with traditional “warrior” attributes – are increasingly salient in this future.
Moreover, individuals with such a skillset will need to be in positions of authority and on
decision-making staffs (Schneider 2018).
This study demonstrates that integrating changes that involve a fighting force with skills that
don’t align with traditional combat soldiers can be challenging for military organizations. Not
unlike the case of drones, where operators wear flight suits that let them resemble “real” pilots to
enhance their masculine status as “warriors,” it is likely that military forces will seek to do the
same with the integration of cyber and AI capabilities. From this perspective, LeCun had it wrong
– militaries will seek to make AI and other innovative changes masculine. Indeed, if the coders
and algorithm writers are male and conditioned within a masculine military culture – the AI
systems they are responsible for may very well be inserted with their prejudices, perpetuating
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gendered hierarchies and norms (Garcia 2016; Roff 2016). Such norms will also be contingent
where most of the work on AI is done and what the versions of masculinity and femininity look
like: “Depending on the role or job of the warbot, the gender will be stereotyped to fit” (Roff
2016, 10). This norm has extended to the civilian sphere where, at Google, high-level employees
complain about gender bias and the gender makeup of the AI workforce has produced a “macho
“environment. Indeed, as discussed above, the culture permeating computer science and robotics
continues to be predominantly masculine and male (Burleigh 2015; Roff 2016).
These and other innovations and smaller technological disruptions in both the civilian and
military sphere can be explained using the theory described in this study. Gender matters when it
comes to international security and military and economic change, and innovation matters to the
construction and performance of gender hierarchies.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS SAMPLE
My interviews were semi-structured. The questions below served as a guide for directing the
conversation, but follow-up questions varied based on participants’ answers. Interviews ran from
1 to 3 hours.
General questions
•

Could you tell me about your career in [XXX military]?

•

Thinking about your time at [XXX unit/service], what did you do there? How long
did you serve there?

•

Could you tell me about the XXX’s implementation of [COIN/Drones]?

•

What was your role in this process?

•

What was your recruitment process like? How did you end up at XXX?

Identifying gendered challenges and responses
•

Do you think the XXX approach to [Drones/COIN] has worked well? What worked
well and where do you think there were problems? Are any of these problems still
evident today?

•

What kinds of organizational changes does the integration of [Drones/COIN]
require? In your opinion what kinds of changes have been the most challenging to
implement?

Necessary skills, system of reward/promotion/recruitment
•

What kinds of promotion opportunities were available to you? How did these
compare with those of other pilots?

•

What are the qualities and/or skills necessary to be “good” [UAV operator/COIN
soldier]? In your opinion? Reflected institutionally – i.e. rewarded by your military?

•

How do these qualities compare to that of a regular combat soldier?

Identifying responses
•

What were the proposed means/measures of addressing these challenges?

•

Were there varying views? Who was advocating for which course of action?
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•

How were the challenges ultimately addressed?

Success/failure of such responses
•

What were the outcomes of such responses?

•

In retrospect, do you think the XXX should have done things differently?

•

What was the most rewarding about your service? What was the most challenging
about your service?

Inclusion questions
•

Do you think it easy for women to serve in the XXX as it is for men to serve?
Why/why not?

•

How would you describe the “culture” of the XXX? Does this culture vary across the
services? How did your unit compare?

•

From your perspective, what are the advantages and disadvantages of having large
numbers of women in active service?

•

What steps (if any) does your military take to recruit/retain a diverse pool of soldiers?
Is there a strategic and/or operational advantage to do doing so? A disadvantage?

•

What do you think of the use of all-female units (e.g. for surveillance or
intelligence)?

Final questions
•

Is there anything else I need to know?

Who else should I talk to?
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW METHODS APPENDIX
Table A-1. Interview Subjects
Interviewee

Status

Recording

Length

#

Co-Founder, CEO of Drone Collision
Avoidance System Company (Former
Colonel, Air Force Cobra and Apache
squadron)

Conducted in person
2/25/20

Audio Recording

1:16:58

2

CTO Drone Company

Conducted in person
2/26/20

Audio Recording

1:20:48

3

Conducted in person
3/1/20

Audio Recording

1:26:41

6

Conducted in person
3/5/20

Audio Recording

2:27:18

10

Audio Recording

1:22:08

1

Audio Recording

2:12:16

4

Audio Recording

1:29:59

7

Concurrent Notes

2:15:00

8

Audio Recording

1:21:32

5

Audio Recording

28:91;
48:51

11

Concurrent Notes

0:40

9

Audio Recording

53:59;
58:89

12

Audio Recording

1:23:20

13

Zoom call 10/14/20

Audio Recording

1:12:09

14

Zoom call 12/16/20

Audio Recording

1:25:08

16

Zoom call 10/20/20

Audio Recording

1:14:06

15

DRONES
Category 1: Experts (Industry)

Professor in Faculty of Airspace at the
Technion, Former Senior Systems
Engineer at Raphael
Drone Company Executive (Former
Combat Officer)
Category 2: IAF Pilots
Former Fighter Pilot (Major)
Retired IAF Colonel
Former Fighter Pilot
Former Fighter Pilot, IAF Drone
Squadron Commander

Conducted in person
2/25/20
Conducted in person
2/27/20
Conducted in person
3/2/20
Conducted in person
3/3/20

Category 3: IAF Operators
Former IAF Drone Operator
Former IAF Drone Operator

Conducted in person
2/29/20
Conducted over the phone
3/9/20; 3/11/20

Category 4: Artillery Corps Operators
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator
Former Artillery Corps Drone Operator;
Now Drone Company Executive
Former Artillery Corps Drone Unit
Officer

Conducted over the phone
3/3/20
Conducted via Zoom
10/26/20 and 11/2/20
Conducted via Zoom
11/5/20

COIN
Category 1: Australian Military
Experts/Personnel
General Mick Ryan, Australian Defense
Force. Commander of the
Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) in
Afghanistan.
Brigadier General Christopher Smith,
Australian Defense Force
Professor Michael Evans,
General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of
Military Studies, Australian Defence
College. Lead Author of Australian
Defense Force 2009 Manual,
Counterinsurgency, LWD 3-0-1
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APPENDIX C. OCCUPATIONAL RESTRICTIONS: TYPOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS
Typology of Roles in Armed Forces (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 754):
Category 1: Non-combatant
Historically, women were formally limited to roles deemed “non-combatant,” such as nursing.
Initially, these positions were auxiliary and separated by gender. For example, The British Army
set up the Army Nursing Service after the establishment of the first purpose-build military
hospital staffed by civilian nurses in 1856. More recently, however, these non-combat roles have
been extended to include ‘medicine and “specialties allied to medicine”” (Harries-Jenkins 2002,
754).
Category 2: Combat service
Following the success of women in non-traditional civilian occupations (such as the munitions
industry) during the First World War, and major shortages of male personnel in countries that
suffered very heavy casualty rates, women were recruited to combat service roles. For example,
in 1915 in Britain, an Army Council Instruction (ACI) authorized the employment of women as
uniformed waitresses and cooks in home-based military establishments (Becket 1985, 15;
Harries-Jenkins 2002, 754). Following the official recognition of the Women’s Legion in
February 1916, women also served with the Royal Flying Corps and their occupational specialties
included new technical roles such as “motor dispatch rider” (Hobart 2000, 8; Harries-Jenkins
2002, 755).
Category 3: Combat support
While historically (from the Second World War onwards) these roles tended to concentrate
employment of women in visible areas such as anti-aircraft batteries and operations rooms, in
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reality the majority of women recruited served in communications and logistics occupational
specialties. Increasingly, military establishments recruit women for such positions, utilizing their
“intellectual ability, technical skills and manual dexterity” (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 755).
Category 4: Combat
As militaries become increasingly technological, the distinction between combat support and
combat roles are less clear. Nevertheless, the roles which constitute categories 4, 5 and 6 continue
to be considered “core specialties” within the western military (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 755).
Despite the changing nature of contemporary warfare, combat roles continue to be uniquely
characterized by their identification direct offensive action. Thus, the distinction between military
roles associated with categories 4 and 5, is that between personal and distant combat. Roles such
as aircrew specialties, missile launch operators, and a range of billets on board ships can be
considered are more physically distanced from the fighting (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 755).
Category 5: Direct ground combat
These occupational specialties refer to units whose primary mission is “direct combat on the
ground” and “engage the enemy with individual or crew weapons and with a high probability of
physical contact” (U.S. Department of Defense 1994). Roles such as tank crews or infantry fall
under this category (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 756).
Category 6: Special forces
Roles in special forces differ from conventional military formations in many respects. Acting
independently or integrated with conventional operations, special forces have unique modes of
employment, independence of action, and operational techniques (Harries-Jenkins 2002, 756).
These roles include service in units such as commandos, marines, rangers, airborne, special air
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service, special boat service and SEALS. A key feature of this category is the “common principle
of interoperability,” summarized in the US Marine maxim, “every man a rifleman” (HarriesJenkins 2002, 757). This principle is derived from the environment of operation where, given that
individual units cannot be readily reinforced when casualties are suffered; all personnel must
fight in the primary occupational specialism of combat soldier (irrespective of their individual
occupational specialties). While women have been recruited to these forces to fill combat service
specialties in some instances (in administrative roles or, in the case of the British Royal Marines,
the Band Service), they have been historically excluded from these roles (Harries-Jenkins 2002,
757).
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APPENDIX D. AVERAGE ICI SCORES FOR ALL NATO MEMBER AND PARTNER
COUNTRIES
Table A-2. Average ICI Scores, NATO Member and Partner Countries 1991-2016
Country

Mean

Std. Dev.

Austria
Serbia
Italy
Turkey
Ukraine
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Greece
Georgia
Luxembourg
Estonia
Croatia
Slovakia
Moldova
United States
Japan
Bulgaria
Portugal
Spain
Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Germany
Australia
Albania
Switzerland
Belgium
Slovenia
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
Finland
Ireland
Sweden
France
Canada
Norway
Denmark
New Zealand

4.9
4.95
5.083
5.923
9
10
10
10.667
10.778
11
11
12
12.667
12.667
13
13.211
13.333
13.667
13.667
13.8
13.9
14
14
14.125
14.304
14.333
14.333
14.5
15
15.25
16
16
16
16
16.333
16.444
16.5
17
17

6.402
5.790
6.543
1.055
0
2
0
1.155
0.667
1
1
0
1.528
0.5774
0
1.584
1.155
0.577
0.577
1.874
1.524
0
1
1.088
1.521
1.155
1.155
3.697
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
1.155
0.616
1
0
0

Total

11.785

4.899
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APPENDIX E. EXISTING EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FOR INCLUSION REFORM
Table A-3. Women’s Military Participation: Existing Explanations
Military
Social Structure

(A)
Segal

(B)
Iskra et
al.

(C)
Kümmel

- National security
situation
- Military technology
Combat to support ratio
– Force Structure
- Military accession
policies

- Purpose/function of
the armed forces
- Subculture ideology
- Subculture
demographics
- Military technology
- Organizational
structure
- Military accession
policies

- Changing images of
war
- Military missions
- Military technology
-Combat to support
ratio
- Organizational
structure
- Level of women’s
integration
- Personnel and
accession policies
- Leadership
- Soldierly interaction

International
Environment

Domestic Environment

- Demographic
patterns
- Labor force
characteristics
- Economic
factors
- Family
structure

Demographic
patterns
Labor force
characteristics
Economic
factors
Family
structure

- Demographic
trends
- Structure of
working
population
- Gendered
segregation of
professions
-Economic
development
- Family
patterns

Culture
- Social
construction of
gender and family
- Social values
about gender and
family
- Public discourse
regarding gender
and family
- Values regarding
ascription and
equity
- Social
construction of
military
- Social values
about force, power,
domination
- Social
construction of
gender and family
- Social values
about gender and
family
- Public discourse
regarding gender
- Values regarding
ascription and
equity
- Social
construction of the
family
- Social
construction of
gender roles
- Norm system of
masculinity,
femininity and
family
- Discourse on
gender roles in
society
- Key social values:
power, equity
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Political

- National
security situation
- Civil-military
relations
- Political
ideology
- Current
leadership
- Public policy
regarding race,
ethnicity, gender,
sexuality, etc.
- Sources of
change other
than armed
conflict
- Political system
and leadership
- Modes of
political change
- Policies on
race, ethnicity,
gender and
sexuality
- Political
ideology
- Law
- Media
- Civil-military
relations

- Security
political
context
- Civilmilitary
relations
abroad Armed forces
in foreign
countries International
military
cooperation

(D)
Carreiras

(E)
Obradovic

Strategic Orientations
- National Security
situation (Mission
definition; level of
threat)
Military Culture
- Gender regime of the
armed forces (Military
ethos; values about
war; dominant image of
gender roles,
masculinity in soldier’s
identity)
Organizational
structure
- Dominant
organizational
orientation (Military
accession policies;
force structure;
combat/support ratio;
social diversity of
members)
- Force structure
- Birth rates in the State
and Ratio of Men to
Women
- Percentage of women
in technical and
professional fields
- Lower unemployment
rates

- Demographic
patterns
- Economic
development
- Labor force
characteristics
(women’s labor
force
participation;
occupational
sex
segregation)
- Family
Structure

- Percentage of
women in the
labor force
- Economic
development

- Social
construction of
gender
- Public discourse
- Social
construction of
family

- Level of
women’s
social/political
participation
- Political system
- Civil-military
relations
- Political
ideology of
current
leadership

-International
security
situation Alliance
politics –
“Diffusion
effects”

- Religiosity of
population
(Protestant
population)
- Values regarding
women in business;
women politicians

- Percentage of
women in
legislatures
- Percentage of
women in
ministerial
positions
- Autonomous
women’s
associational
groups involved
in defense policy

- Defensive
military
capabilities
-Participation
in
international
peacekeeping
missions
- NATO
tenure
(original vs.
new
membership)
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